Ron Johnson opposed the expanded child tax credit that dramatically cut child poverty, but he did just vote for a $6000 senior deduction.
We’re all trying to find the guy that did this.
@davedeek.substack.com
Big fan of Common Side Effects Writes: https://www.governance.fyi Biases: YIMBY, Urbanist, Antitrust, Right To Repair, Free Speech, Deming’s Fanboy, ML models are useful but against AI Art
Ron Johnson opposed the expanded child tax credit that dramatically cut child poverty, but he did just vote for a $6000 senior deduction.
We’re all trying to find the guy that did this.
None of these require new legislation. None require new revenue. And the evidence we review here says they matter more than the expensive programs cities typically reach for first. We want to make an argument that will sound, at first, like we are telling local officials to do nothing. We are not. We are telling them to do the thing that matters as more of a prerequisite/ corequisite and costs the least, before they do the things will cost a lot of money. The lowest cost investment (in the long term) a city can make to support family formation is not a new subsidy, a new program, or a new department. It is making the existing institutional machinery work as designed: delivering services reliably, communicating intentions clearly, and earning the trust of households deciding whether this is a place where they can raise a child. You will need to spend money in the mid-to-long term. Right now we are talking about the lowest hanging (and cheapest) fruit to a very complex and expensive phenomenon.
The cheapest way for cities to become family friendly and more pronatal, is just focusing on doing a better job and improving service delivery
www.governance.fyi/p/nolow-cost...
chat, why is it bad to force hundreds of people to breathe toxic carcinogens in a confined space?
YOU JUST REALIZE THIS?
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY BROS BEEN SCREAMING FROM THE ROOFTOPS?!?!
12/12
かつて100ドルの原油に反応したワイルドキャッターたちはもういない。ウォール街が彼らに取って代わった。日本の254日分の備蓄は、来ない供給増に対してカウントダウンしている。
#石油 #日本経済 #ホルムズ海峡 #Energy
11/12
日本のエネルギー安全保障は二つの前提の上に成り立ってきた。十分な備蓄と、反応する世界の供給サイド。備蓄はまだある。供給サイドが変わった。
10/12
エクソンとシェブロンがプレマーケットで6%超上昇した時、投資家は増産を織り込んでいなかった。同じバレル数での利益率向上を織り込んでいた。
9/12
EOGは2026年のフリーキャッシュフローの90〜100%を株主還元に充てると発表。生産は横ばい。シェブロンは2025年に121億ドルの自社株買い。過去最高額だ。
8/12
パイオニアの当時のCEOスコット・シェフィールド(現在同社はエクソン傘下、買収額600億ドル)はこう言った。「150ドルでも200ドルでも100ドルでも、成長計画は変えない。」
7/12
2022年、原油は100ドル超。大手石油5社の合計利益は約1990億ドル。彼らは自社株を買った。増産はしなかった。
6/12
2022年から2025年前半にかけて、米国石油・ガス企業のキャッシュフローの約45%が配当と自社株買いに回った(デロイト調べ)。再投資率は2010年代半ばの半分だ。
5/12
2008年、ブレントが133ドルに達した時、米国では数百のE&P企業がリース権、サービス、人材を奪い合った。生産は数カ月で価格に追随した。そのモデルは死んだ。
4/12
かつての答えはこうだった。米国のシェール企業が価格シグナルに反応し、増産で市場を満たすまでの時間。そのメカニズムはもう機能していない。
3/12
日本には備蓄がある。輸入量254日分。それは事実だ。だが備蓄はバッファーであって、解決策ではない。時間を稼ぐだけだ。問題は、何のための時間か。
2/12
月曜、日経平均は7%超の下落。原油は1バレル114ドルを突破。日銀は3月の利上げを予定していた。それが凍結された。アナリストは「戦略的麻痺」と呼んでいる。
1/12
日本の原油の95%は中東から来る。その約70%がホルムズ海峡を通る。その海峡が今、閉鎖されている。
なぜ米国のシェール産業は助けに来ないのか。🧵
#原油 #日経平均 #エネルギー安全保障
Really Really Bad Things On Every Level
14/14
They were pricing in higher margins on the same barrels.
We used to have an energy sector that responded to price signals with supply. Now it responds with shareholder distributions.
The wildcatters are almost all gone. Wall Street won. We all lose
#Oil #Finance #Houston #Investing
13/14
EOG committed to returning 90 to 100% of free cash flow to shareholders in 2026, production flat. Chevron recorded $12.1B in buybacks during 2025, a record. When Exxon and Chevron surged 6%+ pre-market Monday, investors weren't pricing in more barrels.
12/14
Scott Sheffield, then Pioneer CEO (now part of Exxon after a $60B deal): "Whether it's $150 oil, $200 oil, or $100 oil, we're not going to change our growth plans."
11/14
The pattern is now symmetric. Lower prices: return less cash, drill less. Higher prices: return more cash, drill the same.
10/14
By early 2026, European majors (Shell, BP, TotalEnergies, Equinor) were cutting buybacks as Brent lingered in the $60s. U.S. supermajors ExxonMobil and Chevron reiterated their buyback pace.
9/14
And what did they do with it?
Not drill. They bought back stock and raised dividends.
8/14
The first real test came in 2022. Crude above $100. The five largest public oil companies earned a combined ~$199B. The global industry earned nearly $4 trillion, per the IEA. More cash than ever.
7/14
The money no longer cycles through Houston's economy. It flows to institutional shareholders and pension funds, most of whom are not in Houston and none of whom hire welders in Katy.
6/14
Wood Mackenzie reported in late Feb 2026 that the 30 largest oil and gas companies now return 30 to 50% of op. cash flow to shareholders. Reinvestment rates are 1/2 of mid-2010s levels.
5/14
Between 2022 and mid-2025, nearly 45% of U.S. oil and gas cash flows went to dividends and buybacks (per Deloitte).
4/14
What replaced it? Capital discipline. Not temporary. Permanent. Enforced by compensation structures, board mandates, and an investor base ready to punish any reversion to growth-at-all-costs.
3/14
Many independents ran negative free cash flow for years. The 2014 crash triggered bankruptcies. The 2020 pandemic collapse, when WTI briefly traded at negative $37/barrel, finished the job.
2/14
In 2008, Brent hit $133/barrel. Hundreds of independent E&P firms competed for acreage, services, and talent. When prices rose, production followed within months.
The model worked. It was also financially unsustainable.