»Multipolarität« ist zum zentralen, aber ambivalenten Begriff der Debatten über die künftige Weltordnung geworden. Eine neue SWP-Studie zeigt, welche Ordnungsvorstellungen und Ziele in ausgewählten Staaten mit dem Begriff Multipolarität verbunden werden. www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...
Correction: 3.7%.
Germany's intelligence service BND says Russia's federal deficit was actually 3.6% of GDP in '25, not 2.6%. This was exactly my final estimate in December, based on past spending patterns (random but funny: I estimated 8.02 trillion). If true, the deficit was probably hidden in other public budgets.
Link to official data:
minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistic...
Link to nominal GDP: rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/d...
Russia Finance Ministry data now officially confirms: Russia's consolidated budget deficit was 3.9% of GDP in 2025 (8291.5 billion RUB).
More on the background: janiskluge.substack.com/p/russias-co...
Dmitry Peskov says the main goal of Russia's war is to "ensure the safety of the people in Donbas who used to be in mortal danger..."
Plus: Recruits that don't have relatives. But I think that the total number of these groups - relative to "official" recruitment of 400k per year - are a smaller share. Maybe 10%?
Russia’s recruitment numbers look steady, but regional funding is reaching a breaking point. How much longer can Putin avoid another mobilization? We asked researcher @jakluge.de. meduza.io/en/feature/2...
Russia relies on high bonuses to recruit soldiers to fight in Ukraine, but with costs soaring, is there a looming risk of another mobilization?
“Recruitment is clearly the Achilles’ heel of Russia’s war,” says @jakluge.de. My latest Q&A for @meduza.io. meduza.io/en/feature/2...
I am tracking 15 Russian regions covering 20% of the total population, and they paid out compensation for 19,500 killed soldiers in 2025. This supports estimates of up to 100,000 Russian KIA last year. (Changes from month to month don't show battlefield dynamics, rather budget dynamics).
Yes, regions are spending a lot on these bonuses. Of course, if you die before you get them, your family is entitled. There are some court cases linked to payout issues, but I have not seen evidence of massive issues...
Average pension in St. Pete: 300,000 rubles per year.
In St. Petersburg, contract soldiers are promised 10m rubles in the first year of service, almost 5m in the first month.
The median salary in St. Petersburg is ~1.0m per year, the average ~1.5m per year. As a contract soldier, you go straight to the top 10% income bracket.
Interesting, changes in KIA payouts are very rare... Budget situation in Kemerovo is dramatic, as a direct result of the EU coal import embargo.
A handful of regions lowered bonuses late in 25 and raised them again in 26.
Every day, Russian regions are increasing their signing bonuses for contract soldiers. St Petersburg just became the new leader, offering a regional payout of 4.1 million.
Rapidly increasing payouts mean that Russian recruitment is not going as planned right now.
(Chart from gogov.ru)
There was no massive reduction last year, only a few regions reduced their bonus temporarily. My impression: foreigners are not a major factor yet (except for North Koreans), but the Russians are definitely trying.
Russia's Vologda region just entered the (growing) club of regions offering over 3 million rubles to new contract soldiers.
Source: gogov.ru/contract-pay...
The militarization of Russia's economy continues at full speed: Production of weapons (here: "finished metal goods") increased by 20-30% last year. Source: forecast.ru
The deficit in Russia's extra-budgetary (social) funds was more surprising - and looks more like "creative accounting": Reducing federal subsidies to the funds so that the federal budget deficit can stay within the announced 2.6% of GDP.
The budget deficit of Russia's regions shouldn't have been a surprise: Regional budget balances was worsening throughout 2025. War costs of Russian regions increased, while tax revenues (especially profit tax) fell.
Source of data: Russian Finance Ministry.
185,000 killed Russian soldiers, identified by name. Light gray is "date of info" (when the information about the death appeared online), if the date of death is not known. Not necessarily an indication of the death toll in a particular month, but overall there seems to be a trend. Data: poteru.net.
Russian labor market is cooling (red: job openings - gray resumes).
In early 2024, there were fewer regions reporting bonus payments. In my chart, I try to account for this by adjusting the extrapolation, which is why my chart looks a bit different for H1/2024. janiskluge.substack.com/p/russian-re...
Financial Times featured my recruitment estimates today. www.ft.com/content/ce74...
Forgot to mention:
4.) Declining unemployment
Russian pensioners 2020: 43.6 mio
Russian pensioners 2022: 41.8 mio
The financial situation of Russia's pension system improved a lot since 2017, saving the budget 2% of GDP in spending (almost 10% of federal budget spending). The reasons were:
1.) Increasing the pension age
2.) High Covid-19 death rate
3.) Increasing real wages > higher contributions
Federal budget subsidies to the Russian social security system. Pension subsidies fluctuate a lot. They are occasionally used as a buffer to make sure that the federal budget balance comes in on target.
Russia's fiscal situation is worse than expected: The consolidated budget had a deficit of nearly 4% of GDP in 2025. Regions are under pressure from increasing war costs. Social funds were forced to draw down their reserves after federal transfers were cut. Read: open.substack.com/pub/janisklu...
