No. Moral realism is the position that there are stance-independent moral facts. Naturalism is a specific form of moral realism which holds that those stance-independent moral facts are natural facts, meaning (roughly) that they are consistent with the natural sciences (like atoms).
Some features of English best accord with a subjectivist interpretation of ordinary moral language. I discuss this with Nils Franzen here:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OUfH...
I'll check it out. Thanks.
Is it this one? Broome, J. (2021). Giving reasons and given reasons. Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, 209-308.
Yea, Parfit is one of the people I have in mind with the post. This talk of reasons simpliciter is, I think, simply confused.
New post on why I don't think there are irreducibly normative reasons:
www.lanceindependent.com/p/there-are-...
W00t!
Really enjoyed talking to @lanceindependent.bsky.social face to face. My first philosophy stream! Lance was a great host, my apologies for the poor audio on my end, especially the first half. www.youtube.com/live/z6OFkWz...
Lance Bush @lanceindependent.bsky.social and I wrote a takedown of "intuitions" as a normatively-laden concept deserving justificatory weight out of the gate. It's past time to give that notion the heave-ho.
open.substack.com/pub/lanceind...
Really? I mostly encounter moral realists. Where are all the antirealists at?
Nah.
I don't believe moral realism is true. Why do we have to believe it is true?
Congratulations to @simine.com well deserved winner of the Einstein Foundation Individual Award for Promoting Quality in Research 2025 🎉 www.einsteinfoundation.de/en/media/pre...
Weirdly, I can't seem to locate the paper. How do I find it? It's not turning up in literally any search results or me at all.
Hahahahaha we’re fucked.
My blog is back! Stan Patton and I wrote our most recent piece on intuitions, which may put an end to the intuition wars on Substack for good (they won't, but one can dream):
www.lanceindependent.com/p/the-intuit...
Stan did the bulk of the work here, as well as creating all the images.
What I’d like to see philosophers do is taboo the use of “intuition” when writing essays or having conversations for a while, and see how that goes. What do you end up having to do to clarify what you are saying? I suspect the answer would be very informative.
There was this old suggestion from the rationality community from back in the day where you “taboo” a word (and any obvious synonym). This can put pressure on you to get clear about what you mean.
Congrats!!!
Correct.
Hell yea I second that one.
Have you read Neil Sinclair's paper on the presumption in favor of realism? (Assuming that's what you are referring to)
About what? Evolutionary debunking arguments or metaethics in general?
I defend the indeterminacy thesis with respect to the meaning of ordinary moral claims: specifically, ordinary moral claims do not best fit a realist or antirealist analysis.
As a result, all standard metaethical positions in the realism/antirealism disputes are mistaken.
The notion of normative "reasons" commonly employed by analytic philosophers is meaningless, as is the notion of irreducible normativity.
As a result, standard forms of non-naturalist moral realism aren't even false; they are not even an intelligible position.
Shokz. I recommend the Open Run Pro (I think they're on v2). They're very useful and are also good for phone calls.
Also they help with my tinnitus.
I've had these for years and they are great. Incidentally, they also have excellent mic quality and are great for phone calls.
That's a good way to distinguish them. Unfortunately the term "objective" isn't consistently used that way and I see it tossed around in other ways all over the place. I wish philosophers could all agree to use at least some terms more consistently.
I may have listened to quite a few of those. I mostly recall your discussions with Spencer Case.
