That's not what "export ban" implies, and the distinction matters for policy design. Worth noting too that even the 2024 figures are likely a lower bound (we capture rerouting but not smuggling or misclassification), and that for military goods, any remaining imports can matter.
Thanks for sharing! Indeed, sanctions reduced imports substantially, and we explicitly highlight the 2024 improvements. The title refers particularly to the early phase: until Jan 2024, many military-relevant product categories were only partially banned, with related subcategories still legal...
The figure shows monthly Russian imports of 42 military-relevant product categories from the EU Common High-Priority list, total and decomposed by channel, using Russian customs transaction data and authors’ coding of EU export bans. Dark red: products not yet subject to any ban. Light red: partially banned products (some product variants are banned but others remain legal to export). Dark grey: in-transit flows with EU as both origin and dispatch country. Light grey: fully banned products rerouted via third countries (non-EU dispatch country). Despite comprehensive export sanctions from Western allies against Russia, Western components continue to appear in Russian weapons. This column uses transaction-level Russian customs data combined with novel data on EU export bans to separate and quantify three distinct channels through which banned military-relevant goods reached Russia. Trade continued legally for nearly two years, as restrictions were gradually introduced. Furthermore, goods could claim to transit through Russia en route to other destinations or they were rerouted through intermediary countries. It argues that the design and implementation of export bans deserve at least as much attention as their announcement.
Russia acquired Western weapons components post-sanctions via 3 channels: gradual introduction of restrictions, goods transiting through Russia, or rerouted goods.
L Scheckenhofer @feodorateti.bsky.social @torundavid.bsky.social @joschkawanner.bsky.social
cepr.org/voxeu/column...
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Check out the August 2025 issue (23,4) of @jeeanews.bsky.social Journal of @eeanews.bsky.social
academic.oup.com/jeea/issue
Teaching materials available: www.eeassoc.org/teaching-mat...
🌟We have an exciting guest next week!
@torundavid.bsky.social will be at the ifo Institute from April 21st to May 3rd!🎉
Check out his website for more info on his research in International Trade.
Don’t miss the chance to learn from his expertise!🔍
sites.google.com/view/davidto...
We thank the referees and the editor for their thoughtful feedback. Feel free to reach out if you have any questions! 5/5
US tariffs: Large tariff increases destroy firms’ sunk investments. As a result, these tariffs have long-lasting effects, even if they’re short-lived. Reverting tariffs to old levels won’t simply restore trade flows to pre-trade war levels. 3/5
Timing: What if some countries liberalize trade earlier than others? When major trade partners cut barriers first, they gain a first-mover advantage, which boosts export growth relative to late liberalizers and makes global trade more concentrated overall. 2/5
Thrilled to see our paper forthcoming @jeeanews.bsky.social!
We show how incumbent firms shape international trade (🧵linked below).
Some implications: The timing of trade liberalization matters, and the planned surge in US tariffs can have long-lasting effects, even if tariffs are temporary. 1/5
Thanks, Tom! Could you please add me?
I updated the starter pack of academic economists who work on international trade
But I'm sure I've missed many people, so suggestions welcome #econsky
go.bsky.app/G3dqAYg
