John Barresi

I will try to contact you soon. First, I need to learn more about Arendt's use of the term Amor Mundi. My work compares Descartes and Kafka, contrasting the disembodied 'self' and "nowhere" in Descartes to the embodied 'self' and "somewhere" in Kafka. Arendt appears importantly in the work.

Thanks. I might give it a try to contact her. But, she seems pretty busy from the looks of her CV. I'll think about it.

Love the idea of this talk. I've been working on a related idea. Do you know of an online version of this or a previous talk on the same topic? I can't find anything in Barwich's 2025 CV on this topic.

Arendt interprets Kafka's Archimedean point as the cosmic viewpoint of Galileo (and Descartes), which views humans as natural phenomena to be studied by material science. Kafka may agree with Arendt's intended critique of science, but I think this quote refers to himself, not to 'man' in general.

"Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, uses this quote from Kafka to claim: "If ...we return ...to the discovery of the Archimedean point and apply it, as Kafka warned us not to do, to man himself ... all his activities, ... would appear not as activities of any kind but as processes." (HC 322)"

What do you think Kafka meant by this Jan 1920 Diary entry that was included in the “He” aphorisms?   “He has found the Archimedean point, but has used it against himself. Evidently it was only on this condition that he was allowed to find it.” (Crick, Hunger Artist 201)."

@franz-kafka.bsky.social

I tried to post on this website before, but I can't find it on there now. Maybe it was deleted.

I'm hoping to engage in discussion with other people interested in Kafka's life and works.

Here is my first attempted post. I answer it later on.

bsky.app/profile/jbar...

His aphorism was not merely about rejecting an objective Cartesian science based on reason and a return to Arendt's 'human condition' but about finding a deeper ‘indestructible’ personal and situated human truth that could be discovered through creative acts involving language and intuition.

Since no one else has responded to my question, here is a brief hypothesis:

Kafka likely had Descartes’ Archimedean assertion in mind but inverted it. Instead of self-certainty of a thinking "I" or ego as the Archimedean point, he saw the conscious ego as a significant obstacle to overcome. (1/2)

Randomness, Not Representation: The Unreliability of Evaluating Cultural Alignment in LLMs Research on the 'cultural alignment' of Large Language Models (LLMs) has emerged in response to growing interest in understanding representation across diverse stakeholders. Current approaches to eval...

Try again:

arxiv.org/abs/2503.086...

Sorry. The address doesn't work as is, so try:

arXiv:2503.08688

Through experiments examining ... preferences of leading LLMs, we find a high level of instability..., incoherence , and erratic behavior...These inconsistencies can cause the results of an evaluation to be very sensitive to minor variations in methodology.

arXiv:2503.08688v2 [cs.CY] 8 Apr 2025

Arendt interprets Kafka's Archimedean point as the cosmic viewpoint of Galileo (and Descartes), which views humans as natural phenomena to be studied by material science. Kafka may agree with Arendt's intended critique of science, but I think this quote refers to himself, not to 'man' in general.

Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, uses this quote from Kafka to claim:
"If ...we return ...to the discovery of the Archimedean point and apply it, as Kafka warned us not to do, to man himself ... all his activities, ... would appear not as activities of any kind but as processes." (HC 322)

@franz-kafka.bsky.social

What do you think Kafka meant by this Jan 1920 Diary entry that was included in the “He” aphorisms?
 
“He has found the Archimedean point, but has used it against himself. Evidently it was only on this condition that he was allowed to find it.” (Crick, Hunger Artist 201).

(PDF) Types of Intentionality in Humans vs. AI Systems and Robots: Implications for AI and Robotic Personhood PDF | AI in Society provides an interdisciplinary corpus for understanding artificial intelligence (AI) as a global phenomenon that transcends... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Res...

I've posted it on ResearchGate:

www.researchgate.net/publication/...

My latest publication just came out:
Barresi, J. (2025). “Types of Intentionality in Humans vs. AI Systems and Robots: Implications for AI and Robotic Personhood.” Samantha-Kaye Johnston, David J Gunkel (Eds.), Oxford Intersections: AI and Society; Personhood, March 20, 2025. doi.org/10.1093/9780...

Opps. My answer to this comment is attached to my previous comment.

I guess you are right. The feeling and its NCC have the same causal power. But consequences downstream might more easily be tracked by considering bodily movements that follow rationally from conscious thoughts than by trying to find these temporally distant causal relations from NCCs alone.

Feeling pain is an after effect of the cause of pain. This feeling can have an after effect of moving away from the cause of the pain if moving is not already a consequence. Immediate NCCs of conscious experience are the wrong temporal correlates for finding the causal consequences of consciousness.

Thanks for your response. I'm still skeptical about the possibility. There are people who are able to 'update' their personality profiles without any memories of the events involved (See S. Klein's, Two Selves). However, this odd situation occurs after loss of normal episodic memory connections.

How is this possible. It seems that sapience depends on having sentience and personal identity across time depends on having sapience.

My research shows that acting based on preferences of a future self develops in 4.5 year olds, while 3.5 year olds act on preferences of a present self.

In the interview you say:
"[S]apience is our ability to reflect on those sensations, and selfhood is about our ability to abstract a sense of ourselves as existing in time. ...with AI we might get a lot of that sapience, ... and might even get forms of selfhood without any sentience at all." 2/x

Moreover, without a reflexive or reflective power of being aware of its own thoughts and memory for past thoughts, it could not have any knowledge of its own existence through time.

I read the article but not your book. I'm puzzled how one could possibly identify an entity with reflective consciousness of their identity through time, without this entity also having sentience and the reflexive and reflective capacity to be aware of and think about this sentience. 1 of x

Opps! Sorry. I may have got off on the wrong foot with "phenomenal content". Not sure what that means for @metzinger.bsky.social . To me it is a kind of qualia in theories of consciousness. It is phenomenological content that I think of as experiential content. This involves embodiment in the world.

Let me add that the person who perceives the world is a physical being that world. The person, not the mind, has an experiential relation to the world in which these concrete objects and relations occur. This is the phenomenological ground for all knowledge of the physical world that we can have.

Brain, world, light & sound are concrete. So their physical relations are also concrete. Their phenomenal & representational relations are abstract.

It's concrete because its a relational state to the world not a representational state. The brain is concrete as is the world of perception. One relates to the other through perception. Representational states of the brain/mind are abstractions of this process as is their conceptual world 'content.'

Opps! Try: www.researchgate.net/profile/John-Barresi/research