Australien hat als erstes Land der Welt Konten in sozialen Medien für unter 16-Jährigen verboten. Eltern atmen auf. Zu früh?
Reportage aus Melbourne und Sydney in @spiegel.de (10-mal frei)
www.spiegel.de/ausland/aust...
“The first thing Xi said to Merz was that unification with Taiwan would happen,” one person who was on the trip told me. This triggered what one diplomat described to me as an “intensive discussion” between the two leaders on Taiwan.
Die drittgrößte Volkswirtschaft der Welt macht sich klein: In Peking schrumpft der Kanzler den Krieg mitten in Europa zur »Ukraine-Frage«. Auch sonst wählte Friedrich Merz bei Xi Jinping zu weiche Worte.
Kommentar @spiegel.de (10-mal frei)
www.spiegel.de/ausland/mein...
Friedrich Merz reist nach Peking. Vorher bat er eine Runde von Chinakennern zum Abendessen. Einer von ihnen ist der in Taiwan lebende Schriftsteller Stephan Thome. Im Interview @spiegel.de sagt er, auf welchen Kanzler-Satz er gegenüber Xi Jinping hofft.
(10-mal frei)
www.spiegel.de/ausland/frie...
Merz reist nach China. Get ready for Jahr-des-Pferdes-Artikeleinstiege
Xi stürzt seinen mächtigsten Soldaten. Vielleicht der Letzte, der sich traute, ihm zu widersprechen. Unser @spiegel.de Report über Chinas größte Führungskrise seit Jahren.
Thanks to Dennis Wilder, @josephtorigian.bsky.social, @ktristantang.bsky.social for weighing in
www.spiegel.de/ausland/chin...
Er war Xi Jinpings rechte Hand in Uniform, jetzt werden Chinas oberstem Soldaten Zhang Youxia »schwere Disziplinar- und Gesetzesverstöße« vorgeworfen. Das Misstrauen des Machthabers gegen seine Armee reicht tief.
Diese Nachricht ist groß. Mehr bei @spiegel.de 👇
www.spiegel.de/ausland/chin...
Das Taipei 101 war einst das größte Hochhaus der Welt. Nun will ein Extremkletterer es erklimmen – ungesichert, live auf Netflix. Porträt eines Turms, in dem Dumpling-Köche und Börsenmakler arbeiten, Zahnärzte und deutsche Diplomaten. @spiegel.de
www.spiegel.de/ausland/umst...
China quietly mobilized thousands of fishing boats twice in recent weeks to form massive floating barriers of at least 200 miles long, showing a new level of coordination that could give Beijing more ways to impose control in contested seas.
I have done so little For you. And you have do little For me. That we have good reason Never to agree. I, however, Have such meagre power, Clutching at a Moment, While you control An hour. But your hour is A stone. My moment is A flower. -Langston Hughes, "Poet to Bigot"
I, however,
Have such meagre power,
Clutching at a
Moment,
While you control
An hour.
But your hour is
A stone.
My moment is
A flower.
-Langston Hughes, "Poet to Bigot"
#everynightapoem As ever.
Long, long time ago... I can still remember how that music used to make me feel
Takaichi posted the picture too, adding that Lee and she played “Dynamite” by BTS.
x.com/takaichi_san...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdZL...
South Korean president Lee and Japanese prime minister Takaichi playing drums in matching tracksuits.
It’s pretty remarkable to see a left-wing South Korean president and a right-wing Japanese prime minister like this.
Source: Lee Jae Myung on X x.com/Jaemyung_Lee...
Exklusiv-Begleitung von Chrupallas China-Reise durch den BLZ-Chefredakteur. Artikelthemen: Verlorener Koffer am Gepäckband, mitgebrachte Leberwurstbrote, wörtliche Wiedergabe eines von Chrupalla kolportierten AfD-freundlichen Zitats eines KP-Vizeministers.
www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik-gese...
China ist einer von Venezuelas wichtigsten Partnern. Wie blickt Peking auf die Maduro-Entführung durch die USA? Asienexpertin @bglaser.bsky.social glaubt nicht, dass China eine Aufteilung der Welt in Einflusssphären will – und erklärt, warum der Taiwan-Vergleich hinkt.
www.spiegel.de/ausland/vene...
