@mixedmigration.org
MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, and analysis on mixed migration, with regional hubs in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America #MixedMigration https://mixedmigration.org/
From Bangladesh to Italy via Libya:
High recruitment fees in Bangladesh can leave migrants heavily indebted before reaching Libya. In Libya, Bangladeshi migrants are targeted for extortion due to strong family support networks — making them seen as reliable payers.
https://f.mtr.cool/iirtoobcxi
🚀 MMC is hiring! We are looking for a consultant to assess how AI is currently used by MMC: implications for data collection, analysis, writing & research, & develop guidelines for its use
📍 Location: Home based
📅 Tender closes: 18 March 2026 – 08:00 UTC
🔗Apply: https://f.mtr.cool/cwmubmqxmj
The Bangladesh–Libya–Italy corridor:
Policy & protection responses cannot focus on sea crossings alone. Response requires examining the full chain — from recruitment and financing in Bangladesh to transit dynamics in the Gulf and Libya, and labour policies in Europe.
https://f.mtr.cool/youfgyfrar
📌 Explore more MMC research on gender, children and youth in mixed migration:
https://f.mtr.cool/bdbmalcgzd
#IWD2026
📌 Afghan Women’s Migration to Türkiye (May 2024) – examines the implications of the Taliban takeover on migration dynamics among Afghan women.
https://f.mtr.cool/ulbgnafsuy
#IWD2026
📌 Weathering Change: The gendered impacts of climate on pastoralist migration in Northern Senegal (Dec 2024) -how climate factors are shaping gendered mobility patterns among herder communities with involuntary immobility among women.
https://f.mtr.cool/oedfvveohq
#IWD2026
📌 Gendered Smuggler-Migrant Interactions in Central Sahel (Jan 2025) : how gender influences migrants-smuggler interactions in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, includes the role of women smugglers.
https://f.mtr.cool/kbuscnyycu
#IWD2026
📌Horror & hope in migration: voices of women on the move (Mar 2025), sheds insights from +28,000 refugee and migrant women surveyed across migration routes since 2019.
https://f.mtr.cool/xbfhvejxtb
#IWD2026
📌Women on the move in Ethiopia: drawing on 1,263 surveys, it covers Ethiopian women returnees, non-Ethiopian women transiting through Ethiopia, and non-Ethiopian women residing in the country without plans to move onward.
https://f.mtr.cool/fitlmgmypo
#IWD2026
📌Migrant women in transit across South America (2025): evidence on how gender shapes migration. Women represent 51% of migrants of South American origin, yet their specific experiences are poorly documented.
https://f.mtr.cool/yacboqqxgq
#IWD2026
50% of refugee & migrant women in North Africa (travelling with at least one child) reported giving birth during their journey (2023-25). On migration journeys women having specific health needs and limited access to healthcare.
For #IWD2026 we highlight research on women on the move. ⬇️⬇️⬇️
From Bangladesh to Italy via Libya: Migrants interviewed reported paying USD 10,000–14,000 for the journey to Italy via Libya, generating an estimated USD 160–190 million annually across the corridor.
https://f.mtr.cool/wxrrgtqcoz
From Bangladesh to Italy via Libya: Many migrants interviewed started their journeys through legal migration channels or believed they were doing so. When those pathways become inaccessible or too costly, the same intermediaries can redirect migrants into irregular routes. bit.ly/4cZBb3e
Bangladeshi nationals were the leading arrivals to Italy via Libya by sea in 2024 & 2025.
Our new report looks at how this corridor operates — from recruitment and financing in Bangladesh to transit through Gulf to Libya and sea crossings to Italy.
https://f.mtr.cool/pyjzdmlngn
Mauritania saw rising migrant expulsions in 2025, with civil-society sources reporting between 18,000 and 20,000 expulsions in October-November alone. Mauritanian authorities reported 18,300 expulsions between January and July 2025.
The measure granted refugee status to around 69,000 Burkinabe and 1,500 Malians who arrived after May 2021.
In 2025, the Canary Islands were no longer the main point of arrival to Spain (17,941), with the Western Mediterranean Route recording higher arrivals (19,447).
📢 Discover West Africa's latest quarterly mixed migration updates for 2025. #QMMU
🔗Read the full QMMU: https://f.mtr.cool/hasulvspul
𝗟𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻 𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗮 & 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗯𝗯𝗲𝗮𝗻 (𝗤𝟰 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱)
Law enforcement in the USA increase despite low arrivals, routes are slowing down & decreased return movements. Venezuelans continue to face displacement & protection gaps as legal pathways evolve in the region
🔗 #QMMU: https://f.mtr.cool/ssqdncczmt
EU migration reforms pave the way for "return hubs" following publication of new rules and processes ahead of the Pact on Asylum and Migration in June 2026: expanded detention powers, fast-tracked deportations, and accelerated returns.
In 2025, arrivals in Europe fell overall, though trends vary by route. Much of this reduction was due to a fall of 62% in 2025 along the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands compared to the previous year. On the Western Mediterranean route, the total in 2025 (19447) was 11% higher than in 2024.
📢 Discover Europe's latest quarterly mixed migration updates for 2025. #QMMU
🔗⬇️Read the full QMMU:
In the EU’s new migration strategy, legal pathways are gaining visibility but remain limited and conditional. They are largely offered to transit countries engaged in migration-control cooperation rather than to the main countries of origin driving irregular arrivals.
👇
📢 We’re hiring: join us to lead MMC’s strategy and oversee its implementation across the Middle East & Asia.
📍 Duty station: Amman, Jordan
📄 Contract: Expatriate or national contract
⏳ Deadline: 25 February 2026
Apply: https://f.mtr.cool/qztaacbyui
EU migration: Labour migration schemes are unlikely to work for many people displaced by conflict or persecution. Both asylum & labour pathways are needed. But refugee resettlement & humanitarian admission numbers to EU remain modest, in some cases appear to be declining.
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EU’s reliance on migration partnerships for deterrence is unsustainable. Deals with countries multiply as routes shift, creating a reactive "firefighting" cycle of containment rather than durable migration governance - at high political & human cost
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Deterrence displaces movement and risk, it does not reduce demand. Example: crackdowns in Mauritania sharply reduced departures on Atlantic route. But new departure points emerged further south, including from Guinea-Conakry - lengthening journeys & increasing exposure to danger. 👇
Short-term falling numbers of irregular arrivals do not equal policy success. Arrivals fluctuate and must be read in longer-term context. Recent reductions do not rule out renewed increases. 👇
