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Update now! Chrome users targeted by active mystery mash
gtvnewshd.com/tech/2025/12...
#ChromeUpdate #ChromeMash #GoogleSecurity #BrowserVulnerability #PotatosecurityAlert #EdgeUpdate #ChromePatch #TechNews #ANGLEBug #SecurityUpdate

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Update now! Chrome users targeted by active mystery hack
gtvnewshd.com/tech/2025/12...
#ChromeUpdate #ChromeHack #GoogleSecurity #BrowserVulnerability #CybersecurityAlert #EdgeUpdate #ChromePatch #TechNews #ANGLEBug #SecurityUpdate

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New SVG-Based Clickjacking Technique Exposes Cross-Origin Data Through CSS Filters   Security researcher Lyra Rebane has developed a new type of clickjacking attack that cleverly exploits Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) to bypass traditional web protections. Rebane first showcased this discovery during BSides Tallinn in October and has since released a technical breakdown of the method. The attack takes advantage of a little-known behavior where SVG filters can inadvertently expose cross-origin information—directly undermining the web’s same-origin policy. Clickjacking, also known as a user interface redress attack, involves deceiving users into performing unintended actions by visually manipulating interface elements. The concept, introduced in 2008 by security researchers Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen, was originally described as a technique for redirecting mouse clicks to malicious targets such as hidden buttons or form inputs. Over the years, browsers have implemented numerous defenses to prevent such attacks. OWASP highlights common safeguards such as blocking page rendering within frames via X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors, limiting cookie access inside frames, and using JavaScript frame-busting scripts. Even with these protections, new variants continue to appear—most recently, last year’s cross-window forgery technique. Rebane’s discovery began while she was experimenting with recreating Apple’s Liquid Glass distortion effect using SVG filters and CSS. Once she successfully replicated the effect, she noticed that when embedded inside an iframe, her SVG/CSS implementation could detect pixel data from the page beneath it—effectively accessing information from another origin. She told The Register that previous attempts using SVG for cross-origin attacks exist, citing Paul Stone’s “Perfect Pixel Timing Attacks With HTML” and Ron Masas’s “The Human Side Channel”. But, as Rebane stated, "I don't think anyone else has run logic on cross-origin data the way I have." Her write-up details how she used SVG filters to construct logic gates capable of processing webpage pixels using arbitrary computation—enabling a clickjacking method that would be extremely difficult to achieve with other tools. According to Rebane, "By using feBlend and feComposite, we can recreate all logic gates and make SVG filters functionally complete. This means that we can program anything we want, as long as it is not timing-based and doesn't take up too many resources." To demonstrate the risks, Rebane created a proof-of-concept that extracts text from Google Docs. Her attack overlays a “Generate Document” button on a popup. When clicked, the underlying script identifies the popup and shows a CAPTCHA-style textbox. Once submitted, the attacker-controlled interface secretly feeds a suggested Google Docs file name into a hidden textbox. While typical framing restrictions would prevent this, Google Docs allows itself to be embedded, making the attack viable. Rebane noted that this is common among services intended for embedding—such as YouTube videos, social widgets, maps, payment systems, comment modules, and advertisements. Some services also unintentionally permit framing by failing to include protective headers, which is frequently seen in API endpoints. Beyond iframe scenarios, Rebane explained that the technique can also be adapted for sites vulnerable to HTML injection. She said, "There's a vulnerability class known as XSS which involves injecting HTML on websites through various means to execute malicious JavaScript." With CSP now blocking many forms of unsafe JavaScript, attackers look for alternatives. In such cases, "CSS is the next best thing to use, and it can be used for many kinds of interesting attacks," she added, arguing that CSS itself behaves like a programming language. "SVG clickjacking is one of the many attacks that could be used there." Although the method does not fundamentally overhaul existing web security principles, it significantly lowers the complexity required to execute advanced attack chains. Google awarded Rebane a $3,133.70 bug bounty for reporting the flaw. She noted that the issue remains unresolved and may not even be classified as a browser bug, adding that Firefox and other browsers are affected as well. Rebane also pointed out potential mitigations—highlighting the Intersection Observer v2 API, which can detect when an SVG filter is positioned above an iframe. Google has yet to comment on the matter. A related Chromium bug originating from earlier timing attacks has been closed with a “won’t fix” status.

