@cristiancantir
Associate Professor, Oakland University. Foreign policy analysis, paradiplomacy/sub-state diplomacy, role theory, Romania, Moldova, fiction, and TV. Academic work: https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=Vvx23r4AAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubda
... talking point that any conflict between Chișinău and Moscow is always the responsibility of Chișinău, and especially its purportedly irrational dislike for Moscow and Russians. Not sure if the Kremlin actually believes this, but it's a major presence in the pro-RU imaginary.
... fairly frequently in MD outlets, but it just seems like there were more than usual in the last few days. All of the narratives, of course, absolve Russia of any responsibility for attacking Moldova in 1992 or Ukraine more recently, and are rooted in a major pro-Russian ...
... administrative reforms (Source: GagauzInfo portal). And the pro-Kremlin Mejdurecie portal is saying Russophobia is responsible for authorities seeking to show a film in schools about the 1992 Russian-Moldovan war in Transnistria. I see Russophobia claims ...
Busy day for the "Russophobia is everywhere" crowd among pro-Kremlin propagandists in Moldova. Pro-Russian commentator Valeriu Reniță said that Russophobia will lead to the dismantling of the Gagauz autonomous region as Chișinău tries to enact ...
... would do with the information. And lest you think Nantoi's concerns were exaggerated, the head of parliament's legal department, for instance, is currently under investigation for treason after allegedly selling national security information to Russia in 2023-2024.
... and national security matters are discussed more in the executive anyway, but it's an illustration of RU's influence in the country that a major legislative committee couldn't talk about major national security threats because they didn't know what pro-RU M.P.s ...
... that pro-EU M.P.s didn't trust. This statement belongs to former PAS M.P. Oazu Nantoi during an extensive podcast interview with Radio Free Europe's Pe Agendă show (he makes the statement at about min. 15). Obviously, pro-Russian M.P.s continue to be in MD's parliament, ...
An example of Russia's deep influence in Moldova in 2022, when RU invaded Ukraine: around the time of the invasion, M.P.s couldn't have substantive discussions about national security in the legislative national security committee because there were pro-Kremlin M.P.s on it ...
... And, finally, Moldova 1 (the country's public TV station) will be doing lots of coverage in Romanian throughout the day. Mesager is live right now, but the show will be uploaded soon and will have an extensive report with footage from 1992 (moldova1.md/s/ro/14).
... Nicolae Pojoga's Album de Război/War Album remains one of the best visual accounts of the war and includes 96 pictures from that period, taken by the journalist while he accompanied soldiers on the front lines. I highly recommend getting a copy if you can...
On March 2, 2026, Moldova commemorates 34 years since the beginning of the 1992 Russian-Moldovan war in Transnistria. A few recommendations. Last year, Moldova's state-run Moldpres published lots of war pictures from its archives (www.moldpres.md/rom/societat....
... can become yet another pathway for pro-Russian and anti-EU forces to seek to take power. In any case, something to watch for the future as a new cleavage may emerge in Moldova's politics.
... and pro-EU forces in general need to be more proactive about both monitoring this rhetoric and coming up with their own response to it. It appears that foreign workers will become indispensable for Moldova's economy, and anti-migrant rhetoric ...
... This politicization won't only fall along geopolitical lines, by the way. I fully expect groups like PDA, which are not pro-Russian in the classical sense and are affiliated with Romania's far-right, to also adopt some anti-migrant rhetoric. The ruling PAS ...
... are working in certain parts of the economy (Source: Agora.md, Sep. 10, 2025). And, recently, pro-RU politician Irina Vlah warned of "negative scenarios" related to foreign workers coming into the country (Source: Vlah's Facebook). ...
... has mostly been anti-migrant and seeks to exploit ignorance and fear in the country. For example, pro-RU leader Igor Dodon said Maia Sandu has started the "deconstruction of the Moldovan people" because more Nepalese people than Moldovans ...
... aren't doing. So foreign workers are more visible in the country (in food delivery, for instance). Pro-Russian forces are trying to bring this issue into the public sphere. Since they have a natural affinity with sovereignist groups in Europe, the rhetoric ...
... Anti-migrant or anti-foreign worker rhetoric has been rare in the country because it's never been a destination for foreign workers. That is changing slowly for several reasons, including the country's depopulation and the need for low-skilled labor that Moldovans ...
One phenomenon to watch in the next decade or two in Moldova: how political groups politicize the presence of foreign workers in the country. Seeing recent attempts especially by pro-Russian groups to capitalize on this topic with rudimentary anti-migrant rhetoric ...
... as supporting RU's invasion. Voting "no" would also contradict the narratives from these pro-RU circles that put out vague calls for peace without identifying Russia as the culprit. Source: Moldova's Parliament website, where you can also find the full text of the statement.
... by Renato Usatîi, who's also had a long history of pro-Kremlin policies. Interesting to see that nobody voted against condemning, with the pro-RU strategy focused on not casting a ballot. This may be a strategy to avoid being branded ...
... was divided, with some non-votes and some who voted to condemn. People like Alexandr Stoianoglo, who lost the 2024 presidential election, didn't cast a ballot. The far-right PDA mostly voted to condemn, as did the populist Our Party, which is run ...
... which is unsurprising since it proposed the statement. Staunch pro-Russian groups like PSRM and PCRM refused to cast a vote. Alternativa, which brands itself as a pro-EU group while being led by people with a long history of support for the Kremlin, ...
Good indicator of support for Ukraine in Moldova's parliament: a vote on a Feb. 26 statement condemning Russia's invasion of UA. MD's parliament has roll call vote reports, so you can see how each group and M.P. votes. As you can see, the ruling PAS voted to condemn Russia, ...
... Unsurprisingly, Transnistrian figures have criticized the measure. Source for the bio of the 9 individuals here (in Romanian: zonadesecuritate.md/cine-sunt-ce...)
... The withdrawal of citizenship happened at the behest of the secret service (SIS), so I'm sure Chișinău has some pretty serious national security reasons to pick these individuals. There are obviously a lot more Transnistrian officials who should be on this list ...
... individuals likely have Russian citizenship, but pulling their MD citizenship means they'll have to get visas to travel. The decision also happens as MD's and Transnistria's political negotiators are meeting for the first time in a while ...
... involved in the repression of political prisoners in the region. There are a few others, including people affiliated with the Sheriff conglomerate and a couple of the people running Transnistria's elections. Two of them fought against Chișinău in 1992. These ...
... in the region. There's Vladislav Juc, who's one of the people running the penitentiary system in the region (which has been documented for systematic human rights violations). And there's Ruslan Mava, a former "interior minister," who's been ...
Moldovan Pres. Maia Sandu has withdrawn the MD citizenship of 9 current and former Transnistrian officials. Who are they? There's Igor Buga, who fought against Moldovan troops during the Russian-Moldovan war of 1992, and is now a chief fighter against "non-traditional values" ...