Ideally, yes.
@jamalgreene
Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Ex-DOJ/OLC. Becoming familiar with your game. How Rights Went Wrong available at Bookshop.org (https://tinyurl.com/se32my4r), Amazon (https://tinyurl.com/3vbcfwa4), or a decent public library.
Ideally, yes.
I'll add that Senate-confirmed agency heads generally have more de facto authority than acting officials. This can be a good thing when the president is a rogue. It depends on the person/context.
Unpopular on here, but I think the (somewhat) bipartisan norm of voting to staff the govt when you have no specific reason to vote against someone is fine, and while I respect the position that one should vote for no Trump nominees as a matter of principle, I wouldn't insist on it. . . .
Motion to change the word βskeetβ to βblooskiβ
SCOOP: Federal judiciary approves new Supreme Court defender office to help represent indigent defendants at #SCOTUS.
Its full-time director will serve as a counterweight to the U.S. solicitor general in federal criminal cases. The first will be former Kagan clerk and SG atty Ashley Robertson.
If such an exemption is effective in remedying their injury, then universal relief wasn't needed to make them whole. Imagine instead a plaintiff who is, eg, injured by the fact that the government is injuring nonplaintiffs. It would be consistent with CASA to enjoin the government universally.
Even as to a private plaintiff, nothing in CASA prevents a single court from granting universal relief if such relief is necessary to remedy their individual injury.
Sure, my only point is that, under that theory, enjoining with respect to one plaintiff would be all you need to accomplish the objective. No need for a class action.
There may be any number of jurisdictional problems, but I don't think CASA would be the main one. I assume the theory of standing you have in mind would require an end to the war to make the state plaintiff whole.
You are right, of course, about Zivotovsky and about precedent, but if you think there's any chance this Court would let a district court purport to enjoin this war, you and I have very different perceptions of the world we live in.
The line beyond which disclosure is required as a matter of academic ethics.
I think "AI wrote it" is over the disclosure line, and heeding suggestions to rephrase dangling modifiers or passive voice or somesuch is not over the disclosure line (in my view), but I haven't developed a strong view of where the line is between those. (@jtlg.bsky.social has stronger views.)
I think "pushing" overstates my view, and I have no control over any Columbia Law Review policy!
Re: disclosure, I would think it already the case that someone who submits a publication whose abstract was written by AI but doesn't disclose has breached an ethical duty. I bet many do it anyway.
Grateful for this exchange. I tend to be pragmatic by temperament, and it feels intuitively as though James is nitpicking a bit, but I suspect it wonβt be long before it seems obvious that academics should have gotten off this bullet train earlier. His clarity about academic integrity is welcome.
My own view is that universities, including public ones, should be understood to have qualified institutional autonomy that insulates many personnel decisions from judicial interference on 1A grounds, though I agree thatβs not the same thing as the βacademic freedomβ of faculty.
"The Trump administration is engaged in a brazen and far-reaching campaign of censorship while cynically and falsely claiming that censorship is what it is fighting." CITR v. Rubio, new case just filed in DDC by @knightcolumbia.org & @protectdemocracy.org. knightcolumbia.org/content/tech...
Many (all?) who think they are "crap" as in wildly inconsistent, but I can't off the top of my head think of any who think, e.g., standing, political question, mootness, ripeness, etc. should not constrain A3 courts.
Apart from standing, any district court that enjoined the war would be reversed in about 10 seconds on political question grounds and, if one thinks that doctrine has any legitimacy, rightly so. One might think litigation should happen anyway, eg for expressive reasons, but the syllogism would fail.
I don't know that a court would specify that the ground is "academic freedom," as this area is not a model of conceptual clarity, but yes, I doubt a court would parse the internal governance of a university in this way, and I think in most cases it would be right not to do so.
I meant "would" scrutinize the admin's overruling. As to "should," I'd need more facts than the bare hypo I described, but I would think it shouldn't raise a 1A issue in the mine run of such cases, even when based on the content of the work.
I agree that's a standard formulation, but it's hard to cleanly separate the univ's hiring/tenure freedom from its faculty's. Imagine, e.g., a ct stepping into public univ admin overruling its own faculty's judgment on a hiring/tenure decision. Should be colorable on the std view, but I'm dubious.
The irony deepens when one recognizes that the difference is in the name of "academic freedom." The irony is perhaps reconcilable--it's the university's freedom in the first example, and the professor's in the second--but thinking this through admits of less easy answers than is sometimes supposed.
An irony of this sort of case is that if the university refused to hire him or grant him tenure because its faculty found his work of low value/quality, there would be no 1A issue, but adverse action based on claimed anxiety about disruption does raise a 1A issue . . . .
βTehran is burning. And smoke has filled the streets. Itβs impossible to drive out of the city right now and even with the windows closed, heavy smoke is making its way inside."
Read every word.
What are we fightinβ for, indeed.
RIP Country Joe McDonald
Exactly.
That rule certainly doesnβt do much to disincentivize Steagald violations.
Very interesting paper from my colleagues Kellen Funk and Tom Schmidt on what they call the βequity docket.β papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Thank you for the informative thread! It still seems to me that the level/scope/nature of "human" involvement lies more on a spectrum than a binary, though of course the actions and statements of the current DOD have given us no reason to think they're at an acceptable place along that spectrum.
I've seen different accounts of whether ID always uses humans. This, e.g., suggests not, but I'm no expert. My broader point is that one needs to qualify what "human intervention" & "AI" & "evaluation" mean, which is why so many are calling for a new, clarifying treaty. www.pbs.org/newshour/wor...