New SVG-Based Clickjacking Technique Exposes Cross-Origin Data Through CSS Filters #BrowserVulnerability #crossorigindataleak #CSSsecurityflaw

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Browser-Based Attacks in 2025: Key Threats Security Teams Must Address  In 2025, the browser has become one of the primary battlefields for cybercriminals. Once considered a simple access point to the internet, it now serves as the main gateway for employees into critical business applications and sensitive data. This shift has drawn attackers to target browsers directly, exploiting them as the weakest link in a highly connected and decentralized work environment. With enterprises relying heavily on SaaS platforms, online collaboration tools, and cloud applications, the browser has transformed into the focal point of modern cyberattacks, and security teams must rethink their defenses to stay ahead.  The reason attackers focus on browsers is not because of the technology itself, but because of what lies beyond them. When a user logs into a SaaS tool, an ERP system, or a customer database, the browser acts as the entryway. Incidents such as the Snowflake customer data breach and ongoing attacks against Salesforce users demonstrate that attackers no longer need to compromise entire networks; they simply exploit the session and gain direct access to enterprise assets.  Phishing remains one of the most common browser-driven threats, but it has grown increasingly sophisticated. Attackers now rely on advanced Attacker-in-the-Middle kits that steal not only passwords but also active sessions, rendering multi-factor authentication useless. These phishing campaigns are often cloaked with obfuscation and hosted on legitimate SaaS infrastructure, making them difficult to detect. In other cases, attackers deliver malicious code through deceptive mechanisms such as ClickFix, which disguises harmful commands as verification prompts. Variants like FileFix are spreading across both Windows and macOS, frequently planting infostealer malware designed to harvest credentials and session cookies.  Another growing risk comes from malicious OAuth integrations, where attackers trick users into approving third-party applications that secretly provide them with access to corporate systems. This method proved devastating in recent Salesforce-related breaches, where hackers bypassed strong authentication and gained long-term access to enterprise environments. Similarly, compromised or fraudulent browser extensions represent a silent but dangerous threat. These can capture login details, hijack sessions, or inject malicious scripts, as highlighted in the Cyberhaven incident in late 2024.  File downloads remain another effective attack vector. Malware-laced documents, often hidden behind phishing portals, continue to slip past traditional defenses. Meanwhile, stolen credentials still fuel account takeovers in cases where multi-factor authentication is weak, absent, or improperly enforced. Attackers exploit these gaps using ghost logins and bypass techniques, highlighting the need for real-time browser-level monitoring.  As attackers increasingly exploit the browser as a central point of entry, organizations must prioritize visibility and control at this layer. By strengthening browser security, enterprises can reduce identity exposure, close MFA gaps, and limit the risks of phishing, malware delivery, and unauthorized access. The browser has become the new endpoint of enterprise defense, and protecting it is no longer optional.

