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VoxEU @ CEPR

@voxeu.org

VoxEU – CEPR’s policy portal - promotes "research-based policy analysis and commentary by leading economists". VoxEU columns cover all fields of economics broadly defined and are widely read.

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Latest posts by VoxEU @ CEPR @voxeu.org

Figure shows the number of immigrants arriving in Israel from the former Soviet Union, by year.

The integration of immigrants is the subject of contentious public debates. This column studies the labour market outcomes of nearly one million Jews who migrated from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the 1990s and were granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival. The immigrants initially worked in lower-paying firms than natives, but narrowed the wage gap with natives by switching jobs more often and making larger upward moves when they did. Policies that tie immigrants to a single employer or delay unrestricted work authorisation may slow access to better firms and delay convergence.

Figure shows the number of immigrants arriving in Israel from the former Soviet Union, by year. The integration of immigrants is the subject of contentious public debates. This column studies the labour market outcomes of nearly one million Jews who migrated from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the 1990s and were granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival. The immigrants initially worked in lower-paying firms than natives, but narrowed the wage gap with natives by switching jobs more often and making larger upward moves when they did. Policies that tie immigrants to a single employer or delay unrestricted work authorisation may slow access to better firms and delay convergence.

J Arellano-Bover & S San use evidence from Jews who immigrated to Israel from the former USSR in the 90s & were granted citizenship upon arrival to show policies that delay unrestricted work authorisation may slow access to better firms & delay convergence.
cepr.org/voxeu/column...
#EconSky

10.03.2026 10:03 👍 2 🔁 3 💬 0 📌 0
The graph plots the average monthly frequencies of price changes (black lines), increases (red lines) and decreases (blue lines) in the euro area, the solid lines plots the +/- 6-period-window moving averages of the frequencies (source Gautier et al. 2026). Euro area HICP inflation excluding energy is represented by the grey histogram (source Eurostat)

When inflation is low and aggregate shocks are small, prices tend to be sticky and the proportion of price changes is broadly constant. When aggregate shocks are large, models predict that prices will adjust more frequently, implying that ‘large shocks travel fast’. This column provides new evidence on the stickiness of consumer prices in the euro area during the 2021-2024 inflation episode. Retailers facing a large but transitory shock did indeed increase their frequency of price changes, accelerating the transmission of the shock to prices, but this increase proved to be only temporary.

The graph plots the average monthly frequencies of price changes (black lines), increases (red lines) and decreases (blue lines) in the euro area, the solid lines plots the +/- 6-period-window moving averages of the frequencies (source Gautier et al. 2026). Euro area HICP inflation excluding energy is represented by the grey histogram (source Eurostat) When inflation is low and aggregate shocks are small, prices tend to be sticky and the proportion of price changes is broadly constant. When aggregate shocks are large, models predict that prices will adjust more frequently, implying that ‘large shocks travel fast’. This column provides new evidence on the stickiness of consumer prices in the euro area during the 2021-2024 inflation episode. Retailers facing a large but transitory shock did indeed increase their frequency of price changes, accelerating the transmission of the shock to prices, but this increase proved to be only temporary.

Erwan Gautier et al. provide new evidence on the stickiness of consumer prices in the euro area during the 2021-2024 inflation episode. Euro area inflation did not simply reflect higher inflation, but also a different repricing behaviour.
cepr.org/voxeu/column...
#EconSky

10.03.2026 10:00 👍 2 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
Map of the United States showing that in states recording partisan affiliation, most counties fuel rising partisan segregation, with Democrats gaining strength on the urban coasts and Republicans in the rural heartland, Florida, and Maine.

Political polarisation has increased dramatically in the US in recent decades and is often linked to partisan geographic segregation. This column presents new evidence from 2008 to 2020 that reveals an increase in partisan segregation even at very local levels. However, while most studies focus on one explanatory factor, residential mobility, we find that generational change (in Democratic-trending areas) and Democrats leaving their party (in Republican-trending areas) explain a much larger share of the rise in partisan segregation.

Map of the United States showing that in states recording partisan affiliation, most counties fuel rising partisan segregation, with Democrats gaining strength on the urban coasts and Republicans in the rural heartland, Florida, and Maine. Political polarisation has increased dramatically in the US in recent decades and is often linked to partisan geographic segregation. This column presents new evidence from 2008 to 2020 that reveals an increase in partisan segregation even at very local levels. However, while most studies focus on one explanatory factor, residential mobility, we find that generational change (in Democratic-trending areas) and Democrats leaving their party (in Republican-trending areas) explain a much larger share of the rise in partisan segregation.

J Brown, @ryanenos.bsky.social, E Cantoni, @vinpons.bsky.social, & E Sartre find an increase in partisan segregation in the US even at very local levels. Generational change and Democrats leaving their party explain a large share of the rise of partisan segregation.
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#EconSky

09.03.2026 10:32 👍 9 🔁 3 💬 0 📌 1
The figures show the slope of the Phillips curve from the baseline estimations. Panel a) plots the raw inflation data and the raw unemployment data, grouped into 200 bins of unemployment. Panel b) plots the binned residuals of inflation and unemployment against region and time fixed effects and controlling for national inflation expectations. The dashed lines represent the best linear fit for both estimations; the grey areas show the associated confidence intervals. The data are expressed in percentage points.

The relationship between inflation and economic slack, shown by the Phillips curve, has long been a cornerstone of economic policymaking. This column uses regional data for 11 euro area countries from 1999 to 2023, instead of country-level data, to estimate the Phillips curve. It finds that inflation still responds to economic slack, but this relationship is more modest and largely shaped by inflation expectations. This implies that traditional demand-side central bank policies may have limited direct effects on inflation, highlighting that anchoring expectations is essential for effective monetary policy transmission.

The figures show the slope of the Phillips curve from the baseline estimations. Panel a) plots the raw inflation data and the raw unemployment data, grouped into 200 bins of unemployment. Panel b) plots the binned residuals of inflation and unemployment against region and time fixed effects and controlling for national inflation expectations. The dashed lines represent the best linear fit for both estimations; the grey areas show the associated confidence intervals. The data are expressed in percentage points. The relationship between inflation and economic slack, shown by the Phillips curve, has long been a cornerstone of economic policymaking. This column uses regional data for 11 euro area countries from 1999 to 2023, instead of country-level data, to estimate the Phillips curve. It finds that inflation still responds to economic slack, but this relationship is more modest and largely shaped by inflation expectations. This implies that traditional demand-side central bank policies may have limited direct effects on inflation, highlighting that anchoring expectations is essential for effective monetary policy transmission.

