Yandex traffic to Starlink in Ukraine. Evidently more popular among Russian than Ukrainian forces.
11.03.2026 20:48
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Yandex traffic to Starlink in Ukraine. Evidently more popular among Russian than Ukrainian forces.
A similar drop was visible in @radar.cloudflare.com:
radar.cloudflare.com/explorer?dat...
(h/t @dbelson.com)
This is really compelling evidence of how much Russian forces have been relying on Starlink near the front
On Feb-4, @Starlink disabled terminals in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine that weren't on Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's approved list.
We saw a 75% drop in Starlink traffic to Ukraine as a result. 🤯
www.politico.com/news/2026/02...
Iran is in the 10th day of the second internet shutdown of 2026.
Within the small amount of traffic that continues to trickle out of Iran since Feb-28, several networks experienced further drops in traffic volume on Mar-5 possibly due to airstrikes.
#IranWar #DigitalBlackoutlran
Since Jan-11, Pars Oil & Gas Company (AS51554) has been offline (un-routed) from around 13:55 UTC (5:25pm local) to 04:50 UTC (08:20am local) every day.
Routes have been down since the beginning of the latest shutdown on Feb-28, but came back on Mar-8.
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/51554?fr...
Iran is down, but IPv4 BGP routes are still 98% up (@ioda.live). It is necessary the routes be up to selectively authorize internet access (i.e. whitelisting).
Conversely, when we see routes go down, we may infer that those events are not govt-directed.
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?f...
Iran is in the 10th day of the second internet shutdown of 2026.
Within the small amount of traffic that continues to trickle out of Iran since Feb-28, several networks experienced further drops in traffic volume on Mar-5 possibly due to airstrikes.
#IranWar #DigitalBlackoutlran
At the moment, the primary source of Internet blocking is from the Iranian government. If they were to lift the block, we could see how much disruption has been caused by the air strikes.
Starlink was being blocked in a few areas of dense population in Iran in January.
Yes, Starlink published a software change that reduced the interference.
Iran’s internet shutdown has reduced connectivity by 99 percent, with air strikes likely causing additional outages, and few workarounds remaining. www.wired.com/story/the-fu...
The current Internet shutdown in Iran is in its 7th day.
A small amount of traffic continues to trickle out of Iran for whitelisted individuals and services, for everyone else, almost no connectivity whatsoever.
#IranWar #DigitalBlackoutlran
Barriers to connectivity make cyber operations challenging. Not impossible. But less easy.
The current Internet shutdown in Iran is in its 7th day.
A small amount of traffic continues to trickle out of Iran for whitelisted individuals and services, for everyone else, almost no connectivity whatsoever.
#IranWar #DigitalBlackoutlran
In addition to the ongoing shutdown of the Internet in Iran, IODA sees evidence of damage to critical Internet or power infrastructure through simultaneous drops in Routing Announcements across various networks.
For example, at ~6:00 PM local time today we see 5 networks show simultaneous drops.
BGP routes belonging to the network of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (AS42586) were completely down between ~17:00 UTC on Mar-1 and ~10:00 UTC on Mar-2.
See @ioda.live here:
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/42586?fr...
themedialine.org/top-stories/...
Active measurement (blue line) was already down due to the shutdown. The BGP outage (green line) might be indicative of technical failure (fiber cut, power outage) or cyberattack.
BGP routes belonging to the network of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (AS42586) were completely down between ~17:00 UTC on Mar-1 and ~10:00 UTC on Mar-2.
See @ioda.live here:
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/asn/42586?fr...
themedialine.org/top-stories/...
I suspect some common piece of infrastructure broke (fiber cut, power outage, etc) that took out these networks.
Several networks stopped exchanging traffic at ~07:10 UTC today:
> AS62442, AS60423, AS213069, AS201295, AS61173, AS206507, and 10 others.
Another group stopped at ~15:20 UTC:
> AS205585, AS213807, AS34918 (also experiences a drop at 07:10 UTC), AS214515, AS64458, AS208161
Nearly all of the Iranian internet has been down for 43+ hours but, as was the case with last month's shutdown, there is a tiny amount of traffic still getting passed.
Within the remaining traffic, we can see subsequent outages, possibly caused by continued US/IL airstrikes…🧵
Internet in Iran still down:
As was the case with last month's internet shutdown in Iran, a small amount of traffic continues to make its way into the country.
The country's recently-developed system of whitelisting enables exceptions to internet blocks for people loyal to the govt.
As was the case with last month's internet shutdown in Iran, a small amount of traffic continues to make its way into the country.
The country's recently-developed system of whitelisting enables exceptions to internet blocks for people loyal to the govt.
Internet connectivity down in Iran as airstrikes hit the country.
Traffic volume dropped at 07:06 UTC and then again at 11:47 UTC with minimal connectivity remaining.
The country had a partial restoration since Jan-27 following a complete shutdown in Jan-8.
IODA shows the Internet in Iran has been cutoff from the global Internet since ~7:00 AM UTC. The regime implemented a similar Internet shutdown when Israel attacked Iran in June of 2025.
Follow connectivity in Iran in near realtime:
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?f...
BGP leak in Iran briefly knocked out traffic amidst a new normal of reduced internet connectivity in the country.
#DigitalBlackoutIran
At 12:09 UTC on Feb-15, AS60148 (Info Technology Org) leaked thousands of Iranian routes through AS12880 (TIC), including new more-specifics.
Doug is continuing to provide great coverage of the state of the internet in Iran which is an important indicator of what’s going on in the country
The leak corresponded to a dip in travel volume to several Iranian networks as misdirected traffic sent the wrong way was dropped due to insufficient bandwidth.
BGP leak in Iran briefly knocked out traffic amidst a new normal of reduced internet connectivity in the country.
#DigitalBlackoutIran
At 12:09 UTC on Feb-15, AS60148 (Info Technology Org) leaked thousands of Iranian routes through AS12880 (TIC), including new more-specifics.