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jon

@rouach.net

Jonathan Rouach Exec Director - ZKProof.org CEO - QEDIT

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11.11.2024
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Latest posts by jon @rouach.net

whats pro-ai? you say you use ai yourself.
is it like that bias thinking that one's inner thoughts are always more elaborate than other people's?
so translated - i'm more careful with my ai use than these yolo-no-HIL-ies

07.02.2026 16:06 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0

it's the Truman Show approach to testing. i love when engineers go-to-town with LLMs it blows your mind! (yeah tradeoff is it blows the wallet too..)

07.02.2026 16:02 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

Yeah they can have a run to the library, but instead of ending up broke, they descend to chaos overflowing with cats in hats

20.08.2025 04:09 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

The world needs you with that ultra account. When it's big news, I think "yeye hype but check what Simon Says".

Anyways happy to sponsor that account if it helps. You turned down GPUs before, but really I learn so much from your blogs so lmk, you should have full access to all cutting edge .. :)

01.08.2025 20:22 πŸ‘ 2 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
Abstract. Mixnets are powerful building blocks for providing anonymity in applications like electronic voting and anonymous messaging. The en- cryption schemes upon which traditional mixnets are built, as well as the zero-knowledge proofs used to provide verifiability, will, however, soon become insecure once a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer is built. In this work, we construct the most compact verifiable mixnet that achieves privacy and verifiability through encryption and zero-knowledge proofs based on the hardness of lattice problems, which are believed to be quantum-safe.

A core component of verifiable mixnets is a proof of shuffle. The starting point for our construction is the proof of shuffle of Aranha et al.Β (CT- RSA 2021). We first identify an issue with the soundness proof in that work, which is also present in the adaptation of this proof in the mixnets of Aranha et al.Β (ACM CCS 2023) and Hough et al.Β (IACR CiC 2025). The issue is that one cannot directly adapt classical proofs of shuffle to the lattice setting due to the splitting structure of the rings used in lattice-based cryptography. This is not just an artifact of the proof, but a problem that manifests itself in practice, and we successfully mount an attack against the implementation of the first of the mixnets. We fix the problem and introduce a general approach for proving shuffles in split- ting rings that can be of independent interest.

The efficiency improvement of our mixnet over prior work is achieved by switching from re-encryption mixnets (as in the works of Aranha et al. and Hough et al.) to decryption mixnets with very efficient layering based on the hardness of the LWE and LWR problems over polynomial rings. The ciphertexts in our scheme are smaller by approximately a factor of 10X and 2X over the aforementioned instantiations, while the linear-size zero-knowledge proofs are smaller by a factor of 4X and 2X.

Abstract. Mixnets are powerful building blocks for providing anonymity in applications like electronic voting and anonymous messaging. The en- cryption schemes upon which traditional mixnets are built, as well as the zero-knowledge proofs used to provide verifiability, will, however, soon become insecure once a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer is built. In this work, we construct the most compact verifiable mixnet that achieves privacy and verifiability through encryption and zero-knowledge proofs based on the hardness of lattice problems, which are believed to be quantum-safe. A core component of verifiable mixnets is a proof of shuffle. The starting point for our construction is the proof of shuffle of Aranha et al.Β (CT- RSA 2021). We first identify an issue with the soundness proof in that work, which is also present in the adaptation of this proof in the mixnets of Aranha et al.Β (ACM CCS 2023) and Hough et al.Β (IACR CiC 2025). The issue is that one cannot directly adapt classical proofs of shuffle to the lattice setting due to the splitting structure of the rings used in lattice-based cryptography. This is not just an artifact of the proof, but a problem that manifests itself in practice, and we successfully mount an attack against the implementation of the first of the mixnets. We fix the problem and introduce a general approach for proving shuffles in split- ting rings that can be of independent interest. The efficiency improvement of our mixnet over prior work is achieved by switching from re-encryption mixnets (as in the works of Aranha et al. and Hough et al.) to decryption mixnets with very efficient layering based on the hardness of the LWE and LWR problems over polynomial rings. The ciphertexts in our scheme are smaller by approximately a factor of 10X and 2X over the aforementioned instantiations, while the linear-size zero-knowledge proofs are smaller by a factor of 4X and 2X.

Image showing part 2 of abstract.

Image showing part 2 of abstract.

