Liviu Horovitz

Poland seeks as much autonomy as possible in terms of nuclear arms, Tusk says Poland wants to be autonomous in the future when ​it comes to a nuclear deterrent, Prime ‌Minister Donald Tusk said on Tuesday, as Europe seeks to build its capabilities independently of the United St...

Tusk: "We ​are investing heavily in future nuclear power plants, and ​Poland will not want to be passive when it comes to nuclear security in a military context."

"We will cooperate with our allies...as our capabilities increase, ‌we ⁠will try to prepare Poland for autonomous action in this matter."

Mein Versuch, nukleare Abschreckung in Europa weiterzudenken.

Eine Umsetzung ist derzeit höchst unwahrscheinlich – aber wir brauchen innovative Ideen jenseits ausgetretener Pfade.

Kritik & weitere "verrückte Ansätze" herzlich willkommen!

OUT NOW: Mind the Deterrence Gap: Assessing Europe's Nuclear Options.

A new report by the European Nuclear Study Group assessing #Europe 's options to maintain a credible deterrence posture in the face of continued aggression from #Russia and an increasingly strained transatlantic relationship.

👇

It was a real pleasure to collaborate on this with an outstanding group of colleagues! I’m looking forward to discussing it in Munich at #MSC2026. Europe’s nuclear choices are complex, consequential, and will require sustained work.

New START: Liviu Horovitz (SWP) über Modernisierung von Atomwaffen in Europa

Das letzte große Abkommen zur nuklearen Abrüstung "New START" läuft heute aus. Droht jetzt ein atomares Wettrüsten? Welche Rolle spielen die Atommächte GB und Frankreich künftig? Darüber spricht @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social im DLF: www.deutschlandfunk.de/new-start-li...

@smetanamichal.bsky.social and @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social introduced our chronology of nuclear signaling between Russia and NATO during the war in Ukraine in a recent episode of Ukraine: The Latest @telegraph.co.uk!

🎧 Listen here: open.spotify.com/episode/2Ycr...

@ims.fsv.cuni.cz

Just read this again, slowly.

What nuclear signaling did Russia vs. NATO use during the first 3 years of Ukraine war? We systematically tracked these statements in our recent study with @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social. Join us for our event on Jan 27 for a study presentation and a discussion with authors! More info below 👇

The Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) in Hamburg is offering a number of research positions in security/conflict/peace

www.ifsh.de/en/career

Over the past 3 years, a growing body of literature has emerged on the nuclear aspects of Russia’s war against Ukraine. We hope our empirical work will anchor various debates more firmly in systematic evidence, making them more clearly grounded in what the available data can and cannot show. 7/7

We identified 282 Russian signals & 170 Western ones. The lion's share (114) of Russian nuclear signals falls into the category of nuclear escalation-risk signaling. Most Western signals were aimed at deterring Russian nuclear use (38) or de-escalating tensions (37). 6/7

With the new dataset, we used an inductive approach to develop a novel taxonomy of Nuclear Escalation Relevant Signals (NERS). We focused on the content or form of the signal, aiming to develop mutually exclusive categories. This approach yielded 8 categories of NERS for Russia & 8 for the West. 5/7

For the more than three years from autumn 21 to January 25, we identified, evaluated & coded over 450 nuclear-relevant signals - statements & actions related to nuclear issues. The 553 pages also include hundreds of other potentially relevant exchanges. Yet we do not claim to be exhaustive. 4/7

Peace Research Center Prague - Charles University Center of Excellence This working paper by SWP and PRCP chronologically traces nuclear signaling in Russia’s war against Ukraine from autumn 2021 to January 2025, coding 452 Russian and Western public statements. Re...

This is the Chronology's 5th update.
The 1st version appeared in German in May 22. The 2nd iteration went online in September 22. The 3rd version was published in February 23. The 4th version was released in August 23.
However, for this update we created a NEW taxonomy & recoded ALL the data. 3/7

This was a Big Team effort. Michal Smetana and I would like to thank our many co-authors: Karina Matvienko, Anna Arndt, Ayesha Zafar, Alexandra von Vultejus, Pars Peikert, Sara Camussi, Martha Stolze, and Larissa Kirstein. We estimate that around 14 person-months went into this update. 2/7

I am thrilled the newest "Russia's Nuclear Signaling" Chronology is published! Really glad @smetanamichal.bsky.social came onboard 15 months ago to continue this important work. A big thank you to all @swp-berlin.org @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social #STAND & @prcp.cuni.cz for making this possible! 1/7

📄 Just published: Our latest study with @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social #STAND provides a comprehensive chronology of nuclear signaling in the Ukraine war. We found that Russia amplified perceptions of nuclear escalation, while NATO focused primarily on deterring nuclear use. Read more 👇

Gelingt es Washington, eine glaubwürdige Abschreckung gegenüber Russland und China aufrechtzuerhalten? Kann sich Europa weiter auf den nuklearen Schutzschirm der USA verlassen? Darüber spricht @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social im SWP-Podcast: www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...