A Beschin, J Paredes, G Polichetti, & T Renault use data from 11 euro area countries to estimate the Phillips curve and show that inflation still responds to economic slack, but the relationship is more modest and largely shaped by inflation expectations.
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#EconSky

09.03.2026 10:25 👍 4 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
Figure shows that what initially appears to be a sizeable remote work premium is largely explained by its correlation with higher wages, professional occupations, and stronger workplace environments. Location flexibility, once separated from these correlated attributes, carries considerably less explanatory power.

Remote work has become part of the workplace fabric across the world, but evidence on its impact on productivity and job satisfaction is often contradictory. This column argues that the debate has been framed too narrowly. Using data from PayScale and Gallup, the authors show that once compensation, occupation, and workplace environment are controlled for, as well as types of task and manager quality, the contribution of remote work is smaller and more conditional than headline comparisons suggest.

Figure shows that what initially appears to be a sizeable remote work premium is largely explained by its correlation with higher wages, professional occupations, and stronger workplace environments. Location flexibility, once separated from these correlated attributes, carries considerably less explanatory power. Remote work has become part of the workplace fabric across the world, but evidence on its impact on productivity and job satisfaction is often contradictory. This column argues that the debate has been framed too narrowly. Using data from PayScale and Gallup, the authors show that once compensation, occupation, and workplace environment are controlled for, as well as types of task and manager quality, the contribution of remote work is smaller and more conditional than headline comparisons suggest.

Christos Makridis & Jason Schloetzer show that once compensation, workforce environment, and task and manager quality are controlled for, the contribution of remote work to job satisfaction is smaller and more conditional than is often suggested.
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#EconSky

09.03.2026 10:24 👍 7 🔁 2 💬 1 📌 0
The left panel shows average cumulative net tightening index (iBoP-C) (negative values indicate net loosening). The right panel shows average cumulative net tightening (iBoP-C) by income group (2024 World Bank Income Group Classification).

As geoeconomic tensions rise, researchers rush to understand how cross-border restrictions have been used in the past. This column constructs a new, publicly available, daily dataset on de jure cross-border flow restrictions using seven decades of IMF reports. Capital account controls are only a small part of a much wider toolkit spanning current account, foreign exchange market and financial sector measures, and these tools are typically deployed in multi-instrument packages, especially during currency and debt crises. The findings provide an empirical basis for discussions on the potential role of cross-border restrictions in times of financial fragmentation.

The left panel shows average cumulative net tightening index (iBoP-C) (negative values indicate net loosening). The right panel shows average cumulative net tightening (iBoP-C) by income group (2024 World Bank Income Group Classification). As geoeconomic tensions rise, researchers rush to understand how cross-border restrictions have been used in the past. This column constructs a new, publicly available, daily dataset on de jure cross-border flow restrictions using seven decades of IMF reports. Capital account controls are only a small part of a much wider toolkit spanning current account, foreign exchange market and financial sector measures, and these tools are typically deployed in multi-instrument packages, especially during currency and debt crises. The findings provide an empirical basis for discussions on the potential role of cross-border restrictions in times of financial fragmentation.

Katharina Bergant, Andrés Fernández Martin, Ken Teoh, & Martín Uribe show that capital account controls are only a small part of a much wider toolkit of cross-border flow restrictions, spanning current account, FX market, and financial sector measures.
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#EconSky

09.03.2026 10:22 👍 6 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
The figure shows the number of Canadian resident visitors returning to Canada from the US in each week of 2023, 2024, and 2025. Figures are in thousands of visitors. The percentage figure represents the change in 2025 relative to the average of 2023 and 2024.

President Trump’s rhetoric about a possible acquisition of Canada and escalating trade tensions led to a 25% decline in Canadian visits to the US in 2025. This column uses smartphone foot-traffic data and employment records to explore how this negative demand shock affected US local labour markets, especially in the food services, retail, and leisure sectors. By mid-2025, establishments in areas with the highest share of Canadians among visitors employed roughly 6% fewer workers relative to establishments in less exposed markets, and spillover effects may imply even larger employment losses. The findings highlight a channel of harm that trade policy debates often overlook.

The figure shows the number of Canadian resident visitors returning to Canada from the US in each week of 2023, 2024, and 2025. Figures are in thousands of visitors. The percentage figure represents the change in 2025 relative to the average of 2023 and 2024. President Trump’s rhetoric about a possible acquisition of Canada and escalating trade tensions led to a 25% decline in Canadian visits to the US in 2025. This column uses smartphone foot-traffic data and employment records to explore how this negative demand shock affected US local labour markets, especially in the food services, retail, and leisure sectors. By mid-2025, establishments in areas with the highest share of Canadians among visitors employed roughly 6% fewer workers relative to establishments in less exposed markets, and spillover effects may imply even larger employment losses. The findings highlight a channel of harm that trade policy debates often overlook.

By mid-2025, US establishments in areas w/ the highest share of Canadians among visitors employed roughly 6% fewer workers relative to establishments in less exposed markets, w/ a 25% overall decline in Canadian visits to the US in 2025.
A Kurmann, E Lalé, J Martin
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#EconSky

09.03.2026 10:20 👍 5 🔁 7 💬 1 📌 1
Description of the figure: At first the innovation was incremental process improvements, but now China has moved up the value chain and also innovates at the frontier. The country now wins almost half of the world records for solar cell efficiency, whereas before 2005 it did not win any.

China's solar industry is a poster child for the country’s economic rise over the last four decades. The output of Chinese solar grew by 76% annually between 2004 and 2013, and by 2019 Chinese firms accounted for 63% of all solar panels produced worldwide. At the same time, the cost of solar has fallen by over 90%, making it competitive with fossil fuels. This column shows that local government subsidies to produce, install and perform solar R&D were a major cause of the industry’s explosive growth. The findings highlight that green industrial policies pursued at the national level can become a powerful means of slowing global warming.

