Data has obviously since come in. I process updates 3x daily. So far, it is pointing in the same direction as trends in the charts above. We show a selection of the latest here: www.economist.com/interactive/...
I analysed data on 788 distinct attacks, 1,860 missile and drone launches, and abnormal “high-temperature events”, such as fires, at 208 strategic sites. It suggested the war has entered a new phase. www.economist.com/interactive/...
It is rumoured that Russia's leader will assess whether to attempt another offensive in March. No large city has fallen since Mariupol in May 2022. The towns that have, such as Avdiivka and Bakhmut, were reduced to rubble long before the Russian flag was raised.
The latest casualty estimates—from official and independent sources, as well as The Economist’s own modelling—suggest that Russia is losing far more troops than Ukraine, while gaining almost no ground. www.economist.com/graphic-deta...
Our cover this week. As I write in the accompanying briefing: where the press is stifled today, corruption should be expected tomorrow. www.economist.com/briefing/202...
Every November, @economist.com ponders the year to come. For this year’s edition of The World Ahead, I wrote about the conflicts to watch in 2026. I highlighted seven—of which one has already taken a major turn. www.economist.com/interactive/...
Delighted to be shortlisted for specialist journalist of the year at the British Journalism Awards. Congrats to all the other nominees pressgazette.co.uk/press-gazett...
Delighted to share that several brilliant colleagues from @economist.com have been shortlisted for the British Journalism Awards 2025 🏆
Congratulations @matthewholehouse.bsky.social, @duncanrobinson.bsky.social and @sondreus.bsky.social!
Read the full shortlist:
pressgazette.co.uk/press-gazett...
Russia does not appear to be winning the war on the battlefield. It is advancing only slowly, with little hope of a breakthrough and at a cost that is unsustainable in manpower and materiel. My latest on the war: www.economist.com/interactive/...
Lack of enough data precludes doing the same for Ukraine. But we do find that while Russian forward movement is still slow, it is speeding up. More at link: www.economist.com/interactive/...
To estimate Russian losses, I lined up satellite data and shifts to areas of control in Ukraine with more than 200 estimates of total casualties there. This enabled me to construct a credible day-to-day range for the toll of the war since the invasion.
Our analysis of data from the front lines in Ukraine suggests Russia is suffering its heaviest losses of the conflict so far. We use satellites to track the fighting: www.economist.com/interactive/...
Whether a specific ceasefire will hold can be very hard to tell. But data on masses of them, researchers told me, reveal some factors that tend to be correlated with success. I had a look at 2,203 declared since 1989: www.economist.com/graphic-deta...
Just saw this. It would be possible to replicate the approach if I knew the locations of strategic sites to monitor within Israel. It is also possible to do this independently of strategic sites, as I do in Ukraine. www.economist.com/interactive/...
While tracking thermal events is not perfect either, it has some advantages: it covers all sites systematically, and data comes in regardless of access (as long as skies are clear), several times daily.
To track the Israel-Iran war, @economist.com, I think uniquely, monitors 208 strategic sites in Iran for abnormal thermal activity. It can be hard to know how much maps of confirmed strikes may miss. We find broad overlap, but not perfect. www.economist.com/interactive/...
Last week, we wrote about how estimated casualties (dead+wounded) are approaching 1m on the Russian side. Those timelines may now shift forward. www.economist.com/internationa...
Russia has attacked along virtually the entire front in the past week, and especially heavily in the past few days. But essentially no shift in the front lines. www.economist.com/interactive/...
Read cover story by @vinjeru.bsky.social (with some numbers / projections from me), which also evidences a preference for girls emerging in parts of the rich world www.economist.com/briefing/202...
Our cover this week is about girls. The news is good: I find that the enormous global shortfall of baby girls has seen a stunning decline. www.economist.com/leaders/2025...
Thanks Hethan, glad you found it fascinating.
Thanks!
Happy to hear that, thank you again.
Thank you very much @gaborbekes.bsky.social
Too rare I'm afraid. If it helps, I'm also not in the data.
Our poll of Ukraine is now in (N=1000). Mr Zelensky approval at >70%, very few want elections before peace. But also suggests 58% will not want Ukraine to concede territory, and that many also expect the war to end within the year ->
www.economist.com/europe/2025/... by @olliecarroll.bsky.social
Some sources provide casualties (dead+wounded), some provide dead only. I collected both. More on dead-to-wounded ratios here: www.economist.com/internationa...
I cover both casualties (dead and wounded) and dead. The chart that appears with the link shows fatalities only. As you may know, this cuts both ways: a lower dead-to-wounded ratio means that for any given set of fatalities, there are more wounded and thus probably more soldiers out of action.
In 2024, Russia seized less than half a percent of Ukrainian land at the cost of about 100,000 lives, new estimates of casualties and my calculations suggest. My take on the latest data:
www.economist.com/graphic-deta...