Crockett: "Everyone wants to talk about how Maduro was illegitimate. As we sit here on January 6, I do want to be clear: somebody else was trying to be a Maduro of the United States. Somebody else wanted to do the exact same thing. The difference is Maduro was successful."
Was stimmt: Sollte China mal kriegerisch gg. Taiwan vorgehen, wird es das nach außen leichter propagandistisch verkaufen können. Pekings innere Taiwan-Konzeption verwandelt sich nun aber nicht zu „Jetzt dürfen wir auch“. Denn Peking glaubt eh, dass es „darf“.
Frage ist nicht dürfen, sondern können.
Auch die Analyse, dass gemäß „Donroe-Doktrin“ die USA nun nur über „ihre” Hemisphäre verfügen wollen und im Umkehrschluss China automatisch Ostasien überlassen, hat neben validen Punkten ihre Schwächen. Trumps National Security Strategy legt viel Aufmerksamkeit auf China. Der US-Kongress sehr viel.
Der US-Angriff auf Venezuela wird Chinas Blick auf Taiwan nicht grundlegend verändern. Peking war schon immer überzeugt davon, dass es ein Herrschaftsrecht über Taiwan habe, das eine *inländische* Sache sei (Taiwan widerspricht mit Recht). Relevanter: Wie stark verheddern sich die USA in Südamerika?
www.spiegel.de/ausland/vene...
I am horrified that the United States continues to set precedent for China to take unilateral action against Taiwan.
It isn’t 疑美論, it is 怕美論.
Wir sind besorgt über die jüngsten militärischen Übungen Chinas rund um #Taiwan. Jegliche Änderung des Status quo darf nur friedlich und in gegenseitigem Einvernehmen erfolgen. Die Bundesregierung ruft zu Zurückhaltung und Dialog auf. Ganze Erklärung 👉 diplo.de/2750632
Today, a lawyer for DHS suggested sending Guan Heng to Uganda, a country with close ties to China that is "more likely than not" to send him back, says Mr. Guan's lawyer. Due to increased public attention to the case, he has been scheduled for a 2nd hearing on Jan 12. www.nytimes.com/2025/12/15/u...
The security of Asia and Europe is closely intertwined. Free movement of goods in the Taiwan Strait is important for prosperity in Europe and worldwide. An escalation there would also affect us. Any change to the status quo must be non-violent and consensual. @aussenminister.diplo.de
Such wording is often much more than pure semantics. As a reminder, Xi has apparently been chasing a big concession from Trump: that the U.S. say it “opposes” Taiwan independence rather than just “does not support”, as @lingling-wei.bsky.social reported here.
www.wsj.com/world/china/...
For example, the State Department said this in April:
www.state.gov/response-to-...
I’m thinking about why this says the U.S. “does not support” unilateral change to Taiwan‘s status quo. Why not “opposes”, as the U.S. has said before?
Purposeful, yet diplomatically veiled, softening of U.S. position as a concession to Beijing? Overthinking?Thoughts?
PDF: www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u...
In the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict. A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible. A related security challenge is the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea. This could allow a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce or—worse—to close and reopen it at will. Either of those two outcomes would be harmful to the U.S. economy and broader U.S. interests. Strong measures must be developed along with the deterrence necessary to keep those lanes open, free of “tolls,” and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country. This will require not just further investment in our military—especially naval—capabilities, but also strong cooperation with every nation that stands to suffer, from India to Japan and beyond, if this problem is not addressed.
Given President Trump’s insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain. We will also harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific, while in our dealings with Taiwan and Australia we maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending. Preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific, a renewed defense industrial base, greater military investment from ourselves and from allies and partners, and winning the economic and technological competition over the long term.
The Trump admin’s new National Security Security prioritises the Western Hemisphere, but does devote significant space to Asia & the Indo-Pacific.
The China portions are focused on trade imbalances. But there’s also quite a bit on military deterrence.
Here are the parts on Taiwan (emphasis added):
Ahead of 🇩🇪 FM Wadephul’s Beijing trip next week, our Morning Briefing features experts from 🇯🇵, 🇹🇼 & 🇩🇪 to unpack rising Taiwan Strait tensions, EU/German de-risking, Beijing’s posture, and what this means for Europe’s China policy.
Watch it here: 👇
youtu.be/cHeFOQv9byo