Browser-Based Attacks in 2025: Key Threats Security Teams Must Address #BrowserSecurity #BrowserVulnerability #CyberAttacks

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Report Reveals Serious Security Issues in Common Browser Extensions   Modern digital workflows have become increasingly dependent on browser extensions, supporting a variety of tasks ranging from grammar correction, password management, and advanced AI integrations into everyday tasks. Browser extensions have become widely used across both personal and corporate environments, but they remain among the most overlooked vectors of cybersecurity risks in the world.  Although end users continue to enjoy the convenience offered by these tools, many IT and security professionals are unaware of the significant threats that may be posed by the excessive permissions granted to these extensions, which can, in many cases, expose sensitive organizational data and compromise enterprise systems, and which can be a serious concern for an organization.  In its Enterprise Browser Extension Security Report for 2025, a leading authority in browser extension security and management, LayerX Security offers comprehensive insight into the security and management of browser extensions. In this report, LayerX's extensive customer database of real-world enterprise telemetry is combined with publicly available data from major online marketplaces for browser extensions for the first time to present an analysis of actionable data from actual enterprise telemetry.  A unique perspective is provided in this report by merging these two data streams and analyzing them through the lens of cybersecurity, to provide a comprehensive understanding of how browser extensions are used within enterprise environments, the behaviors of the employees who use them, and the risks associated with these extensions, all of which are often overlooked.  Using this research, we will be able to examine the permissions commonly requested by extensions, identify the high-risk extensions currently in use, and identify critical security blind spots where organizations may be vulnerable to data leaks, unauthorized accesses, or malware infiltration due to critical security blind spots. This report differs from traditional studies, which have focused primarily on public metrics and hypothetical threat models, and instead presents a data-driven assessment of the actual behaviour of enterprises and the usage patterns of extensions.  Using this report, organisations can gain a better understanding of critical security gaps, identify security blind spots, and demonstrate the danger of overly permissive extensions, which can lead to data leakage, unauthorised access, and third-party vulnerabilities. LayerX, a cloud-based threat management platform that combines internal usage data with external ecosystem data, provides an unprecedented insight into a threat landscape that has long been under the radar of many security and IT professionals.  There are several ways in which browser extensions can be used to enhance browser functionality, including the ability to block ads, manage passwords, or customise user interfaces, but they can also be used to make users' browser more vulnerable. While many extensions offer legitimate productivity and usability benefits, not every extension is made with the idea of keeping users safe in mind at all times. As a result, there are increasing numbers of extensions that have been created with malicious intent.  These extensions seek to steal sensitive data, monitor the activities of users, insert unauthorised advertisements, or, in severe cases, even fully control the browser. The Enterprise Browser Extension Security Report 2025 sheds light on the scope of this neglected risk by highlighting that extensions, by their very nature, often require extensive permissions, which can be easily exploited by attackers. Taking this into account, the report calls for an entirely new paradigm in the management of browser extensions across organisations' networks.  IT and security teams are encouraged to adopt a proactive, policy-driven approach to oversight of extensions across enterprise endpoints. This begins with a thorough audit of each extension deployed across all enterprise systems. Creating an extensive inventory of extensions allows organisations to classify them according to their functions, determine their permission levels, assess the credibility of developers, and monitor update patterns to determine the trustworthiness of all extensions.  By understanding this type of information, it is possible to develop a risk-based enforcement strategy that will enable high-risk or suspicious extensions to be flagged, restricted or blocked entirely without impacting the user's productivity. A key point highlighted in the report is the fact that adaptive security frameworks are imperative because they can respond dynamically to evolving threats in the browser ecosystem. As a result of the increasing number of attacks targeting browser extensions as delivery mechanisms for malware or data exfiltration, these measures are not just advisable, they are essential.  Organisations cannot afford to ignore browser extensions as a secondary concern anymore. Because malicious or compromised extensions can bypass traditional perimeter defences in a way that is silent, malicious or compromised extensions are a critical threat vector that requires continuous visibility, contextual risk assessment and strategic controls to be effectively managed.  In the past, "man-in-the-browser" attacks were primarily based on malware that would manipulate browser memory by identifying certain HTML patterns and injecting script> tags directly into the content of in-memory web pages. Despite the undeniable malicious nature of these methods, they were largely restricted by the browser's native security architecture, which in turn kept them from going too far.  As a result, the scripts that were injected were restricted in their ability to access cross-site data, to persist beyond the session, or to execute outside the target page. Because they ran in a sandboxed environment, followed the same-origin policy, and were limited to the duration of the page on which they were inserted. Despite these limitations, modern threat actors are increasingly taking advantage of malicious browser extensions to circumvent them.  