The prize announcement is here: dailynous.com/2024/12/19/...
But I thought more about that conversation—and I've come to think that that philosopher was right in their accusation. And now, instead of resisting the label, I've decided to embrace and reclaim it. So, this paper is an admission of guilt—and a coming out of the closet.
At the time—as a young graduate student—I was too embarrassed to call myself a 'sense-datum theorist', so I cowered and prevaricated in shame. I struggled to explain why, *technically*, I'm not a sense-datum theorist.
The story behind this paper starts a decade ago, when I was talking to another philosopher about my views on perception. The other philosopher said: “But isn’t that basically a version of sense-datum theory?”
I'm grateful to have won the Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind! And it's for "A Theory of Sense-Data," where I defend one of the most unpopular, ill-reputed, and disparaged views in all of philosophy. philpapers.org/rec/LEEATO-3