Lessons From Los Alamos America has the most to lose from restarting nuclear testing.

Despite early skepticism that a no-test era could keep the arsenal reliable, decades of stockpile stewardship proved more effective—yielding deeper scientific understanding than testing ever did. Resuming tests now would bring risks, not benefits, argues Siegfried Hecker @foreignaffairs.com 10/10

US, Russia & China run subcritical tests & keep test-readiness, risking misinterpretation. The US alleged Russia may be doing hard-to-verify hydronuclear tests. If this drove Trump’s rhetoric, it is better to address the issue — not resume tests, argues Daryl Kimball @armscontrolnow.bsky.social 9/10

Despite turbulent rhetoric over US security guarantees and Europe’s push to bolster deterrence with France & the UK, both sides still invest in NATO nuclear-sharing—observable when it comes to upgraded dual-capable aircraft & gravity bombs, argue Alex Bollfrass & Annemiek Dols 8/10

The EU Space Act: a call for true strategic fairness The EU Space Act: a call for true strategic fairness

The EU Space Act could be an important step toward strategic autonomy & European sovereignty — but only if Europe prioritizes industrial autonomy, which means putting European tech, launch systems & services first, while also cutting red tape, argues Olivier Lemaitre @spacenewsinc.bsky.social 7/10

China launched Shijian-28, its latest in a series of experimental, often opaque satellites, with little information known, while first planned Chinese orbital launch and booster recovery attempt was postponed indefinitely for unknown reasons, reports @spacenewsinc.bsky.social 6/10

China has minimal nuclear arsenal, seeks no arms race with US: white paper Document criticises Trump’s planned Golden Dome system, saying it would ‘pose a serious threat to outer space security’.

In its new White Paper on nuclear policy, China claims it does not seek a nuclear arms race, reiterates its minimum deterrence & no-first use, opposes deployments of missiles in Asia & warns the US Golden Dome initiative threatens outer space security, reports @scmpnews.bsky.social 5/10

Most Democrats and one-third of Republicans think it’s likely the U.S. will get into a nuclear war in the next decade | YouGov Republicans are more than twice as likely as Democrats to say the U.S. possessing nuclear weapons makes them feel safer.

Most Americans now see nuclear war as possible in the next decade: 57% of Democrats & 37% of Republicans. Democrats are more worried about such a war (77% vs 58%) & they’re far more likely to want Congress involved in any nuclear-launch decision (63% vs 25%), finds the @today.yougov.com poll 4/10

The missile meant to strike fear in Russia’s enemies fails once again One of Vladimir Putin’s favorite sabres to rattle seems to have lost its edge.

Russia’s latest ICBM test crashed seconds after launch, likely another failure of the RS-28 Sarmat. The “doomsday weapon” meant to replace aging Soviet missiles keeps floundering, raising doubts about Russia’s future nuclear readiness as its arsenal ages, notes Stephen Clark @arstechnica.com 3/10

Arrow: Das kann das Raketenabwehrsystem Arrow Es arbeitet nach dem "Hit to Kill"-Prinzip und soll auch Europa schützen: Mit dem Raketenabwehrsystem Arrow aus Israel will Deutschland Verteidigungslücken schließen.

The US-Israeli Arrow missile-defense system, procured by Germany to intercept intermediate-range Russian missiles, has reached initial operational capability, reports @zeit.de t.ly/nxdHh. Ex-STAND Lydia Wachs pointed out a number of concerns about Arrow’s suitability for this threat t.ly/xBSnA 2/10

Arrow & Germany, Russian Sarmat, US & nukes, Chinese nuclear policy & satellites, EU Space Act, US security guarantees & testing in our very last STAND newsletter, a project by @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social on recent news & analyses to better #underSTAND #nuclear #space #deterrence & #threats 1/10

Nuclear Negotiations This volume studies nuclear negotiations and diplomacy from a negotiation perspective providing key insights for effective nuclear negotiations

This volume, edited by Isaak Swensson & Ulrika Möller, examines multilateral nuclear negotiations, seeking to uncover what makes them effective. Each chapter explores essential dimensions of nuclear diplomacy & the key empirical challenges of the field 10/10

The era of “peace dividends” is over, and questions of nuclear deterrence are once again relevant – Admiral Bernard Rogel examines the French nuclear deterrent through a European lens #FondationRobertSchuman 9/10