One of Kripkestein’s main points is that the potential cannot be grounded on the actual, because the infinite cannot be grounded on the finite.
13.03.2026 21:49
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One of Kripkestein’s main points is that the potential cannot be grounded on the actual, because the infinite cannot be grounded on the finite.
The problem, of course, is whether there is an entity that is the subject, separate but related to the person as it presents itself to third persons.
Is what is possible independent from what is actual?
People don't like celebrities fighting Paparazzi, because it is beating down
Sense data theory was not such a bad idea, actually.
To hypothesize that there is an object, say, planet 9 is not to postulate a hypothetical object Planet 9, just as to imagine a pink elephant is not to create an imaginary pink elephant.
Austin & Kripke: perceptual properties are intrinsically perceptual.
Ayer: the relation we have with an object when we see it is vastly different from the relation we have with perceptual properties when we see them.
Alongside Marco Rubio, the case’s cast includes a Trump-advising oilman, Kellyanne Conway, a GOP congressman code-named “Sombrero,” an Iran-Contra veteran, a cartel-linked cocaine trafficker, Ghislaine Maxwell’s lawyer and Nicolás Maduro.
www.levernews.com/the-miami-tr...
“Proper names do not have meaning, not even syntactically driven. They serve as mere syntactic placeholder for a suitable contextual pragmatic assignment”. García Ramírez & Saab.
According to Carmen Curcó, proper names are like non-perspectival indexicals. Being a bearer of a name is to being the referent of the use of a name as being close is to being the referent of a use of the determinant “this”.
Simplicial models are duals of Kripke models
How are indistinguishable entities related? By transformations.
Knowledge is grounded on indistinguishability.
In 1975 Margarita Valdés read “Naming and Necessity” for the first time. It was recommended to her by Hugo Margain. She was very impressed, read it in one go and became a lifelong fan. She realized that she needed to become a Kripke advocate.
Distraction is the opposite of boredom
Gazzaley and Rosen: distraction is just suboptimal distribution of attention
Recuerden sintonizar hoy, como todos los lunes, d e 2 a 3pm, La Cosecha de la Casa, por @Reactor105
Estaré poniendo lo más nuevo de la programación
www.imer.mx/reactor/reac...
A new interactive workshop on prison censorship by @themarshallproject.org puts a PEN America report on widespread book censorship in prisons front and center. Check out the workshop: www.themarshallproject.org/events/works...
If we have formal theories of truth and of modality, why not of existence?
Now out: How did earthquakes come to have a (quantitative) size? How can we quantify without experimental control? @cristianlarph.bsky.social and I answer both questions and show their implications for human science measurement.
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
#philsci #histsci #seismology
"Antes, el feminismo contaba con marcos para analizar determinadas situaciones; ahora [todo] ha quedado subsumido bajo el concepto de violencia.”
Laura Macaya 2026
"Euforia Adolescente" de Abril ya salió en 2024 y creo que no le prestamos suficiente atención, es muy buen album de pop.
¡Manúscrito enviado! Deséenme éxito
Es un desatino el que las revistas aún te pidan ascripción a la hora de someter un manuscrito
I just love advice columns. Even better that I love most public practical philosophy. This here is a great example on how one simple situation can exemplify deep moral issues.
slate.com/advice/2026/...
Some metaphysicians think that yes, that is what topos do in our ontology.
the (intrinsic, yet relational) property of having that part. Does the same thing hold in the inverse order? For every property, is there such an associated part that the object has whenever (and maybe even be metaphysically responsible for the fact that) she has that property?
What is the relation between parts and properties? On the one hand, ontologically they are deeply different: parts are objects and properties are not. But on the other, there is a strong parallelism between them. For every part, there is an associated property, i.e., ... 🧵
o ¿pueden ser abstractas y entonces debemos extender nuestra noción de partes de tal manera que un objeto material tenga partes abstractas?