Dank!!
11.03.2026 08:28
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Dank!!
Polls have closed in the first of this year's five German state elections, in prosperous Baden-Württemberg. It's looking like a remarkable win-from-behind by the Greens under @oezdemir.de. Full results over the course of the evening.
The numbers are even more brutal than I thought.
It’s less economical to open new plants - and takes decades - but closing ones that had years and years of very low marginal cost and 0 emission electricity in them was wild.
cdn.jpmorganfunds.com/content/dam/...
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Germanys self-destructive nuclear phase-out hurts again as a new Iran gas shock looms.
JPM: “Had Germany not phased out nuclear power, it would have generated 50% less electricity from fossil fuels, 84% less electricity from natural gas in 2024. Electricity prices would have been 25% lower.”
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Following a wave of takeovers of European semiconductor companies, Europe strengthened its investment screening mechanisms. Now, Europe must tackle new challenges. 🇨🇳 🇪🇺
New @centreeuropeanref.bsky.social insight by @sandertordoir.bsky.social & @james-r-green.bsky.social.
Read here: buff.ly/JTsL3yP
EU foreign policy is a mess because the Lisbon Treaty is a mess. Hence EU “high rep” title not EU “foreign minister.” Member states want the EU to be strong and speak with one voice but hesitate to make the trade: control (sovereignty) for strength. And the end result is they get neither.
Very interesting analysis of screening of Chinese FDI in Europe. Also, follow James, who's the new CER tech expert.
Good debate between Nils and Shahin!
After months of wrangling and an epic list of delays, the Commission has finally released its Industrial Accelerator Act.
This could turn into one of the EU’s most consequential industrial policy files in years - and the proposal is honestly not a bad place to start.
Some quick thoughts:
Sharp analysis by @sandertordoir.bsky.social @james-r-green.bsky.social on how Chinese tech investment in Europe is shifting and EU policy struggling to keep up.
Plenty of lessons for EU policymakers as they revisit FDI screening and ask themselves some tricky questions about Europe's openness.
Fascinating stuff: confirms Chinese investment now mainly target new EV/battery factories in EU. Described as “low tech transfer” supply hubs these are mostly aimed at assembly, not adding much local value, that sidestep EU duties. CATL in Spain promises tech sharing, but hard evidence is scarce.
Great thread from James on our new paper.
James is the CERs new tech fellow, bringing key transatlantic experience from his years on Capitol Hill.
Do give him a follow if you’re interested in European tech, competition and innovation policy.
So boring but true: the decisive factor will not be how Europe manages Chinese capital, but how successfully it strengthens its own competitiveness.
The piece with @james-r-green.bsky.social is attached. END.
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www.cer.eu/insights/eur...
The case for centralising powers in Brussels is to constrain member-state that court Chinese investment for short-term gains, undermining single market cohesion.
At the same time, Europe is asking more of Chinese investment than it is likely to deliver - it's now a modest €10 billion a year.
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Europe can now block Chinese tech takeovers. But loopholes remain – particularly around greenfield investments, uneven national enforcement and smaller deals that evade scrutiny.
Closing them will require stronger EU and member-state capacity as well as, over time, greater EU-level control.
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Chinese investment patterns are shifting.
Chinese greenfield investment in Europe is rising, creating economic security dilemmas.
And the EU frets corrupt member-states like Hungary becoming holes in the EU single market for China to set up low-tech transfer supply hubs of Chinese content.
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At the EU level, a tighter FDI ramework is expected to kick in in mid-2026 (see screenshot), and, the EU will debate new tools like the Industrial Accelerator Act.
Europe is pulling in two directions: restricting takeovers while seeking capital in sectors it lacks, like batteries.
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That era is over. Countries hosting much of Europe’s tech sector have tightened screening — especially after China backed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Germany (Elmos, ERS, Siltronic), Italy (LPE), the Netherlands (Nexperia) and the UK (Newport Wafer Fab) have all blocked/unwound Chinese deals
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The 2010s were a European garage sale of high-tech firms to China, enabling Chinese investors to acquire intellectual property, know-how and supply-chain leverage.
This included for example Silex, Okmetic, LFoundry and of course Nexperia, which is still giving the Dutch and Germans headaches.
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New piece on Chinese tech investment in Europe — fittingly out the day the Commission publishes the Industrial Accelerator Act, kicking off months of legislative wrangling.
A look at the data and recent cases shows Europe has learned to block Chinese takeovers of tech & semiconductor assets.
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Europe has made real progress in protecting its technological base from Chinese takeovers.
The risk is that China will now invest in EU countries with weak oversight like Hungary, argue @sandertordoir.bsky.social and @james-r-green.bsky.social
Read here: buff.ly/JTsL3yP
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Just a wee bit of pressure on global stocks this morning.
The contrast between the US SecDef belittling European allies and the French president outlining a forward-deterrent scheme for Europe today is quite something.
Looking forward to exchanging with the European committee of the Bundestag this Wednesday on the EUs growth agenda - alongside @lucasguttenberg.bsky.social
Strategically it’s incredibly clever the EU is eroding the key levers of the green transition.
As a net oil and gas importer being susceptible to repeated geopolitical supply and terms of trade shocks is just such a great place to be.
Chancellor Merz much more bold than his predecessors in tabling China's imbalances and distortions.
He's asking for the right kind of market adjustment.
China will ignore his request but important for the Chancellor to signal what Germany needs to diplomatically cover countermeasures.
From NYT
Steve is right thanks for the correction!
German firms are running out of chip supply as the AI memory demand spike creates scarcity. German firms have few stockpiles and resupply wait time surges to 1y.
Why are German firms always the first to run into supply chain crunches?
hbapp.handelsblatt.com/cmsid/100201...
Follows from the EUs long standing policy that tax policy is a national competence. Not loftiness.
Thus all EU MS have to agree to a change to the EUs own resources (read: tax revenue equivalent).
In this case Hungary has to formally agree to change EU Own Resource Decision to backstop loan.