@kovrig
Senior Adviser, Asia @crisisgroup.org | Strategic narratives on China, Indo-Pacific, geopolitics, geoeconomics, philosophy and values. Ex-diplomat. Don't start none, won't be none. 实事求是。己所不欲,勿施於人 https://open.substack.com/pub/michaelkovrig
“Networks of fake TikTok accounts, paid influencers, and misinformed supporters acted in coordination – sometimes knowingly, sometimes unknowingly – to generate manufactured popularity” for Russia’s preferred candidate in Romania.
Check out this Balkan Free Media Initiative piece on Romania, Bulgaria and Kosovo. It shows how influence is distributed across invisible networks, optimised to operate faster than human cognition, and capable of shaping perception and behaviour before institutions or the public can respond.
@techpolicypress.bsky.social points out ByteDance retains ownership of the recommendation algorithm, so there’s no way for Western subsidiaries to unilaterally change how it works or block updates based on ByteDance’s IP.
@chathamhouse.org last year made the same argument with a memorable metaphor: focusing on TikTok’s ownership and data management while deprioritizing counter-disinformation work is like double-locking the front door but forgetting to close the upstairs windows.
A new @atlanticcouncil.bsky.social commentary on the US TikTok deal likewise argues it does little to address systemic challenges of information manipulation, foreign influence and data exploitation.
That’s a potential threat that merits rigorous monitoring and analysis. What should sensible citizens do in the meantime? Don't use TikTok, for starters.
Bottom line: Canada and other governments have focused on regulating data security while leaving vectors for influence unimpeded. Ensuring that user data isn’t being read by Chinese employees does nothing to stop TikTok’s recommendation engine from shaping how users interpret political events.
That could shift the affective terrain of emotions, attitudes and values, and so contribute to polarization that makes open societies harder to govern and free nations less able to resist authoritarian rivals.
At scale, that could make populations angrier, more morally certain, and less capable of tolerating the ambiguity and compromise democratic governance requires.
Morgan’s research suggests that even before that happens, people are emotionally sorted by their feeds into communities of shared outrage or sympathy they didn’t consciously choose. Seems to me most social media do that, but TikTok’s architecture makes it particularly potent.
To function effectively in a liberal democracy, political deliberation needs informed citizens who encounter and evaluate events, policies and statements on relatively neutral ground.
That could serve adversaries’ propaganda aims by weakening and dividing society. Seed enough outrage or moral indignation through algorithmically amplified content & the audience is pre-conditioned for subsequent persuasion. No false claims, no coordinated messaging, just intensified sentiments.
New research by Michael Morgan, however, suggests that while TikTok may not tell you what to think or believe, it may condition how you FEEL before you think. Users’ emotional orientation shifts measurably on the platform even when declared political beliefs stay stable.
But the new compromise still seems to leave a hole in defence against foreign influence. One reason is that current propaganda monitoring tools focus on disinformation and ideology.
As UOttawa’s Michael Geist has explained, the government had no choice but to change tack once the Trump administration cut a deal with ByteDance. After PM Carney visited China, the government agreed to set aside its shutdown order and negotiated new terms with TikTok.
I’m told that was the most the government was able to do, and it was meant as a signal to the public that experts thought the platform was dangerous. TikTok brought a legal challenge to the order and kept its Toronto office open, and in January, a federal court overturned the shutdown.
Background: After an initial review, in 2024, the Liberal government said TikTok’s offices in Canada were “injurious to national security” and ordered them to close, although Canadians could still use the app.
Canada has followed the US and EU in allowing TikTok to operate, subject to data security conditions. The trouble is, these measures don’t appear to protect society from the platform’s more subtle propaganda and influence risks.
www.canada.ca/en/innovatio...
Hope to see you there. Ping me if you plan to attend and we could at least partake in the “dynamic networking in curated spaces designed for collaboration” and have some “insightful conversations shaping the future of business in Canada.” Or less ambitiously, just catch up over a coffee or a beer…
Looking forward to the Future of Business Summit April 20-21, where I’ll be one of the “high-profile speakers driving national & global change.” Billed as “Canada’s premier gathering of visionaries, innovators and decision-makers shaping our economic future." I’ll do my best to live up to the hype.
A new ChinaPower CSIS report provides alarming clarity on the scale and scope of China’s vast expansion of its military presence in the South China Sea, near Japan and, most forcefully, in the Taiwan Strait. It demonstrates how the PLA is normalizing its displays of joint cross-domain capability.
“Israel is hammering Iran. [But] the question is, how long can we go on like this? What is the endgame?”
Our analyst Mairav Zonszein reports from Tel Aviv as the U.S., Israel and Iran enter a perilous new phase of direct confrontation.
www.crisisgroup.org/how-we-work/...
My full testimony:
parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/P...
All my parliamentary appearances are here:
www.ourcommons.ca/committees/e...
Turning to China to hedge against Trump carries serious risks. Accommodation invites more coercion. The CCP playbook runs from inducements to dependency, to demands for deference, to coercion. Stay out of the doom-loop. More in my testimony to Canada’s House of Commons Committee on Trade last week.
What Xi’s really trying to do is behaviourally condition them to self-censor in return for economic crumbs and relief from bullying. It's propagandistic narrative control.
Xi’s framing is a dominance move that deliberately ignores that criticisms go public because it’s frustratingly hard to get access to Xi, and even when leaders do meet him, it usually doesn't accomplish anything for them, because the CCP has its own solipsistic agenda.
But what are we to do if we bring problems to the General Secretary, and he doesn't resolve them to our satisfaction?
More on my Substack in the link below. open.substack.com/pub/michaelk...
Canada’s PM reveals some clues about his discussion with China’s Xi in January. At a basic level, Xi articulated to Carney what everyone wants: "If you have a problem, talk to me directly. Don't criticize me publicly."
À mesure que les échanges s’approfondissent, les menaces à la sécurité, à la technologie et aux droits de la personne augmentent. Le silence sur les valeurs est un signal, et Pékin sait le lire.
