Diego Vega

Article submission day is a good day.

This article is part of my dissertation research, as a Ph.D. candidate in the UT Austin Government Department (currently in the job market!).

I am really happy to see it out at LAPS!

In-depth interviews collected during fieldwork in Argentina and Colombia confirm the political motivation behind this behavior. Bureaucrats and cabinet members describe how presidents expected CCTs to quickly increase their governments' popularity, especially in moments of political weakness.

I compare CCTs and PPPs diffusion patterns across the region.

Presidents used their powers to enact CCTs unilaterally in all countries except Uruguay, and rushed bureaucrats to implement quickly.

For PPPs, only two presidents used decree powers, and most let bureaucrats work at their own pace.

New Article! polisky comparativesky
I explain Conditional Cash Transfers' fast diffusion in Latin America by tracing policymaking in 18 countries.

Presidents fast-tracked CCTs because they expected to gain popularity. The same didn't happen to public-private partnerships.

doi.org/10.1017/lap....

Do you mean to know which congressperson voted in favor or against?

This link has all the documents about the approval of that law: www.bcn.cl/historiadela...

The first document has the initial process in the House. You can see them voting starting on page 276 (nearly all in favor in all steps).