My thanks to @cja-news.bsky.social and everyone involved!
02.07.2025 06:33
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My thanks to @cja-news.bsky.social and everyone involved!
Hm, I feel the process is different outside of rigorous Salafi-Jihadism. Within that sub-trend the mechanisms actually are comparable to this historical precedent.
Thread on the second paper "The Major Corporal Punishments of Islamic State". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/neas...
Even more interestingly, Islamic State only identifies alleged offenders by showing their face and giving their full name if they are accused of state-threatening behaviour – an obviouly fitting term developed by @mararevkin.bsky.social (2016). www.brookings.edu/wp-content/u...
On the propaganda side, there are further notable findings. In legal contexts, Islamic State is concerned about its image and censors harsh corporal punishments, only showing executions by bullet-shot.
When looking at relevant videos from the territorial caliphate, it becomes clear that there are minor divergences from theory that might relate to judges of different background or adjustment to local expectations. Over the years, there is obvious bureaucratization from individuals to institutions.
Compared to classical discourse, Islamic State opted for maximalist positions mostly found in Maliki tradition to mete out the harshest corporal punishments possible by either lowering the burden of proof or giving greater leeway to judges, the caliph, and his deputies.
Implementing hudud punishments mentioned in the Quran therefore was not simply a way to govern and establish order but rather a raison d’être. I found that Islamic State's legal canon underwent an evolution shaped by the Office for Research and Study and decision makers in the group's leadership.
Unlike other Islamists, Islamic State raised the actual execution of these punishments to an essentiality for confirming to the concept of tawhid al-hakimiyya or monotheism in judgement. The rejection of positive law is a cornerstone of Islamic State ideology that reserves judgement to God alone.
Islamic State referred to the pre-modern legal thought of shari'a when governing its caliphate state in both Iraq and Syria. The rules Islamic State adopted (and adapted) include harsh corporal punishments known as qisas and hudud punishments.
It also analyses the actual practice of major corporal punishments as shown in officially released videos with a view to understanding the surrounding propaganda.
My second paper "The Major Corporal Punishments of Islamic State" situates the group's use of corporal punishments within the wider context of pre-modern Islamic shari'a and its role in group ideology. It details how Islamic State's legal canon on major corporal punishments developed.
Thread on the first paper "From Allies to Foes: The Relationship between the Islamic State Movement and other Sunni Islamist Insurgents". You can read it here: cja.org/wp-content/u... bsky.app/profile/did:...
If you are more interested in the Iraqi side of things, do check out our article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
This is evident in the case of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid and is still worth discussing with regard to the yet unclear status of groups like the Syrian Saraya Ansar al-Sunna and the 'Lakurawa' in North-Western Nigeria. Read the full piece here: cja.org/wp-content/u...
Secretly pledged leaders and factions allow the movement to influence wider insurgent discourse, lie low in case of danger, and further propaganda of expansion once making the pledge public. While our research focused on the 2011-2014 period, the tactic continued during the territorial caliphate.
A key aspect of the playbook is the use of front groups and secret pledges by leadership figures or factions in allied and rival groups. They allow the movement to perpetrate extreme actions of violence without carrying the blame or to embed itself where its real identity would lead to backlash.
During all stages, the movement practiced a gradual implementation of its policies, coercing ideologically distant insurgents first, then using similar tactics on ideologically closer Political Salafists and eventually even on other Salafi-Jihadists.
In the competitive phase, the movement withdrew from shared governance and began covertly assassinating Sunni insurgent and societal leaders. Success in this stage saw the group advance to a coercive mode of political consolidation, using assassinations and ultra-violence against Sunni rivals.
We also find that this process was gradual and based on ideological proximity to other Sunni Islamists. The movement cooperated with all other Islamist groups on the battlefield and in governance when weak. To advance its political agenda, it sought opportunities by turning to competition.
Based on our previous research on the movement in Iraq, we identify how the group applied a strategic playbook to the Syrian context. Grounded in work by Hafez et al. (2024), we identify that the group moved through phases of cooperation, competition, and coercion.
My first paper for @cja-news.bsky.social was a collaboration with my long-term partner in crime @craigwhiteside.bsky.social. In "From Allies to Foes", we trace the evolution of the Islamic State movement's relations to other Sunni Islamist insurgents in Syria up to the insurgent infighting of 2014.
Last week, @cja-news.bsky.social let me present two papers at their workshop on Islamic State accountability in London. Find threads on the two papers below. bsky.app/profile/cja-...
Finally, @neaskhan.bsky.social introduced his examination of IS’s penal code and judicial proceedings relating to corporal punishment: cja.org/wp-content/u...
@neaskhan.bsky.social presented his and Craig Whiteside’s paper tracing how ISIL relations with other Sunni Islamist insurgents shifted from cooperation through competition to coercion: cja.org/wp-content/u...
The project that @emorier.bsky.social, @vincentfoucher.bsky.social, @corinnajentzsch.com and I are coordinating on armed jihad in Africa is advertising three postdoc positions, in Belfast and Bordeaux. Find all the details below. Apply and/or circulate!
My lecture on Islamic State‘s conception of the past and its use of pre-modern history in propaganda is now online both as video and podcast with Gerda Henkel Stiftung’s L.I.S.A. (German only).
bsky.app/profile/neas...
Ein herzliches Dankeschön an das Organisationsteam Christoph Dartmann, Cordelia Heß und Sita Steckel, das technische Team und die Gerda Henkel Stiftung!
Weitere Videos aus der Reihe finden sich hier: lisa.gerda-henkel-stiftung.de/the_abuse_of...
Es geht zum einen um das Geschichtsbild der Gruppe, zum anderen um die Verwendung von Geschichte als Propaganda. Ich habe den Vortrag im Mai diesen Jahres im Rahmen der Blockvorlesung „The (Ab)use of the Medieval Past. Extremistische und nationalistische Mittelalternutzung“ in Frankfurt gehalten.
Mein Vortrag „Das anachronistische Kalifat? Der ‚Islamische Staat‘ von Retrotopie zu Reenactment“ ist mittlerweile auf der Plattform L.I.S.A. der Gerda Henkel Stiftung online verfügbar. Neben dem Videomitschnitt gibt es den Vortrag auch als Podcast. lisa.gerda-henkel-stiftung.de/abuse_mediev...