When is it justified for the EU to rely on emergency measures to protect Ukraine and counter Russia?
@elenachachko.bsky.social and Katerina Linos present a framework for answering that question:
www.justsecurity.org/129157/eu-em...
“There are serious questions on both the domestic law front and international law front,” Professor Elena Chachko (@elenachachko.bsky.social) told @reuters.com: www.reuters.com/world/americ... #BerkeleyLaw
Delighted to see JIEL 28(3) out in the world, which includes my article 'Dollar Dominance, De-Dollarisation, and International Law'.
The rest of the issue is packed with sharp work (inc @jbentonheath.bsky.social, @dcpeat.bsky.social, @elenachachko.bsky.social).
academic.oup.com/jiel/article...
Thank you @phverdier.bsky.social @uvalaw.bsky.social Sokol colloquium and @lawprofpuig.bsky.social, Kathleen Claussen & Michael Waibel for a terrific issue.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/...
The great @abenewman.bsky.social and I have a new paper in JIEL titled Building Norms of Economic coercion. It's a roadmap for thinking about the legitimacy of different instances of economic coercion, from unilateral sanctions to the tariff wars. Link below
Listen: Assistant Professor Elena Chachko @elenachachko.bsky.social on BBC's Wake Up to Money discussing the recent U.S. Court of Appeals ruling on President Trump's tariffs: www.bbc.com/audio/play/m... #UCBerkeleyLaw
On Friday, the State Department began firing over 1,000 employees.
In Feb, @SrAnderson.bsky.social and @ElenaChachko.bsky.social explained President Trump's "One Voice" executive order which asserted broad presidential prerogative over foreign affairs. www.lawfaremedia.org/article/one-...
Spoke with @npr.org about presidential use of emergency authority and our present moment @ucberkeleylaw.bsky.social
"This is what happens when you take an instrument that has been very useful for many administrations, for many years, and now you overextend it," says @elenachachko.bsky.social, assistant professor of law at UC Berkeley Law on presidential use of emergency powers www.npr.org/2025/06/09/n... @npr.org
By 5-4 vote, #SCOTUS *denies* Trump’s emergency application in foreign aid funding cases, but in a way that sends things back to the district court *before* the payments will have to be made:
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24p...
And yet there are serious precedent-setting effects to consider, as well as implications for European and American assets in other countries—frozen or not. The exigencies of the Ukraine situation should not obscure these concerns.
Are we about to see this line in sanctions policy crossed? Would not be a surprise in the wake of the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting. Transferring frozen assets in the Ukraine case could strike many as an instance of “unlawful but legitimate”.
Under international law, sanctions are supposed to be temporary and reversible. That’s why the assets are frozen, not permanently seized. Issues arise under U.S. law too. So far sanctioning countries agreed to let Ukraine take out a loan against proceeds from the seized assets but not the principal.
Calls are getting louder to allow the transfer of Russian frozen assets to support Ukraine as the U.S. pulls back. About 250B (of roughly 300) are held in EU. When this proposal was debated before many—Biden officials included—concluded that such transfer would likely be unlawful.
Read today's Executive Functions Morning Roundup: the next round in the battle over the admin's effort to fire Hampton Dellinger, more demotions for DOJ prosecutors, commentary from @sranderson.bsky.social and @elenachachko.bsky.social, and more (first three stories below). tinyurl.com/a9pz5834
‘One Voice’ and the Trump Administration’s Conduct of Foreign Affairs www.lawfaremedia.org/article/one-... by Prof @elenachachko.bsky.social and @sranderson.bsky.social @lawfare.bsky.social
One could parse this language but it sure reads like a full throated endorsement of a theory of executive power in foreign affairs that the Supreme Court has rejected, most recently in Zivotofsky II.
From the EO: “Article II of the United States Constitution vests the power to conduct foreign policy in the President of the United States.”
Interesting choice of language there with “one voice”…
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential...
Looking to make sense of our world of sanctions and economic statecraft? (Yeah, me too!)
Next Friday, February 21 at @fordhamlawnyc.bsky.social, the Fordham International Law Journal symposium on Economic Sanctions: go.activecalendar.com/FordhamUnive...
"PAUSING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT TO FURTHER AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY" (?????)
or is necessary for any reason to protect the revenue or to prevent unlawful importations." It is questionable whether the EOs properly exercised that waiver.
Section 321 does provide for a waiver. "The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by regulations to prescribe exceptions to any exemption ... whenever he finds that such action is consistent with the purpose of subsection (a)...
Trump eliminated it anyway based on IEEPA, potentially setting up a conflict between the President and congressional statute (aka Youngstown category III).
But Biden stopped short of modifying the exemption unilaterally via executive order. The reason for Biden's hesitation may have been a belief that eliminating the exception would require changing the statue.
Around 2020, lawmakers and Biden officials began advocating for reform to curb the flow of illicit goods like opioids and competition from predominantly Chinese companies delivering cheap merch directly to U.S. consumers. Notably, the U.S. threshold is comparatively very high.
The de minimis exemption originates in sec. 321 of the Tariff Act of 1930. It now exempts imported goods up to 800 USD from standard duties and process. The exemption used to enjoy bipartisan support.
