Also there was a general expectation that once they've reached the stage of going from youth to actual politics they'd at least try to pretend to be normal
Also there was a general expectation that once they've reached the stage of going from youth to actual politics they'd at least try to pretend to be normal
Bro can't even record a cellphone video in his bunker. I'm 100% a Mojtaba truther now, that mfer is in a coma
The discussions of regime stability keep focusing on the wrong questions, nobody serious actually expected quick political disintegration! The relevant point of analysis is how this will leave the regime's ability to deal with mass unrest and security deterioration in the coming weeks and months
The statistic for this war I'd actually be most interested in seeing tracked is not military equipment destroyed but work delinquincy rates for mid-level regime officials
It's almost funny how some treat this war as some kind of reset to the myriad of social, economic, and political crises Iran was already facing before it began rather than a massive amplifier
And he was actually one of the less gay Hohenzollerns
GER-IRI trade volume had already massively dropped since 2017 and it wasn't really *that* significant in the grand scheme of things before either. There is a limit to how great a business partnership you can develop with a pariah state
The bigger question is whether a sufficient degradation of IRGC infrastructure can be achieved and whether the initial protests after a call to take the streets is put out will build enough momentum to cascade towards a loss of elite cohesion, defections, and, ultimately, regime change
My mental model of popular opinion is essentially 55% solidly opposed, 15% solidly loyalist, and then 30% fence-sitters leaning one way or another. The progress of the campaign will mainly polarise the fence sitters, I don't expect a "rally around the flag" beyond that.
It's hard to see Trump ending the war without Iran at least conceding to hand over its uranium stockpile which was one of the biggest issues in the talks. The "Trump will get tired of it" line of analysis already proved wrong during the build-up, it's even harder to imagine now
Pointing to the sign
FWIW I also don't think we have reached the make or break point of regime change just yet
The reemergence of RP really kicked off between 2017-19, corresponding to the radicalisation of Iranian domestic opposition at the failure of Rouhani to bring about meaningful improvement, though January really cemented it. Also a point against treating the diaspora as this disconnected actor
Not necessarily likely but after the January massacre perhaps plausible enough that I can see why Bibi would take the chance considering the magnitude of the payoff, especially when Trump's buildup presented an opportunity for the US to shoulder a large part of the burden
Neither the fuel depots nor the Qeshm desalination plant bombing fit into a broader pattern of targeting civilian infrastructure and if state collapse is the goal there are many more impactful targets (power plants, transportation hubs, hydroelectric dams etc.)
I am the first to discount public statements as evidence of intention but also don't think strikes so far point to state collapse being preferred over mere regime collapse. Industries that were bombed were all connected to aerospace and even the fuel depots were targeted as military logistics assets
I'm not sure he cares at this point. Why would he. He isn't going to run for re-election (yeah, yeah), he has no loyalty to the GOP, and he clearly despises his actual voters. Only an actual impeachment could do it
Their involvement in missile/aerospace forces, intelligence and internal security, which have been the key targets, is limited, so I assume they are mainly hanging around their barracks
Trump will only play a role in choosing Iran's next leader if they find a collaborator within the regime to make a deal with. If they manage to induce regime collapse he'll simply declare the war won and deal with whoever ultimately manages to come out on top. This debate is kinda pointless
Many people don't know that you can substitute a Leverhulme Prize for being a mujtahid as a qualification for office
I think people are getting their timeline for when, if at all, we should expect to see major unrest mixed up. The IR will be weakest right around the culmination of the strike campaign, there is no reason to move before that. Both Bibi and RP are also explicitly messaging "stand back and stand by"
While the specific kick off is due to Trumpian idiosyncrasies I reckon a lot more planning and preparation went into this contingency than some people give it credit for. Though obviously not from the political leadership of the US itself, which is the major issue ofc
Most smart Iran watchers I'm following predicted after the 12-Day-War that we'd see a similar campaign against the Iranian missile programme within a year. The January crackdown almost certainly accelerated the speed and scope of Israeli military planning.
This isn't a diaspora phenomenon anymore. In January alone the regime killed more than thirty times as many Iranians within 48 hours than Israel did during its entire war last year. And this is just on top of the regularly scheduled executions, humiliations, and economic hardship they have to endure
Perhaps best exemplified by most Iranians attaching their sense of national identity to an entirely different flag than the regime's in the first place
In Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-Saddam/Taliban opposition was still largely Islamist and anti-Western, which is not the case in Iran. Whatever your estimation of the chances of regime change is, ideological retrenchment qua rallying-round-the-flag will not be the vector through which it fails
I was harping on about ignorance on Iran leading to a reflexive reach for GWOT truisms; this is the worst one. The regime's appropriation of secular nationalism already failed (hence Iran's largest popular uprising occurring just 6 months after the 12-Day-War), popular alienation has spiralled since
Khorramabad percs got me contemplating commercial off the shelf ballistic missile components, my regional proxies WILL have exoatmospheric strike capabilities
Being elected doesn't confer additional authority qua any theological grounding but by being an already influential Shiite cleric who is now also the leader of the largest Shiite state in the world. So comparing it to the church confuses the mechanism, yes
Iran is a nation state that fuses republican governance with religious authority (at least that's the idea). The Assembly is more like an electoral college elected for fixed terms with additional stipulation that it elects someone with sufficient religious credentials.