Description of the figure: At first the innovation was incremental process improvements, but now China has moved up the value chain and also innovates at the frontier. The country now wins almost half of the world records for solar cell efficiency, whereas before 2005 it did not win any. China's solar industry is a poster child for the country’s economic rise over the last four decades. The output of Chinese solar grew by 76% annually between 2004 and 2013, and by 2019 Chinese firms accounted for 63% of all solar panels produced worldwide. At the same time, the cost of solar has fallen by over 90%, making it competitive with fossil fuels. This column shows that local government subsidies to produce, install and perform solar R&D were a major cause of the industry’s explosive growth. The findings highlight that green industrial policies pursued at the national level can become a powerful means of slowing global warming.

@ibanares-sanchez.bsky.social, Robin Burgess, Dávid László, Pol Simpson, @johnvanreenen.bsky.social, & Yifan Wang show that Chinese local government subsidies to produce, install, and perform solar R&D were a major cause of the industry's explosive growth.
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#EconSky

06.03.2026 09:06 👍 5 🔁 3 💬 0 📌 0
A number of concerns have been raised regarding retail central bank digital currency. These range from competition and innovation, privacy issues, and monetary sovereignty. This column argues that central bank digital currency is not just another digital payment tool, but state-issued money with the potential to fundamentally reshape monetary systems. It emphasises the differences between neutrality and non-neutrality in adoption, and the implications of both for the financial system. Ultimately, the macroeconomic significance of central bank digital currency is shaped by policy choices, and political economy determines whether it will become a significant factor.

A number of concerns have been raised regarding retail central bank digital currency. These range from competition and innovation, privacy issues, and monetary sovereignty. This column argues that central bank digital currency is not just another digital payment tool, but state-issued money with the potential to fundamentally reshape monetary systems. It emphasises the differences between neutrality and non-neutrality in adoption, and the implications of both for the financial system. Ultimately, the macroeconomic significance of central bank digital currency is shaped by policy choices, and political economy determines whether it will become a significant factor.

Dirk Niepelt argues that CBDC is not just another digital payment tool, but state-issued money with the potential to fundamentally reshape monetary systems. Political economy will determine whether it will become a significant factor.
cepr.org/voxeu/column...
#EconSky

06.03.2026 09:04 👍 1 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
John Maynard Keynes was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1920s for writing “The Economic Consequences of the Peace”. Yet, despite being highly ranked by the advisor of the Nobel Committee and placed on the shortlist, he did not win. This column brings out previously unused archival material from the Nobel Committee in Oslo to explore why. The Committee tended to withhold the Prize when circumstances were too politically sensitive. Keynes, though praised and admired internationally, was likely politically too controversial to be chosen.

John Maynard Keynes was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1920s for writing “The Economic Consequences of the Peace”. Yet, despite being highly ranked by the advisor of the Nobel Committee and placed on the shortlist, he did not win. This column brings out previously unused archival material from the Nobel Committee in Oslo to explore why. The Committee tended to withhold the Prize when circumstances were too politically sensitive. Keynes, though praised and admired internationally, was likely politically too controversial to be chosen.

Lars Jonung examines archival material from the Nobel Committee in Oslo to understand why, despite being nominated three times in the 1920s, John Maynard Keynes did not win the Nobel Peace Prize for writing “The Economic Consequences of the Peace”.
cepr.org/voxeu/column...
#EconSky

05.03.2026 09:17 👍 6 🔁 5 💬 1 📌 0
Description of the figure: Exports of cleantech goods ($ billion). EIB staff calculations based on UN Comtrade data.

In recent years, the European economy has shown remarkable resilience, whilst continuing to transform. This column reveals how EU firms have adapted supply chains and invested in the energy and digital transitions, reducing vulnerability to shocks, cutting energy costs and keeping pace with the US on AI adoption. Europe is now stepping up on defence. But going forward, investment growth, which has been overly reliant on the public sector, will depend on an acceleration of private investment, driven by business opportunities and untapped potential of the EU Single Market. Future policy support will need to focus even more on impact and private capital mobilisation.

Description of the figure: Exports of cleantech goods ($ billion). EIB staff calculations based on UN Comtrade data. In recent years, the European economy has shown remarkable resilience, whilst continuing to transform. This column reveals how EU firms have adapted supply chains and invested in the energy and digital transitions, reducing vulnerability to shocks, cutting energy costs and keeping pace with the US on AI adoption. Europe is now stepping up on defence. But going forward, investment growth, which has been overly reliant on the public sector, will depend on an acceleration of private investment, driven by business opportunities and untapped potential of the EU Single Market. Future policy support will need to focus even more on impact and private capital mobilisation.

D Revoltella, A Kolev, L Maurin, E Sinnott, & T Bending (@eib.org) argue that while the EU has shown remarkable resilience, future European investment growth will depend on an acceleration of private investment, driven by the untapped potential of the single market.
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#EconSky

05.03.2026 09:15 👍 3 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
Description of the figure: A map of Ukrainian oblasts by exposure to the conflict (Low, Medium, High, Contested).

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has generated one of the largest labour supply and reallocation shocks in recent history. This column reveals, however, that job matching efficiency in the country has declined only modestly, with evidence of labour market shutdowns only along the frontline and in occupied regions. Mobilisation of underrepresented groups, remote working, wage flexibility, and a narrowing of the gap between wages offered by companies and demanded by workers have helped compensate for wartime frictions. Meeting the challenges of reconstruction will require investing in human capital, securing high employment among underrepresented groups, and strengthening the institutions that govern labour markets.

Description of the figure: A map of Ukrainian oblasts by exposure to the conflict (Low, Medium, High, Contested). The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has generated one of the largest labour supply and reallocation shocks in recent history. This column reveals, however, that job matching efficiency in the country has declined only modestly, with evidence of labour market shutdowns only along the frontline and in occupied regions. Mobilisation of underrepresented groups, remote working, wage flexibility, and a narrowing of the gap between wages offered by companies and demanded by workers have helped compensate for wartime frictions. Meeting the challenges of reconstruction will require investing in human capital, securing high employment among underrepresented groups, and strengthening the institutions that govern labour markets.

