European hesitation to condemn the illegality of US–Israeli strikes on Iran weakens the credibility of Europe’s (entirely justified) legal critique of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Yes, one can oppose the Iranian regime and still insist international law be applied consistently.
One year ago, I wrote this policy brief for
@nupinytt.bsky.social, arguing for a stronger European maritime footprint from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz.
Today, calls for a sustained European naval presence sound louder than ever.
Perhaps worth (re)reading: www.nupi.no/en/publicati...
𝟏𝟎 𝐓𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐲𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐞𝐥 𝐨𝐧 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 & 𝐃𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐭 @munsecconf.bsky.social
𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕: 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚
1/ European defence spending has increased significantly. The real test now is output — how fast and effectively we deliver capabilities.
@nupinytt.bsky.social
@kiel.institute
@fasosmaastricht.bsky.social
10/ Industrial ambition without political backing fails; political ambition without industrial alignment fails too. Ukraine reminds us: what is not battle-tested will not perform.
𝑶𝒏 𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕
9/ National industrial reflexes — particularly in aerospace — continue to fragment Europe’s defence landscape and limit scale.
𝑶𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒇𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒇𝒂𝒓𝒆
7/ Europe needs far stronger and more structured knowledge exchange between armed forces and industry on future warfare.
8/ European armed forces cannot simply mirror US capability development. Europe must define its own operational vision and priorities.
𝑶𝒏 𝒓𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔
5/ Procurement processes too often separate users from producers — weakening feedback loops and slowing innovation.
6/ Current rules reward risk-aversion and procedural compliance over speed, iteration, and adaptability.
4/ Europe must go beyond incumbents and systematically integrate start-ups and new entrants into defence procurement.
𝑶𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
2/ Europe must allocate a substantially larger share of defence budgets to innovation procurement.
3/ Governments should define operational problems — not engineer solutions top-down. Create space for industry to innovate.
𝟏𝟎 𝐓𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐲𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐞𝐥 𝐨𝐧 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 & 𝐃𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐭 @munsecconf.bsky.social
𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒇𝒕: 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒐 𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒚
1/ European defence spending has increased significantly. The real test now is output — how fast and effectively we deliver capabilities.
Off to Munich for some hopefully insightful discussions on industrial readiness and defence procurement 👇
@munsecconf.bsky.social
It hasn’t received much attention, but Hungary’s request for a 17,4 billion euros loan under the #SAFE mechanism has recently been suspensed due to risks of corruption.
The country that keeps blocking EU assistance to Ukraine gets a taste of their own medicine.
I am very pleased to co-organise this panel on Industrial Readiness and Defence Procurement as an official side event at the @munsecconf.bsky.social, together with @kiel.institute and @nupinytt.bsky.social!
Sat. 14 Feb, 09:30–10:15
Bar Montez, Rosewood Hotel
Get in touch if you want more info!
I am very pleased to co-organise this panel on Industrial Readiness and Defence Procurement as an official side event at the @munsecconf.bsky.social, together with @kiel.institute and @nupinytt.bsky.social!
Sat. 14 Feb, 09:30–10:15
Bar Montez, Rosewood Hotel
Get in touch if you want more info!
My colleague Kevin Munger asked me and a bunch of editors to sit and think through AI and peer review. Our take:
osf.io/9sxnc/files/...
We envision an increased (!) involvement of humans in the evaluation of social science.
Wie de NAVO doodverklaart, zoals CD&V-voorzitter Sammy Mahdi dit weekend, vergeet welke voordelen het bondgenootschap Europa nog biedt.
De Europese bondgenoten moeten nú stappen zetten naar een NAVO die overtuigend Europees wordt.
👉 Mijn opinie @tijd.be: www.tijd.be/opinie/algem...
Wie de NAVO doodverklaart, zoals CD&V-voorzitter Sammy Mahdi dit weekend, vergeet welke voordelen het bondgenootschap Europa nog biedt.
De Europese bondgenoten moeten nú stappen zetten naar een NAVO die overtuigend Europees wordt.
👉 Mijn opinie @tijd.be: www.tijd.be/opinie/algem...
In plaats van scheuren en plooien, doen de EU-lidstaten er goed aan om het Anti-Coercion Instrument op tafel te leggen in de gesprekken met de Trump administratie.
Tijd om een streep in het zand te trekken.
Trump escaleert het conflict met Europa over Groenland door vanaf 1 februari een extra-tarief van 10 % op te leggen. Maar de aankondiging dat hij (pas) op 1 juni de tarieven zal optrekken tot 25 % wekt de indruk dat hij nog tijd laat - allicht in de hoop dat Europa hierover zal scheuren en plooien.
A European Security Council is long overdue. In a Union of 27, its absence has been a structural weakness.
Hopefully this is the moment it finally takes hold. Fragmentation undermines strategic coherence.
Sending European troops to Greenland under the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity is worth considering, argues @guntramwolff.bsky.social.
Not a bad idea - the EU RDC has been operational since last year.
Curious to learn more about the EU RDC?
👉 academic.oup.com/ia/article/1...
The Coalition of the Willing reaffirmed its commitment to deploy a Multinational Force Ukraine after a ceasefire.
What are they are willing and able to put in place?
Check our policy brief collection: www.nupi.no/en/projects-...
Our intro briefing: www.nupi.no/en/publicati...
Good time to repost our policy brief collection on a multinational force for Ukraine 👇
The EU has indeed crossed a Rubicon. Enhanced cooperation is a positive development, but its durability remains uncertain. It remains to be seen how it plays out if a large member state comes under eurosceptic leadership.
Given that the financial burden will be borne by 24 member states (excluding CZ, HU, and SK), this hurdle may be manageable.
For these reasons, an optimistic reading of the outcome is justified. That said, there is an important caveat: Joint borrowing backed by EU budget headroom requires amending the 2021–2027 MFF regulation, which still requires unanimity.
Member states have shown a willingness to side-line actors that obstruct the EU’s ability to act decisively in support of Ukraine, effectively side-lining Europe's pro-Kremlin lobby.
Fourth, by invoking Article 20 TEU (enhanced cooperation) and Article 122 TFEU (economic emergencies), the EU is adapting to a reality that requires greater institutional flexibility.
Third, calling the outcome a failure ignores a crucial development: agreement on joint borrowing. This breaks a long-standing taboo and expands the scope for future collective EU action, on Ukraine and beyond.
