The current Internet shutdown in Iran is in its 7th day.
A small amount of traffic continues to trickle out of Iran for whitelisted individuals and services, for everyone else, almost no connectivity whatsoever.
#IranWar #DigitalBlackoutlran
Nearly all of the Iranian internet has been down for 43+ hours but, as was the case with last month's shutdown, there is a tiny amount of traffic still getting passed.
Within the remaining traffic, we can see subsequent outages, possibly caused by continued US/IL airstrikesโฆ๐งต
Internet connectivity in Iran is now in a near-complete shutdown, down about 98% vs the previous week. The disruption began around 07:00 UTC, following reports of military strikes โ and in past incidents the government has responded with nationwide Internet shutdowns.
IODA shows the Internet in Iran has been cutoff from the global Internet since ~7:00 AM UTC. The regime implemented a similar Internet shutdown when Israel attacked Iran in June of 2025.
Follow connectivity in Iran in near realtime:
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?f...
Internet connectivity down in Iran as airstrikes hit the country.
Traffic volume dropped at 07:06 UTC and then again at 11:47 UTC with minimal connectivity remaining.
The country had a partial restoration since Jan-27 following a complete shutdown in Jan-8.
โ๏ธYesterday, #Gabon started blocking access to social media
We just published a report documenting the blocking of WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube in Gabon based on OONI data: explorer.ooni.org/findings/340...
We thank community members in Gabon for contributing measurements ๐
Huge thanks to everyone who donated to OONI! โฅ๏ธ
As part of our 2025 end-of-year fundraising campaign, we raised โฌ45,108. We are deeply grateful for each and every contribution. ๐
Your support helps us continue providing free software tools and open data in defense of a free and open internet. ๐
๐ Today marks 9 years since we launched the OONI Probe Mobile App! ๐
Its launch led to a major increase in global OONI measurement coverage ๐โจ
Warm thanks to everyone running OONI Probe and contributing to the worldโs largest open dataset on internet censorship ๐โค๏ธ
ooni.org/install/mobile
#ooni
Weโve been building an Anonymous Credentials system to strengthen trust in OONI data ๐ช
Today weโre sharing details of the system ๐
https://ooni.org/post/2025-announcing-ooni-new-anonymous-credential-system/
Feedback welcome, especially from cryptographers & implementers ๐
โผ๏ธ Last week, #Uganda experienced a 5-day internet shutdown during its 2026 general election.
Once internet access was restored, access to WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter/X was blocked.
Learn more in our latest report: explorer.ooni.org/findings/352... ๐โจ
#ooni #censorship #opendata
Iran's shutdown is now 15 days and counting. Small amounts of service have been restored in recent days.
#DigitalBlackoutIran #IranRevoIution2026
State telecom TIC (A49666) re-established many of its lost connections with outside providers, such as GBI (AS200612) at 22:02 UTC on Jan-22.
As two full weeks of #IranDigitalBlackout approaches, traffic again began to grow, starting around 18:00 UTC on 21-Jan. The growth was driven by large increases across several ASNs, and could potentially be related to an expanding whitelist of domains.
radar.cloudflare.com/dns/ir?dateR...
The IODA team completed a comparative analysis of the ongoing Internet shutdown in Iran to shutdowns during Bloody November in 2019, Women Life Freedom Movement in 2022, and the Israel-Iran War in 2025. Please read and reach out with any questions [โฆ]
It's been a big year protecting an Open Internet.
In 2025 we collected 566M msmts from 214 CCs in 10k nets
As the Internet is increasingly fragmented, transparency is ever more essential.
Thank you for helping us build the world's largest Open dataset on Network Interferenceโฃ๏ธ
It's 13 yrs since our 1st Myanmar measurement (Dec 5, 2012) on AS18399 ๐
๐ https://explorer.ooni.org/m/01201212058caa1e07f407aa96c4e33a12c056e2
As #Myanmar elections start tomorrow, we recommit to documenting #NetInterference globally.
#MyanmarElections #DocumentCensorship
Link to the report: ooni.org/post/2025-ir...