Mobilisation of underrepresented groups, remote working, wage flexibility, and a narrowing of the gap between wages offered by companies and demanded by workers have all helped compensate for wartime labour market frictions in Ukraine.
G Anastasia, T Boeri, O Zholud
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#EconSky

04.03.2026 09:56 👍 5 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
Description of figure: Market price indexes. NFT price indexes are from standard repeat-sale regressions with US dollar- and Ethereum-denominated NFT sale prices. ETH is the price index of Ethereum, BTC is the price index of Bitcoin. Index levels in April 2018 are normalized to 100.  William N. Goetzmann, Dong Huang, and Milad Nozari, "Non-Fungible Tokens as Investment," NBER Working Paper 34837 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34837.

The non-fungible token market exploded in 2021, but by late 2022 prices had collapsed. This column uses blockchain records for two major non-fungible token platforms to reveal what investors in the tokens actually earned. A disposition effect – the tendency for investors to hold onto losers and sell winners – inflated apparent returns and also delayed the apparent timing of the crash by seven months. Even after taking this disposition effect into account, the non-fungible token price rise was extraordinary, but was driven by a tiny number of extreme winners.

Description of figure: Market price indexes. NFT price indexes are from standard repeat-sale regressions with US dollar- and Ethereum-denominated NFT sale prices. ETH is the price index of Ethereum, BTC is the price index of Bitcoin. Index levels in April 2018 are normalized to 100. William N. Goetzmann, Dong Huang, and Milad Nozari, "Non-Fungible Tokens as Investment," NBER Working Paper 34837 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w34837. The non-fungible token market exploded in 2021, but by late 2022 prices had collapsed. This column uses blockchain records for two major non-fungible token platforms to reveal what investors in the tokens actually earned. A disposition effect – the tendency for investors to hold onto losers and sell winners – inflated apparent returns and also delayed the apparent timing of the crash by seven months. Even after taking this disposition effect into account, the non-fungible token price rise was extraordinary, but was driven by a tiny number of extreme winners.

William Goetzmann, Dong Huang, & Milad Nozari use #blockchain records to reveal what investors in the #NFT market actually earned. They show that the price rise was extraordinary, but ultimately driven by a tiny number of extreme winners.
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#EconSky

04.03.2026 09:55 👍 3 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 1
Description of the figure: AI intensity across European regions (left panel) and the cumulative change in the labour share between 2000 and 2017 (right panel). In regions with higher AI intensity, the labour income share tended to decrease during the overall time span.

The swift rise of artificial intelligence is raising fundamental concerns about the future of work. This column uses data from 238 regions across 21 European countries to examine how AI-related innovation influences the distribution of income between labour and capital, and among different skill classes of labour. Regions with more intense AI patenting tend to experience a decline in the labour share of income, especially in areas with a strong industrial base, indicating that AI acts as a capital-biased innovation. Without appropriate policy intervention, this trend could exacerbate existing inequalities.

Description of the figure: AI intensity across European regions (left panel) and the cumulative change in the labour share between 2000 and 2017 (right panel). In regions with higher AI intensity, the labour income share tended to decrease during the overall time span. The swift rise of artificial intelligence is raising fundamental concerns about the future of work. This column uses data from 238 regions across 21 European countries to examine how AI-related innovation influences the distribution of income between labour and capital, and among different skill classes of labour. Regions with more intense AI patenting tend to experience a decline in the labour share of income, especially in areas with a strong industrial base, indicating that AI acts as a capital-biased innovation. Without appropriate policy intervention, this trend could exacerbate existing inequalities.

Antonio Minniti, Klaus Prettner, Francesco Venturini, & David Bloom find that European regions with more intense #AI patenting tend to experience a decline in the labour share of income, indicating that AI acts as a capital-biased innovation.
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#EconSky

03.03.2026 10:30 👍 4 🔁 5 💬 0 📌 0
Description of the figure: Even the most actively traded EU global systemically important bank (G-SIB) and sovereign CDSs see limited activity, with Italy’s CDSs averaging just $571 million in daily notional across 13 trades, and most other EU sovereign CDSs recording only five to seven trades per day.

Credit default swap spreads have become critical benchmarks for credit risk assessment. A recent report from the European Systemic Risk Board, however, uncovers a range of imperfections in the credit default swap market that can affect its functioning under financial stress by increasing systemic risks through price-related impacts on funding costs. This column summarises the findings of the report, which also puts forward a set of policy proposals aimed at improving the functioning and liquidity of credit default swap markets, enhancing transparency, and strengthening the quality of information available to authorities.

Description of the figure: Even the most actively traded EU global systemically important bank (G-SIB) and sovereign CDSs see limited activity, with Italy’s CDSs averaging just $571 million in daily notional across 13 trades, and most other EU sovereign CDSs recording only five to seven trades per day. Credit default swap spreads have become critical benchmarks for credit risk assessment. A recent report from the European Systemic Risk Board, however, uncovers a range of imperfections in the credit default swap market that can affect its functioning under financial stress by increasing systemic risks through price-related impacts on funding costs. This column summarises the findings of the report, which also puts forward a set of policy proposals aimed at improving the functioning and liquidity of credit default swap markets, enhancing transparency, and strengthening the quality of information available to authorities.

Joana Baptista, Marco D'Errico, Loriana Pelizzon, Tuomas Peltonen, & Richard Portes summarise the findings of a recent ESRB report that uncovers a range of imperfections in the credit default swap market and provide policy recommendations aimed at improving it.
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#EconSky

02.03.2026 10:17 👍 3 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 1
Description of the figure: Comparing actual 2023 revenues against counterfactual scenarios in which the 2019 system had been kept unchanged or fully indexed shows that governments limited fiscal drag to varying degrees.

The 2022 inflationary spike in Europe has brought renewed interest in fiscal drag. Using harmonised microdata for 21 European countries, this column documents that the progressivity of personal income tax systems gives rise to large tax‑to‑base elasticities, implying substantial potential for fiscal drag if parameters are not adjusted. These effects are more prevalent for labour income and for taxpayers at the bottom and middle of the income distribution. Furthermore, it documents very heterogeneous policy responses across countries over 2019–2023, ranging from incomplete offsetting to over‑compensation of potential fiscal drag.

