Niall Hughes

Reposting this thread as the paper has just come out in the latest print edition of AER :)
www.aeaweb.org/issues/828

We're a smallish (30 or so) but growing department. Just this year we hired Kfir Eliaz, Felipe González, Michael Amior and Nilesh Fernando.
For info on the dept check out www.kcl.ac.uk/political-ec... 2/2

We're hiring a Full Prof in Economics (open-field) at the Econ dept in King's Business School. Come join us in central London - apply here: econjobmarket.org/positions/12... #Econsky 1/2

QPE 2025-2026 seminar lineup

🔥 Excited to share our 2025/26 QPE Seminar lineup!

Externals welcome. Please get in touch at bouke.klein_teeselink@kcl.ac.uk or teresa.estebancasanelles@kcl.ac.uk.

📅 Full schedule 👇

The overall message: Legislative elections outperform single-district elections in a world with multiple dimensions of policy.

Read the full paper, here tinyurl.com/2nsnj438 #EconSky #Elections 14/14

On (ii), I show that increased polarisation does not affect outcomes in legislative elections (policies remain optimal), but it can change outcomes (for better or worse) in single-district elections. 13/14

On (i), I show that parliamentary systems typically result in higher utility for median voters than presidential systems. 12/14

There's much more in the paper (& appendix). I apply the model to two key political debates:

(i) Which system of government is more representative: parliamentary or presidential?

(ii) What is the effect of voter polarisation on outcomes? 11/14

The result? The implemented policy is the one preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension.

3) There's a welfare windfall: Condorcet winner policies are guaranteed to be implemented in legislative elections, but not in single-district ones. 🏆 10/14

2) Policy Outcomes are *more representative*.

In single-district elections, candidates take party loyalists for granted. But in a legislative election, every type of voter is a swing voter. This forces one candidate to offer a platform with majority support on both issues. 9/14

1) Outcomes are *more predictable*.

In legislative elections, candidate platforms and the final policy are uniquely pinned down by voter preferences. In single-district elections, candidates often use mixed strategies, meaning platforms and final policy can be random. 8/14

OK, but does this different voter behaviour have any meaningful effects?

Yes. I show that the behaviour of conflicted voters has substantial effects on the platforms that candidates choose and on the final implemented policy.

Here are three key ways. 👇 7/14

I show that in large elections, voters should focus exclusively on the issue where they are most likely to be pivotal.

Preference intensity is irrelevant! 🤯 It doesn't matter how much you care about one issue over the other; only where your vote has the most impact. 6/14

But in a *legislative* election (for Congress or Parliament), the logic differs. A strategic voter needs to ask:

"What is the relative likelihood that my district swings the legislative majority on one issue versus the other?" 5/14

In a *single-district* election (like for a President or Mayor), the answer is simple. You should vote for the candidate whose overall policy "bundle" you prefer.

In this case, your preference intensity matters. You weigh the issues and pick the lesser of two evils. 4/14

This raises the question: how should you vote if you’re conflicted, liking Candidate A on one issue but Candidate B on the other?

Does the correct choice depend on the type of election you’re voting in? (Spoiler, I show it does). 3/14

Voters often face a choice between candidates who differ on more than the traditional left/right party split; they may have different platforms on some other issue (e.g. social issues, foreign wars, globalisation, immigration...) 2/14

For those interested, here's a thread explaining the paper's core ideas 👇 @aeajournals.bsky.social 1/14

great stuff Benjamin

Looking forward to great talks from Vera Troeger, @edogrillo.bsky.social, Yongping Bao, Margherita Negri, @cubel.bsky.social, Margherita Negri, @phildent80.bsky.social , Jeannette Brosig-Koch, and Gerald Eisenkopf.

Organised by @sfehrler.bsky.social, Torben Klarl, Olexandr Nikolaychuk, Maik Schneider, @markustepe.bsky.social and me. With thanks to DIFIS, @sfb1342.bsky.social, @unibremen.bsky.social, @uni-graz.at , @kingsbschool.bsky.social.

Happy to share the programme for the 9th edition of the "Political Economy: Theory meets Empirics" workshop, taking place over the next 2 days in Bremen, Germany. #EconSky

thanks Anja!

🚨 Thrilled to share that my paper is forthcoming in the American Economic Review. I'm immensely grateful to the editor Sylvain Chassang, excellent referees, and colleagues who provided valuable feedback along the way. I’ll post more on the paper and its findings in the coming days. 🥳

A great read - thanks

Great list. Thanks for sharing

Professor in Economics

We're hiring profs (open field) at the econ dept of King's Business School - we also have lecturer, senior lecturer, and reader positions (those are on econjobmarket) #econsky