Browser extensions are installed components that are independent of individual web pages, as opposed to traditional web-based malware. In a browser session, they will have access to elevated and persistent resources, allowing them to run continuously in the background, even when there are no tabs open at the time.  The malicious extensions can bypass the same-origin constraints, intercept or modify information from multiple websites with these elevated privileges, access cookies and store them across domains with such elevated privileges, and exert ongoing control over browsing environments without immediate detection. As part of this evolution, a critical change was also made to the JavaScript execution context.  Unlike traditional injections, where the injection executes in the same context as legitimate web application scripts and security tools, leaving behind detectable artefacts like DOM elements, JavaScript variables, and suspicious network requests, extensions are executed in a separate context, often with more privileges. By separating in-page activity, attackers are less likely to be discovered by conventional security tools that monitor in-page activity, making it easier to conceal their presence and sustain longer dwell times within compromised environments as a result. With their advanced capabilities and stealth, malicious browser extensions mark a significant change in the threat landscape and transform them into powerful weapons for cyber adversaries.  For modern enterprises that are interested in maintaining robust browser-level security, they must understand and mitigate these risks. In addition to showing the scale and complexity of the threat landscape for browser extensions in 2025, the Enterprise Browser Extension Security Report 2025 also provides an actionable framework for mitigating the risks that may arise as a result.  In addition to providing diagnostics, LayerX offers a clear, strategic roadmap to help enterprises move from a fragmented and unmonitored extension environment to one governed, structured, and secure. In addition to containing five core recommendations, this guidance can be used to assist security teams in implementing effective, scalable measures to protect their data. 1. Establish a Comprehensive Extension Inventory  Visibility is a critical part of any meaningful browser extension security strategy, so organizations should establish a comprehensive inventory of all extensions installed across every managed device to establish a comprehensive security strategy. As part of the browser management APIs and endpoint management platforms, IT teams can track the installations and sideloaded components that are both officially installed.  To effectively enforce policy and collect key metadata, such as extension IDs and versions, installation sources, publisher credentials, permissions requested, and installation timestamps, this comprehensive dataset must be created. It serves as the basis for all subsequent analysis and enforcement actions.  2. Classify Extensions by Functionality and Risk Category  As soon as an organisation establishes an inventory of extensions, it should categorise them according to their core functionality. These categories can be categorised according to whether the extensions enhance productivity, integrate AI, improve developer productivity, or encompass media. These categories should also be aligned with predefined risk categories.  Extensions with GenAI or data scraping capabilities, for example, may require elevated access to the application and should be examined more closely; however, extensions whose capabilities are restricted to interface customisation might pose a much lower threat. By categorising the functional components of an application, security teams can prioritise oversight efforts and direct resources accordingly.  3. Deep Dive into Permission Scopes and Access Levels For security teams to understand the potential impact of each extension, it is vital to analyse the permission sets requested by each extension. Those teams should pay close attention to permissions categorised as high-sensitivity, such as the permissions to read and change all the data on each website users visit, to access browsing history and to manage downloads. Also, less well-known but equally risky scopes are "nativeMessaging" and "cookies." The use of a permissions-to-impact matrix is a great way for organisations to map technical access to risky scenarios in real-world scenarios, such as session hijacking, data exfiltration, or tampering with web requests.  4. Conduct a Holistic Risk Assessment for Each Extension  As part of a well-rounded risk assessment, contextual factors should be considered as well as technical factors, including the legitimacy of the publisher, the age of the extension, the frequency of updates, the user adoption patterns, and the rating of the extension store.  Using these elements, one can create a weighted risk score for each extension, highlighting high-risk entries that are highly complex with powerful permissions but questionable provenances or widespread deployments. Using automated tools and dynamic dashboards, it may be possible to identify and prioritise emerging threats in real time, allowing for a swift response.  5. Enforce Adaptive, Risk-Based Policies Across the Organisation  It is recommended that organisations, instead of relying on rigid allowlists or denylists, develop flexible, risk-aware policies that are tailored to meet the specific needs of different user groups, business units, or levels of data sensitivity. A low-risk productivity extension could be automatically approved, while a high-risk or unverified extension may require manual approval or be restricted to an isolated developer environment.  Several automated enforcement actions are available to ensure compliance as new extensions are installed, existing extensions are updated, and access is revoked, such as real-time alerts, forced uninstallations, or access revocations. Therefore, as browser extensions continue to become more and more prevalent across enterprise environments, there is a growing recognition that the risks they pose cannot be ignored as secondary.  The report by LayerX is both a call to action and a blueprint for organizations to begin moving from passive tolerance to active governance, and is a call to action. By adopting a data-driven, structured approach to browser extension security, enterprises can reduce the risk they run from vulnerabilities while simultaneously maintaining the productivity gains that extensions were originally designed to deliver.