Description of the figure: Comparing actual 2023 revenues against counterfactual scenarios in which the 2019 system had been kept unchanged or fully indexed shows that governments limited fiscal drag to varying degrees. The 2022 inflationary spike in Europe has brought renewed interest in fiscal drag. Using harmonised microdata for 21 European countries, this column documents that the progressivity of personal income tax systems gives rise to large tax‑to‑base elasticities, implying substantial potential for fiscal drag if parameters are not adjusted. These effects are more prevalent for labour income and for taxpayers at the bottom and middle of the income distribution. Furthermore, it documents very heterogeneous policy responses across countries over 2019–2023, ranging from incomplete offsetting to over‑compensation of potential fiscal drag.

Data from 21 European countries show the progressivity of personal income tax systems gives rise to large tax-to-base elasticities, implying substantial potential for fiscal drag
@mathiasdolls.bsky.social, M Freier, @estebangmiralles.bsky.social, A Mazzon, S Riscado
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02.03.2026 10:15 👍 5 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 2
Description of the figure: The dependent variable is the logarithm of new syndicated loans. The bars indicate the effects of a one standard deviation contractionary macroprudential policy shock on loans intermediated by each bank-owned subsidiary relative to domestic bank subsidiaries. The regression specification controls for banking group fixed effects, and for firm x time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm. Full bars represent statistically significant effects at the 1% level. Hollow bars refer to statistically insignificant estimates at the 10% level.

Nonbank financial institutions play a central role in global credit markets, raising concerns about regulatory arbitrage, financial stability, and the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. While recent research shows that tighter bank regulation can unintentionally shift intermediation toward less-regulated sectors, less is known about how banking groups adjust internally. This column shows that banking groups reallocate corporate lending from bank subsidiaries to affiliated nonbank financial institutions when macroprudential constraints tighten. On average, in the syndicated loan market, this intra-group shift offsets more than half of the decline in bank lending induced by tighter macroprudential policies.

Description of the figure: The dependent variable is the logarithm of new syndicated loans. The bars indicate the effects of a one standard deviation contractionary macroprudential policy shock on loans intermediated by each bank-owned subsidiary relative to domestic bank subsidiaries. The regression specification controls for banking group fixed effects, and for firm x time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm. Full bars represent statistically significant effects at the 1% level. Hollow bars refer to statistically insignificant estimates at the 10% level. Nonbank financial institutions play a central role in global credit markets, raising concerns about regulatory arbitrage, financial stability, and the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. While recent research shows that tighter bank regulation can unintentionally shift intermediation toward less-regulated sectors, less is known about how banking groups adjust internally. This column shows that banking groups reallocate corporate lending from bank subsidiaries to affiliated nonbank financial institutions when macroprudential constraints tighten. On average, in the syndicated loan market, this intra-group shift offsets more than half of the decline in bank lending induced by tighter macroprudential policies.

Bruno Albuquerque, Eugenio Cerutti, Melih Firat, & Benedikt Kagerer show that banking groups reallocate corporate lending from bank subsidiaries to affiliated nonbank financial institutions when macroprudential constraints tighten.
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#EconSky

02.03.2026 10:13 👍 3 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
There were initial concerns that the introduction of the Russian oil price cap in 2022 would see Russia cut production, global oil supply fall, and prices spike, thus hurting oil-importing countries while strengthening Russia’s geopolitical leverage. This column argues that the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource which producers can choose to extract now or leave underground to be sold in the future fundamentally changes how producers respond to price caps. This intertemporal nature of oil production means that a well-designed and credibly enforced price cap can increase near-term extraction, lower world oil prices, and reduce price volatility.

There were initial concerns that the introduction of the Russian oil price cap in 2022 would see Russia cut production, global oil supply fall, and prices spike, thus hurting oil-importing countries while strengthening Russia’s geopolitical leverage. This column argues that the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource which producers can choose to extract now or leave underground to be sold in the future fundamentally changes how producers respond to price caps. This intertemporal nature of oil production means that a well-designed and credibly enforced price cap can increase near-term extraction, lower world oil prices, and reduce price volatility.

@simonhrjohnson.bsky.social, Łukasz Rachel, & Catherine Wolfram argue that the intertemporal nature of oil production means that a well-designed and credibly enforced price cap can increase near-term extraction, lower world oil prices, and reduce price volatility.
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#EconSky

02.03.2026 10:10 👍 4 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
Left figure: Year-on-year change (in %) of monthly Chinese exports to the EU and the US (in USD). Right figure: Average year-on-year growth rate (in %) of monthly Chinese export values/quantities/unit values to the EU (in USD) of all HS6 product groups; pre-tariff period is January 2024 to March 2025; post-tariff period is April 2025 to December 2025.

High US tariffs on imports from China in the first half of 2025 led to concerns about a large-scale redirection of Chinese exports to the EU. This column argues that these tariffs have so far caused only limited trade diversion towards the EU. Effects appear confined to a small group of highly exposed products, for which export quantities to the EU have risen and prices appear to have edged down. Thus, the macroeconomic impact likely has been very limited so far. The recent increase in Chinese exports to the EU seems primarily driven by structural factors like China’s growing competitiveness.

Left figure: Year-on-year change (in %) of monthly Chinese exports to the EU and the US (in USD). Right figure: Average year-on-year growth rate (in %) of monthly Chinese export values/quantities/unit values to the EU (in USD) of all HS6 product groups; pre-tariff period is January 2024 to March 2025; post-tariff period is April 2025 to December 2025. High US tariffs on imports from China in the first half of 2025 led to concerns about a large-scale redirection of Chinese exports to the EU. This column argues that these tariffs have so far caused only limited trade diversion towards the EU. Effects appear confined to a small group of highly exposed products, for which export quantities to the EU have risen and prices appear to have edged down. Thus, the macroeconomic impact likely has been very limited so far. The recent increase in Chinese exports to the EU seems primarily driven by structural factors like China’s growing competitiveness.

