MACULAE TEMPORIS

Ka'ba-ye Zartosht (Cube of Zoroaster)

4.3 Ascesis does not entail the renunciation of living as such, only the renunciation of forms-of-living which are incompatible with the occasioning form-of-living.

4.3.1 Far from a renunciation of living, ascesis is lived out of a devotion to and concern for living.

4.2 In ascesis, the renunciation of a form-of-living is secondary to the living of the lived-experience necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable.

4.1 Insofar as the occasioning form-of-living is incompatible with other forms-of-living, ascesis necessarily entails the renunciation of those incompatible forms-of-living.

4 Two forms-of-living can be said to be 'incompatible' to the extent that the lived-experience which is necessary to render one form-of-living livable also renders the other unlivable.

3.3 There are not ascetic forms-of-living and non-ascetic forms-of-living; rather, a form-of-living is only ascetic to the extent that it is lived in order to live the lived-experience necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable.

3.2 In ascesis, the lived-experience which is necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable is lived through the living of already-livable forms-of-living.

3 A form-of-living is here considered ‘ascetic’ to the extent that it is lived in order to live the lived-experience necessary to render a formerly unlivable form-of-living livable.

3.1 Thus, ascesis has for its occasion an unlivable form-of-living.

1 For each form-of-living, there is a lived-experience which is – or lived-experiences which are – necessary to render it livable.

2 Lived-experience is lived in living.

Here, 'ascesis' is described by means of 'living' in order to unbind it from the (religious, spiritual, moral, athletic, etc.) teloi which often restrict it, thereby making possible the conception of novel forms of ascesis.

4.3.1 Far from a renunciation of living, ascesis is lived out of a devotion to and concern for living.

4.3 Ascesis does not entail the renunciation of living as such, only the renunciation of forms-of-living which are incompatible with the occasioning form-of-living.

4.2 In ascesis, the renunciation of a form-of-living is secondary to the living of the lived-experience necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable.

4.1 Insofar as the occasioning form-of-living is incompatible with other forms-of-living, ascesis necessarily entails the renunciation of those incompatible forms-of-living.

4 Two forms-of-living can be said to be 'incompatible' to the extent that the lived-experience which is necessary to render one form-of-living livable also renders the other unlivable.

3.3 There are not ascetic forms-of-living and non-ascetic forms-of-living; rather, a form-of-living is only ascetic to the extent that it is lived in order to live the lived-experience necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable.

3.2 In ascesis, the lived-experience which is necessary to render the occasioning form-of-living livable is lived through the living of already-livable forms-of-living.

3 A form-of-living is here considered ‘ascetic’ to the extent that it is lived in order to live the lived-experience necessary to render a formerly unlivable form-of-living livable.

3.1 Thus, ascesis has for its occasion an unlivable form-of-living.

1 For each form-of-living, there is a lived-experience which is – or lived-experiences which are – necessary to render it livable.

2 Lived-experience is lived in living.

but, there is a sense in which the flock precedes the shepherd (as it is handed down to them from their ancestors) and will continue to exist after them (as they, too, pass it on). Likewise, it is the primary source of life for the shepherd.

What is a god if not a life-giving, everlasting entity?

flocks are not only sacred to them, but that the sheep and goats are their gods. Longus writes of Chloe: "νομίζουσα τὰς αἶγας καὶ τὰ πρόβατα ποιμένων καὶ αἰπόλων ἰδίους θεούς." [thinking that goats and sheep are the gods proper to those who shepherd them].

Although this point isn't expanded on...

swear a second oath, as she doesn't think Pan offers the best model of committed love. What I find interesting is that she doesn't recommend some other deity to serve as his witness, but instead asks him to swear on their flocks. The book ends with a reflection that for them, as shepherds, their ...

The second book of Longus' Daphnis and Chloe ends with Daphnis and Chloe swearing oaths of love to one another. Initially, Daphnis professes his commitment to Chloe with Pan as his witness, whereas Chloe professes her commitment with the Nymphs as her witness. Chloe asks Daphnis to ...

Fragment of a cuneiform tablet with about 5 surviving but broken lines of text.

“Foolishness, anxiety (“heartbreak”), fear, and fright which I constantly experience in my body, in my flesh…”

A man describes his symptoms to the sun god Shamash in ancient Assyria.

He then exports his experience onto a figurine he has made as part of the treatment. “It is removed from my body!”

which would be required to live in the mountains.

This situation is somewhat reversed later in the film, when the character who said "only you city folks call it nature", discusses the insufficiency of the dialect spoken in the mountains with respect to describing emotion.

in an eco-commune out in nature."

The response – at least on my interpretation – isn't an attempt to manufacture arbitrary superiority, it is rather a means of distinguishing their respective forms of life. The point is that the language used by this character is indicative of a lack of experience

I didn't include the statement from the film which prompted this response in my original post, but it was from a man who lived his whole life in the city and had no experience living in the mountains. He said something to the effect of: "we should invite all of our friends from the city to live

distanced forms of life, and that more general abstractions necessarily obfuscate more than more particular ones.

form of life is far removed from those same aspects of the world (i.e. the carpenter vs. the person without carpentry experience). The point is not that abstraction isn't useful/necessary, but rather that there are levels of abstraction and that these levels (often) correspond to more or less

Following Wittgenstein, one's language – and the abstractions one employs – correspond to one's form of life. For one whose form of life is intimately connected to some aspect of the world, the language/abstractions they utilize to describe this aspect will be more specific than one whose