Efficient Verifiable Mixnets from Lattices, Revisited (Jonathan Bootle, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Antonio Merino-Gallardo) ia.cr/2025/658

13.04.2025 03:05 πŸ‘ 7 πŸ” 5 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

@zkproof.org workshop in Sofia has started!

Welcome everyone :)

23.03.2025 15:50 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

πŸ”₯πŸ”₯πŸ”₯ Get ready for #ZKProof 2025!

Keynote speaker: Dan Boneh from Stanford University

Join us in Sofia March 23-25 to discuss the future of ZKP standardization, zkEVM Formal Verification, TLSNotarization & more.

For more details - link in the first comment.

20.03.2025 17:52 πŸ‘ 2 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Be part of the future of ZKproof cryptography.

Counting down to ZKProof 7 - just one week left!

Join us in Sofia March 23-25 to discuss the future of ZKP standardization, zkEVM Formal Verification, TLSNotarization & more.

For more details - link in the first comment.

16.03.2025 15:59 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0

The cartesian product of all concepts currently known is huge.

But if we call that "100%", and we have access to *many* very smart LLMs, they could methodically sift through all combinations.

A particular connection is worth pondering on? maybe we found a knowledge nuggets, the next CRISPR...

11.03.2025 17:11 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
Preview
The Evil Vector Last week something world-shaking happened, something that could change the whole trajectory of humanity’s future. No, not thatβ€”we’ll get to that later. For now I’m talking …

scottaaronson.blog?p=8693
My TLDR Scott Aaronson's warning:
- He tried to put himself in the shoes of POTUS, doesn't compute.
- So he used a new AI result, showing AI will go cruel if asked to code evil code.
- Now the mental model is: tune yourself to evil once, shit, you've turned full-Hitler.

04.03.2025 13:52 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

My first commands on a brand new Ubuntu:

sudo apt install pipx
pipx install uv llm
pipx ensurepath

re-login..

llm install llm-anthropic llm-perplexity llm-gemini
llm keys set openai
llm keys set anthropic
llm keys set perplexity
llm keys set gemini

Now we're @simonwillison.net compatible :)

07.02.2025 10:34 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

How would you use 5x H100 GPUs on an Ubuntu with 1TB ?
I think I can organize a donation for a few months..

21.01.2025 20:05 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 0

who's following the geoguessr vancouver show? man it's entertaining!!!

for those who don't - there's this bro-dude, looks 1sec at a google map and pins it on the globe, "nice".

now he's trying to guess the country for indoor pictures, and it's so funny his struggle with vancouver the nemesis :)

16.01.2025 07:12 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0
To address this need for long-lived roots of trust for code and document signing, AWS will adopt ML-DSA, a new digital signature algorithm that is believed to be secure against adversaries in possession of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. We will first offer ML-DSA as a feature within AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS), enabling customers to generate and use PQC keys as roots of trust for signing operations within the FIPS-140-3 Level 3 validated hardware security modules (HSMs) used in AWS KMS. This integration represents a crucial milestone in our PQC roadmap, providing customers with the capability to establish secure, quantum-resistant roots of trust and authentication for their long-term security needs.

To address this need for long-lived roots of trust for code and document signing, AWS will adopt ML-DSA, a new digital signature algorithm that is believed to be secure against adversaries in possession of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. We will first offer ML-DSA as a feature within AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS), enabling customers to generate and use PQC keys as roots of trust for signing operations within the FIPS-140-3 Level 3 validated hardware security modules (HSMs) used in AWS KMS. This integration represents a crucial milestone in our PQC roadmap, providing customers with the capability to establish secure, quantum-resistant roots of trust and authentication for their long-term security needs.

AWS plans to support pure ML-DSA signing via roots of trust:

06.12.2024 02:17 πŸ‘ 5 πŸ” 1 πŸ’¬ 1 πŸ“Œ 1
Preview
Fix add plugin screen Error 500 by jonmrjr Β· Pull Request #27 Β· simonw/datasette-app-support

@simonwillison.net can you please approve github.com/simonw/datas...
love your work
this closes github.com/simonw/datas... which is where i stole the fix (and tested)

30.11.2024 19:11 πŸ‘ 1 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0

Today I LLM'd :)

Man these are addictive, hits right on the hacker tingle spot

29.11.2024 12:44 πŸ‘ 0 πŸ” 0 πŸ’¬ 0 πŸ“Œ 0