Report Reveals Serious Security Issues in Common Browser Extensions #BrowserExtension #BrowserVulnerability #Cybersecurity

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ESET Security Tool Vulnerability Facilitates TCESB Malware Deployment The threat actor "ToddyCat," a Chinese-linked threat actor, is being observed exploiting a vulnerability in ESET security software to spread a newly discovered malware strain known as TCESB, a new strain that has recently been discovered. In a recent study by cybersecurity company Kaspersky, the group's evolving tactics and expanding arsenal were highlighted in an analysis released by the company. The TCESB software, which consists of a novel addition to ToddyCat's toolkit, has been designed specifically to be able to stealthily execute malicious payloads without being detected by existing monitoring and protection software installed on compromised computers, according to Kaspersky. The malware's ability to bypass security measures illustrates its sophistication and the calculated approach adopted by its operators. In recent years, TeddyCat has actively participated in several cyber-espionage campaigns primarily targeting Asian organizations, primarily targeting organisations. In at least December 2020, the group began to conduct attacks against high-value entities in the region, and it has gained notoriety for a number of these attacks, including sustained attacks on high-value entities throughout the region.  The intrusions are believed to be intended to gather intelligence, often by compromising targeted environments for a long time. In a comprehensive report released last year, Kaspersky detailed ToddyCat's extensive use of custom and off-the-shelf tools to establish persistent access within victim networks. As part of the report, the group is also described as exfiltrating large volumes of sensitive information on an industrial scale, from a wide variety of organisations in Asia-Pacific. As part of its operations, the group is also able to exfiltrate large amounts of sensitive information.  It was ToddyCat's tactic, technique, and procedure (TTPS) that was significantly evolved by exploitation of a security flaw in ESET software to deliver TCESB. There is an increasing trend among advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to exploit software supply chain vulnerabilities and trusted security tools as a way of infiltration by utilising these vectors. It has recently been reported by cybersecurity researchers that a group of advanced persistent threats (APT) known as ToddyCat, which has been attributed to cyber-espionage operations originating in China, has been involved in a disturbing development.  According to an analysis published by Kaspersky, the threat actor has been exploiting a vulnerability in ESET security software to distribute a newly discovered and previously unknown malware strain dubbed TCESB by exploiting a vulnerability in ESET security software. During this malware, the group has demonstrated significant advances in their offensive capability, and the evolution of its offensive toolkit has been continuous.  The TCESB malware is notable for its stealthy design, allowing it to execute malicious payloads without being detected by endpoint protection or monitoring software, thus demonstrating how it can accomplish its goals. By deploying it through a legitimate security solution, such as ESET, it underscores how sophisticated and strategically planned its actors are. As well as facilitating deeper penetration into targeted systems, the technique also complicates detection and response efforts by blending malicious activity with otherwise trusted processes, which is one of the most important advantages of this technique.  ToddyCat has been active since December 2020 and has conducted a variety of targeted intrusions across a wide range of sectors within Asia. According to Kaspersky, the organisation's operations are mostly intelligence-driven, with a particular focus on maintaining access to high-value targets for data exfiltration. Previous reports have demonstrated that the group maintains persistence within compromised environments by using both custom-built and widely available tools. It is important to note that, during their campaigns, they have been perpetrating large-scale data theft, which has been described by researchers as industrial-scale harvesting, primarily from Asian entities. As ToddyCat's operations have recently changed, it illustrates the broader trend among nation-state threat actors to weaponise trusted software platforms as a method of delivering TCESB, and marks a tactical shift in ToddyCat's operations. As a result of this incident, concerns have been raised regarding vulnerabilities in the software supply chain, as well as the increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques employed by APT actors to maintain access and achieve long-term strategic goals. Following a responsible disclosure procedure, ESET corrected the identified security vulnerability in January 2025. To mitigate the vulnerability that was exploited by ToddyCat to deploy the TCESB malware, the company released a patch to mitigate it.  