Patrick Schulte, Almira Enders, Andreas Esser, and Felix Strobel (@bundesbank.de) show that US tariffs on China did not cause large-scale redirection of Chinese exports to the EU despite concerns. Effects appear confined to a small group of highly exposed products.
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27.02.2026 09:06 👍 5 🔁 6 💬 0 📌 0
The US is taking actions to reshore manufacturing while largely abandoning decarbonisation. This column argues that, in response, the EU should capitalise on the potential weakening of the US role in global services and strengthen its own services sector, while remaining firmly committed to decarbonisation by supporting clean technology with strategic investments and a strong business case for clean industry.

The US is taking actions to reshore manufacturing while largely abandoning decarbonisation. This column argues that, in response, the EU should capitalise on the potential weakening of the US role in global services and strengthen its own services sector, while remaining firmly committed to decarbonisation by supporting clean technology with strategic investments and a strong business case for clean industry.

Román Arjona & Emanuele Tarantino argue that the EU could capitalise on the potential weakening of the US role in global services and strengthen its own services sector, while remaining committed to decarbonisation by supporting clean tech.
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27.02.2026 09:05 👍 4 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 0
Panel A shows support for US-China collaborations vs. US-Germany collaborations in the US Policy Community. Panel B shows support for US-China collaborations vs. US-Germany collaborations among US-based scientists. Error bars indicate 95% CIs.

International collaboration is one of modern science’s quiet superpowers. Increasingly, it is also a geopolitical flashpoint. This column presents new experimental evidence that shows both US policymakers and US-based scientists are systematically less likely to support otherwise identical research proposals when a key collaborator is based in China rather than in Germany. Support shifts away from unconditional approval and toward stricter, conditional backing. These penalties are strikingly consistent across scientific fields and respondent characteristics (including Asian scientists), highlighting a tension between science’s universalist ideals and today’s geopolitical realities.

Panel A shows support for US-China collaborations vs. US-Germany collaborations in the US Policy Community. Panel B shows support for US-China collaborations vs. US-Germany collaborations among US-based scientists. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. International collaboration is one of modern science’s quiet superpowers. Increasingly, it is also a geopolitical flashpoint. This column presents new experimental evidence that shows both US policymakers and US-based scientists are systematically less likely to support otherwise identical research proposals when a key collaborator is based in China rather than in Germany. Support shifts away from unconditional approval and toward stricter, conditional backing. These penalties are strikingly consistent across scientific fields and respondent characteristics (including Asian scientists), highlighting a tension between science’s universalist ideals and today’s geopolitical realities.

Alexander Furnas, Ruixue Jia, Margaret Roberts & Dashun Wang present evidence that US policymakers & US-based scientists are systematically less likely to support otherwise identical research proposals when a key collaborator is based in China rather than Germany.
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26.02.2026 09:29 👍 3 🔁 3 💬 0 📌 0
The figure shows the content of feeds, by self-declared partisanship. Average content shown to users in each feed setting: the chronological feed (grey) and the algorithmic feed (red). 95% confidence intervals reported.

Algorithms curate what users of social media see, raising concerns that they may distort attitudes and affect social and political outcomes. This column reports on an experiment conducted on X in the US in 2023, in which users were randomly assigned to either an algorithmic or a chronological feed. Switching from a chronological to an algorithmic feed significantly shifted political opinions in a pro-Republican direction, while switching the algorithm off had no comparable effect. This asymmetry arose because the algorithm affected which accounts users chose to follow, leaving a lasting imprint on their information environment even after algorithmic curation was removed.

The figure shows the content of feeds, by self-declared partisanship. Average content shown to users in each feed setting: the chronological feed (grey) and the algorithmic feed (red). 95% confidence intervals reported. Algorithms curate what users of social media see, raising concerns that they may distort attitudes and affect social and political outcomes. This column reports on an experiment conducted on X in the US in 2023, in which users were randomly assigned to either an algorithmic or a chronological feed. Switching from a chronological to an algorithmic feed significantly shifted political opinions in a pro-Republican direction, while switching the algorithm off had no comparable effect. This asymmetry arose because the algorithm affected which accounts users chose to follow, leaving a lasting imprint on their information environment even after algorithmic curation was removed.

Germain Gauthier, Roland Hodler, @phinifa.bsky.social, & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya show that switching users from a chronological to an algorithmic feed on X significantly shifted political opinions in a pro-Republican direction.
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26.02.2026 09:28 👍 10 🔁 5 💬 0 📌 1
Figure shows the average change in monthly payments upon internal refinancing: realised (red) vs passive counterfactual (blue). The passive counterfactual assumes borrowers roll over remaining debt at expiration without extra payments or contract adjustments.

The surge in inflation following the COVID-19 pandemic prompted many central banks to raise interest rates sharply. This column combines data from a large German bank, a borrower survey, and a letter experiment to show that mortgage-holders’ actions substantially reduce the impact of higher rates on monthly payments when their fixed rate ends. Survey responses indicate high informedness and a strong propensity to prepare, while the letter increases awareness of available options and raises refinancing activity among borrowers close to expiration. Overall, financial strains on mortgagors appear limited despite much higher rates, and mortgagors’ anticipatory actions affect the transmission of monetary policy.

Figure shows the average change in monthly payments upon internal refinancing: realised (red) vs passive counterfactual (blue). The passive counterfactual assumes borrowers roll over remaining debt at expiration without extra payments or contract adjustments. The surge in inflation following the COVID-19 pandemic prompted many central banks to raise interest rates sharply. This column combines data from a large German bank, a borrower survey, and a letter experiment to show that mortgage-holders’ actions substantially reduce the impact of higher rates on monthly payments when their fixed rate ends. Survey responses indicate high informedness and a strong propensity to prepare, while the letter increases awareness of available options and raises refinancing activity among borrowers close to expiration. Overall, financial strains on mortgagors appear limited despite much higher rates, and mortgagors’ anticipatory actions affect the transmission of monetary policy.

Mortgage-holders’ actions substantially reduce the impact of higher interest rates on monthly payments when their fixed rate ends. Financial strains on mortgagors appear limited despite much higher rates.
@fuster.bsky.social @gianiv.bsky.social et al.
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25.02.2026 09:01 👍 3 🔁 5 💬 1 📌 1
The UK vote to leave the EU in 2016 led to an immediate rise in economic policy uncertainty. This column examines how Brexit-related policy uncertainty affected cross-border capital flows to the UK using firm-level evidence from Switzerland. Heightened uncertainty following the referendum led to a persistent decline in short-term debt flows to the UK, while equity investment remained largely unchanged. The adjustment was concentrated among US-controlled firms resident in Switzerland, reflecting their reliance on the UK as a platform for EU market access. The findings underscore the importance of monitoring the composition, not just the volume, of international capital flows.