Sorry our posting platform ate our link ๐ญ๐ญ๐ญ๐ญ๐ญ๐ญ๐ญ
Credit and thanks
๐ค๐ค๐งก๐ฉถ๐
โข The activists who shared experiences under real risk ๐
โข OONI Probe users in Iran who contributed measurements ๐
Report authors include Miaan Group + OONI researchers ๐
@DennaMillet @Ammir @agrabeli_ @elyachmeneva @null_crack @hellais
EOF
If you work in policy, HR, philanthropy, or research: treat ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ต๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐, ๐ฑ๐ถ๐๐ฐ๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ถ๐น๐ถ๐๐, ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฑ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐๐ as core infrastructure for movements, not "nice-to-haves".
Blocking a website can mean blocking a decade of memory
@internetarchive
Whatโs needed (as emphasized by respondents):
โข more secure & accessible circumvention
โข digital literacy and privacy awareness
โข alternative channels that fit local constraints
โข sustained international attention and support aligned with activistsโ realities
@OpenTechFund
โฌ๏ธ Bottom line โฌ๏ธ
This report shows censorship is not just "sites being down". It can erase history, fragment communities, deepen inequality, and constrain safety, while activists continue adapting and pushing womenโs demands into public and political life
Impact #5
๐ฅ๐ฒ๐๐ถ๐น๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ฎ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ฝ๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
Despite constraints, activists keep moving: more encrypted messaging, more short-form and interactive content, more multilingual publishing, and creative workarounds
Impact #4
๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ธ๐ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ธ๐ป๐ผ๐๐น๐ฒ๐ฑ๐ด๐ฒ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ณ๐ฒ๐ฟ
When blogs and archives are blocked, intergenerational learning suffers. Older activist modes (blogging/websites) and younger modes (social platforms) drift apart, weakening continuity and collective memory
Impact #3
๐ฆ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ป๐๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ & ๐ฝ๐๐๐ฐ๐ต๐ผ๐น๐ผ๐ด๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฒ๐ณ๐ณ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐
Censorship drives self-censorship. Activists described fatigue, frustration, isolation, and reduced feedback loops, plus fear that normal participation is treated as "illegal"
Impact #2
๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ด๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ถ๐ป๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ๐บ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
People route around blocks by shifting to social media, messaging apps, podcasts, and foreign platforms, but this often produces scattered, temporary, hard-to-find knowledge.
Impact #1
๐๐ผ๐๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐ฐ๐๐บ๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป & ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฐ๐ต๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐
Blocked sites and declining website activity mean campaigns, reports, and histories disappear or become inaccessible.
Now the "so what": interviews show censorship reshapes the womenโs rights ecosystem, not only access, but also memory, coordination, safety, and morale. We can summarize the impacts in five buckets.
Core finding #3
๐๐ฒ๐ป๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐๐ต๐ถ๐ฝ ๐ฎ๐ฝ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ด๐ฒ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ, ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ฏ๐น๐ฎ๐ป๐ธ๐ฒ๐.
Even though more international sites were tested (25) than Persian sites (17), ๐บ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฏ๐น๐ผ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฑ (๐ณ ๐๐ ๐ฑ).
Core finding #2
๐๐ก๐ฆ ๐๐ฎ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ถ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฑ๐ผ๐บ๐ถ๐ป๐ฎ๐ป๐ ๐๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ต๐ป๐ถ๐พ๐๐ฒ used by major Iranian ISPs to block these websites, confirmed when DNS resolution returns private/bogon IPs that match known censorship fingerprints.
The ๐ฑ ๐ฏ๐น๐ผ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ถ๐ป๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ป๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ฎ๐น ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐ identified in OONI data are:
โข awid.org (AWID)
โข womenonweb.org (Women on Web) @WomenOnWaves_
โข wluml.org (Women Living Under Muslim Laws)
โข rawa.org (RAWA)
โข thepolygon.ca (The Polygon Gallery)
The ๐ณ ๐ฏ๐น๐ผ๐ฐ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ฃ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ๐ identified in OONI data are:
โข iranwire.com (IranWire)
โข zaagaah.com (Zagah)
โข aasoo.org (ASO)
โข anfpersian.com (ANF News)
โข feministschool.com (Feminist School)
โข we-change.org (We-Change)
โข avishanx.com (AvishanX)