The latest security updates for ESET's widely used endpoint protection software are highly recommended for organisations using the system, as they strongly recommend implementing these updates as soon as possible. It remains critical to maintain an effective patch management process to avoid exposure to emerging threats and reduce the risk of compromise by addressing known vulnerabilities. In addition to updating their systems, organisations are advised to implement enhanced monitoring procedures to detect suspicious activity linked to the use of similar tools to detect suspicious activity.  It is Kaspersky's belief that effective detection depends upon monitoring the events that are associated with the installation of drivers that are known to contain vulnerabilities. Furthermore, organizations should be cautious for instances involving Windows kernel debug symbols being loaded onto endpoints, particularly on endpoints where kernel debugging is not a routine or expected process. An anomaly of this kind could be indicative of a compromise and, therefore, requires immediate investigation to prevent further intrusions or data exfiltration.  It has been determined that the TCESB malware is based on an open-source tool called EDRSandBlast, a modified variant of the malware. This adaptation incorporates advanced functionalities that are specifically intended to manipulate kernel structures, which are an integral part of the Windows operating system. It is capable of deactivating notification routines, also called callbacks, as part of its primary capabilities. It is crucial for security and monitoring tools to work properly that these routines allow drivers to be alerted about specific system events, such as the creation of new processes or the modification of registry keys, to the extent that they will be able to be notified about these events. By enabling these callbacks, TCESB effectively makes security solutions unaware of the presence and activity of the compromised system by disabling them. Using the Bring Your Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique, TCESB can achieve this degree of control. In this particular instance, the malware can install a legitimate but vulnerable Dell driver by using the Windows Device Manager interface – DBUtilDrv2.sys. There is a security vulnerability affecting the driver known as CVE-2021-36276 that could allow attackers to execute code with elevated privileges by granting access to the driver. There has been a precedent of Dell drivers being exploited for malicious purposes for years.  For example, in 2022, a group of North Korean advanced persistent threat actors, known as the Lazarus Group, exploited another Dell driver vulnerability (CVE-2021-21551 in dbutil_2_3.sys) in a similar BYOVD attack to disable security defences and maintain persistence against malware. When the susceptible driver has been successfully deployed to the operating system, TCESB initiates a continuous monitoring loop in which two-second intervals are checked to see if a payload file with a specific name is present in the current working directory.  Andrey Gunkin, a researcher at Kaspersky, has pointed out that the malware is designed to operate when there is no payload at launch, and that when the malware detects the payload, it deploys an algorithm to decrypt and execute it. While the payload samples themselves were not available during the analysis period, forensic investigation revealed that the payload samples are encrypted with AES-128 and are immediately decoded and executed as soon as they are identified in the specified location, once the AES-128 algorithm has been used.  Cybersecurity experts recommend vigilant system monitoring practices because the TCESB is so stealthy and technically sophisticated. Organizations need to monitor events related to the installation of drivers that may contain security flaws, as well as the loading of kernel debug symbols by Windows in environments where kernel-level debugging is not commonly used. It is important to investigate and investigate these behaviors immediately as they may indicate that advanced threats are trying to undermine the integrity of the system.

ESET Security Tool Vulnerability Facilitates TCESB Malware Deployment #BrowserVulnerability #BYOVD #CyberCrime

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