The UK vote to leave the EU in 2016 led to an immediate rise in economic policy uncertainty. This column examines how Brexit-related policy uncertainty affected cross-border capital flows to the UK using firm-level evidence from Switzerland. Heightened uncertainty following the referendum led to a persistent decline in short-term debt flows to the UK, while equity investment remained largely unchanged. The adjustment was concentrated among US-controlled firms resident in Switzerland, reflecting their reliance on the UK as a platform for EU market access. The findings underscore the importance of monitoring the composition, not just the volume, of international capital flows.

Andreas Fischer & Pınar Yeşin use firm-level evidence from Switzerland to show Brexit-related policy uncertainty led to a persistent decline in short-term debt flows to the UK, while equity investment remained largely unchanged.
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25.02.2026 08:59 👍 5 🔁 4 💬 0 📌 2
The figure documents a sizeable raw wage gap between workers who work from home and those who do not. As shown in the first bar, on average, the hourly wages of WFH workers are 35% higher than those of on-site workers. Once the authors look within occupation, education, and location, the wage premium associated with WFH shrinks substantially, to about 12% (second bar in the figure). Controlling further for other observable worker characteristics – such as age, gender, and job tenure – reduces the wage premium to 6.6% (third bar in the figure). 

Studies have found that workers typically value the option to work from home and are willing to accept sizable wage cuts in exchange for it, yet a growing literature finds that workers who work from home earn on average higher wages than workers who do not. This column combines French survey data, registry records, and social security records to show that the main driver of this work-from-home wage premium is selection. Workers who are more productive, or have better negotiation skills, appear able to get both higher hourly wages and the right to work from home more often.

The figure documents a sizeable raw wage gap between workers who work from home and those who do not. As shown in the first bar, on average, the hourly wages of WFH workers are 35% higher than those of on-site workers. Once the authors look within occupation, education, and location, the wage premium associated with WFH shrinks substantially, to about 12% (second bar in the figure). Controlling further for other observable worker characteristics – such as age, gender, and job tenure – reduces the wage premium to 6.6% (third bar in the figure). Studies have found that workers typically value the option to work from home and are willing to accept sizable wage cuts in exchange for it, yet a growing literature finds that workers who work from home earn on average higher wages than workers who do not. This column combines French survey data, registry records, and social security records to show that the main driver of this work-from-home wage premium is selection. Workers who are more productive, or have better negotiation skills, appear able to get both higher hourly wages and the right to work from home more often.

Huiyu Li, Julien Sauvagnat, & Tom Schmitz show that the main driver of the work-from-home wage premium is selection. More productive workers with better negotiation skills are more able to get both higher wages and the right to work from home more often.
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24.02.2026 09:32 👍 7 🔁 2 💬 0 📌 1
The figure shows monthly Russian imports of 42 military-relevant product categories from the EU Common High-Priority list, total and decomposed by channel, using Russian customs transaction data and authors’ coding of EU export bans. Dark red: products not yet subject to any ban. Light red: partially banned products (some product variants are banned but others remain legal to export). Dark grey: in-transit flows with EU as both origin and dispatch country. Light grey: fully banned products rerouted via third countries (non-EU dispatch country).

Despite comprehensive export sanctions from Western allies against Russia, Western components continue to appear in Russian weapons. This column uses transaction-level Russian customs data combined with novel data on EU export bans to separate and quantify three distinct channels through which banned military-relevant goods reached Russia. Trade continued legally for nearly two years, as restrictions were gradually introduced. Furthermore, goods could claim to transit through Russia en route to other destinations or they were rerouted through intermediary countries. It argues that the design and implementation of export bans deserve at least as much attention as their announcement.

The figure shows monthly Russian imports of 42 military-relevant product categories from the EU Common High-Priority list, total and decomposed by channel, using Russian customs transaction data and authors’ coding of EU export bans. Dark red: products not yet subject to any ban. Light red: partially banned products (some product variants are banned but others remain legal to export). Dark grey: in-transit flows with EU as both origin and dispatch country. Light grey: fully banned products rerouted via third countries (non-EU dispatch country). Despite comprehensive export sanctions from Western allies against Russia, Western components continue to appear in Russian weapons. This column uses transaction-level Russian customs data combined with novel data on EU export bans to separate and quantify three distinct channels through which banned military-relevant goods reached Russia. Trade continued legally for nearly two years, as restrictions were gradually introduced. Furthermore, goods could claim to transit through Russia en route to other destinations or they were rerouted through intermediary countries. It argues that the design and implementation of export bans deserve at least as much attention as their announcement.

Russia acquired Western weapons components post-sanctions via 3 channels: gradual introduction of restrictions, goods transiting through Russia, or rerouted goods.
L Scheckenhofer @feodorateti.bsky.social @torundavid.bsky.social @joschkawanner.bsky.social
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24.02.2026 09:29 👍 17 🔁 10 💬 1 📌 1
The figure shows simple shares of pro-rich votes cast by each justice, along with a 7-justice moving average trend, calculated separately for Republican and Democratic-appointed justices.

There have long been concerns that US Supreme Court decisions increasingly favour economic elites. This column analyses 1,782 cases from 1953 to 2022 to examine how justices’ rulings directly shift economic resources between the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’. In the 1950s, Democratic- and Republican-appointed justices both sided with the wealthy in around 40% to 45% of cases. By 2022, the average Republican-appointed justice voted pro-rich roughly 70% of the time, while the average Democratic-appointed justice did so about 35% of the time. Moreover, shifts in the Court’s composition have steadily moved the median justice – the pivotal actor in a nine-justice Court – towards pro-rich rulings, with implications for the distribution of resources and for economic inequality.

