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01.08.2025 17:41
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I don't see the contradiction between "I don't owe you X" and "if you're not an asshole, I'll give you X".
It's my policy on Halloween candy, for instance. I don't owe it to anyone, but if they're not an asshole, I'll give them some.
Last semester, I taught a graduate seminar on Bayesian epistemology. Here are my lecture notes:
jdmitrigallow.com/teaching/epist25/aitbe.pdf
Look, I agree with you, but the strategy for persuading OP has to be "ultimately, insincerity isn't a good strategy". She's never gonna go for "I just say what I think".
Video of a talk I gave at USC's Information Science Institute. It's meant to give an opinionated overview of the developments in the philosophy of causation over the past 30 years.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rqt...
Next was a thought-provoking talk by @dmitrigallow.bsky.social on recent developments in the philosophy of causation at the USC Information Sciences Institute www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rqt... (3/6)
This is my favorite song about my home state of Georgia, but since moving to LA, I can't really enjoy it in the same way.
For every cardinal size, a set of things that size could but does not exist
Way more
You can supervise any number of grad students, but only a certain number of dissertations. You just need to start encouraging your students to coauthor dissertations.
That was my first choice
Yes
I reserve "decision" for the situation you are in when you have to select an option and "choice" for the selection you make. I don't think that distinction is there is ordinary English.
I hope that, in the future, we're more focused on the philosophy than the philosophers.
This paper, offering two game-theoretic arguments against Uniqueness in epistemology, is now forthcoming in Erkenntnis.
#philsky
brian.weatherson.org/quarto/posts...
Jefferson dodges the real question of whether the distance between error and suspension is greater than the distance between suspension and truth
I believe this is just the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox, but Kenny and Snow keep telling me there's more to it that I'm missing
Using the cdf avoids the Bertrand style paradoxes, but won't (1) imply that, for a uniform distribution over (0,1), 1/4 is less likely than 3/4, conditional on their disjunction? For the cdf, F(x) = Prob(X <= x) = x. So, conditional on 1/4 or 3/4, it's 1/4 likely to be 1/4.
...But given the implied distribution over X^2, it's intuitive that the probability of X^2=1/4 is greater than the probably of X^2=9/4, conditional on their disjunction.
... For instance, given a uniform distribution over X (which takes values between 0 and 2) it's intuitive that the probability of X=1/2 is the probability of X=3/2, conditional on their disjunction...
I heard about the argument from Brian Hedden, but when I went looking I couldn't find it in the de Finetti.
One reason to worry about the argument: as Wayne Myrvold points out, similar uniformity judgements conditional on prob zero events face Bertrand-style paradoxes...
I have been told that de finetti makes that argument against countable additivity