The figure shows simple shares of pro-rich votes cast by each justice, along with a 7-justice moving average trend, calculated separately for Republican and Democratic-appointed justices. There have long been concerns that US Supreme Court decisions increasingly favour economic elites. This column analyses 1,782 cases from 1953 to 2022 to examine how justices’ rulings directly shift economic resources between the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’. In the 1950s, Democratic- and Republican-appointed justices both sided with the wealthy in around 40% to 45% of cases. By 2022, the average Republican-appointed justice voted pro-rich roughly 70% of the time, while the average Democratic-appointed justice did so about 35% of the time. Moreover, shifts in the Court’s composition have steadily moved the median justice – the pivotal actor in a nine-justice Court – towards pro-rich rulings, with implications for the distribution of resources and for economic inequality.

@andreaprat.bsky.social, @proffionasm.bsky.social, & Jacob Spitz analyse 1,782 SCOTUS cases from 1953 to 2022 and find evidence of a rising pro-wealthy bias on the Court with implications for the distribution of resources and for economic inequality.
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23.02.2026 10:07 👍 5 🔁 5 💬 1 📌 0
The figure displays the number of Japanese foreign manufacturing affiliates in ASEAN countries, conditional on parent firms having at least one manufacturing affiliate in China, for fiscal years 2009 to 2022. The first vertical red line marks the 2012 China–Japan Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and the second vertical red line marks the onset of the US–China trade war in 2018.

Geopolitical risks are reshaping global production, yet little is known about how firms reallocate their supply chains in response. Using parent-affiliate matched data on Japanese multinational corporations from 2009–2022, this column shows that firms respond to rising geopolitical risk by diversifying production from China to ASEAN economies, rather than engaging in full decoupling or reshoring. The findings highlight a shift towards supply chain resilience through regional diversification.

The figure displays the number of Japanese foreign manufacturing affiliates in ASEAN countries, conditional on parent firms having at least one manufacturing affiliate in China, for fiscal years 2009 to 2022. The first vertical red line marks the 2012 China–Japan Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and the second vertical red line marks the onset of the US–China trade war in 2018. Geopolitical risks are reshaping global production, yet little is known about how firms reallocate their supply chains in response. Using parent-affiliate matched data on Japanese multinational corporations from 2009–2022, this column shows that firms respond to rising geopolitical risk by diversifying production from China to ASEAN economies, rather than engaging in full decoupling or reshoring. The findings highlight a shift towards supply chain resilience through regional diversification.

Thi Thanh Ha Doan, Asei Ito, Changyuan Luo, and Hongyong Zhang show that Japanese multinational firms respond to rising geopolitical risk by diversifying production from China to ASEAN countries, rather than engaging in full decoupling or reshoring.
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23.02.2026 10:04 👍 5 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0
The figure shows the gender wage gap (the difference in average log hourly wages between males and females) in log points on the y-axis. The x-axis displays the gender wage premium gap, which is the sum of the sorting and pay-setting components. The diagonal lines represent scenarios in which firm wage premiums account for 10% (top line) and 40% (bottom line) of the total gender wage gap.

Early explanations for gender wage gaps focused on human capital or career choices. This column uses data from the US and ten European countries to examine the role of firms. Across all countries considered, firms account for between 10% and 30% of the gender wage gap, mainly reflecting women being more likely to work at firms that pay less to all employees, irrespective of their skills. While men move to higher-paying firms as they advance in their career, women tend to stay behind. Women also tend to sort into low-wage firms in return for more flexibility in working time. The findings suggests that there is a case for complementing family policies with policies focused on firms.

The figure shows the gender wage gap (the difference in average log hourly wages between males and females) in log points on the y-axis. The x-axis displays the gender wage premium gap, which is the sum of the sorting and pay-setting components. The diagonal lines represent scenarios in which firm wage premiums account for 10% (top line) and 40% (bottom line) of the total gender wage gap. Early explanations for gender wage gaps focused on human capital or career choices. This column uses data from the US and ten European countries to examine the role of firms. Across all countries considered, firms account for between 10% and 30% of the gender wage gap, mainly reflecting women being more likely to work at firms that pay less to all employees, irrespective of their skills. While men move to higher-paying firms as they advance in their career, women tend to stay behind. Women also tend to sort into low-wage firms in return for more flexibility in working time. The findings suggests that there is a case for complementing family policies with policies focused on firms.

Using data from the US & 10 European countries, the OECD LinkEED 2.0 Team analysed the role of firms in the gender wage gap. They find firms account for 10-30% of the gap, mainly reflecting women being more likely to work at firms that pay less to all employees.
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23.02.2026 10:03 👍 12 🔁 6 💬 0 📌 1
Figure shows that in sites surrounded by high-income neighbourhoods, children’s earnings increased by nearly $5,000 per year. In sites surrounded by middle-income areas, the gain was about $1,700. But where surrounding communities were themselves deeply disadvantaged, HOPE VI had virtually no effect.

Income segregation in the US has increased over the past four decades, restricting access to opportunity for many low-income families. This column reports on a programme to replace high-poverty public housing developments across the US with mixed-income communities, tracking more than one million residents to analyse how revitalisation impacted the people living in these communities. While the programme did not increase incomes for the adults living in public housing, it significantly increased the children’s later earnings and also reduced incarceration rates among boys. The programme did not succeed simply by constructing new buildings; its impact worked by changing who children interacted with.

Figure shows that in sites surrounded by high-income neighbourhoods, children’s earnings increased by nearly $5,000 per year. In sites surrounded by middle-income areas, the gain was about $1,700. But where surrounding communities were themselves deeply disadvantaged, HOPE VI had virtually no effect. Income segregation in the US has increased over the past four decades, restricting access to opportunity for many low-income families. This column reports on a programme to replace high-poverty public housing developments across the US with mixed-income communities, tracking more than one million residents to analyse how revitalisation impacted the people living in these communities. While the programme did not increase incomes for the adults living in public housing, it significantly increased the children’s later earnings and also reduced incarceration rates among boys. The programme did not succeed simply by constructing new buildings; its impact worked by changing who children interacted with.

Raj Chetty, @rebeccadiamond.bsky.social, Brad Foster, @lkatz42.bsky.social, Sonya R. Porter, Matthew Staiger, & Laura Tach discuss the outcomes of the HOPE VI programme to replace high-poverty public housing developments across the US with mixed-income communities.
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23.02.2026 10:01 👍 3 🔁 1 💬 0 📌 0