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UK: the fragility of national industrial self-sufficiency & sovereign capability was highlighted last autumn by the National Preparedness Commission. This risk was explored... #industrialresilience #criticalinfrastructuresecurity nationalpreparednesscommission.uk/publications...

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‘Port of Antwerp to get anti-aircraft defence from 2027,’ says Prime Minister Bart De Wever | VRT NWS: news The port of Antwerp will get its own anti-aircraft defence system in 2027, Prime Minister Bart De Wever (Flemish nationalist N-VA) told a meeting of the Antwerp port community. Daily Gazet van Antwerp...

Belgium: NASAMS anti-aircraft weapons for Port of Antwerp-Bruges... #civilprotection #criticalinfrastructuresecurity www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/20...

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Rising Cyber Threats Linked to Ongoing Middle East Conflict A geopolitical crisis has historically been fought on physical battlefields, but its effects are seldom confined to borders in the modern threat landscape. While tensions are swirling across the Middle East as a result of the United States' military operations in Iran and Tehran's retaliatory actions, a parallel surge of activity is being witnessed in the digital world.  There is increasing concern among security analysts as well as government cyber agencies about how geopolitical instability provides fertile ground for cybercriminals and state-aligned actors. In order to manipulate public curiosity, exploit fear, and conceal malicious campaigns, attackers have utilized this rapidly evolving situation as a convenient narrative. As soon as the escalation began, researchers began tracking a growing ecosystem of cyber infrastructure based on conflict that lures unsuspecting users into fraudulent websites, phishing scams, and malware downloads.  In many cases, what appears to be breaking news or urgent updates about a crisis hides carefully designed traps meant to infiltrate corporations, collect credentials, or spread malicious software designed to steal data.  Due to this, the conflict's digital shadow has expanded beyond the immediate region, raising concerns among cybersecurity professionals that opportunistic attacks may become increasingly targeted against individuals and organizations worldwide.  The intensification of hostilities in late February 2026, when the United States and Israel are said to have conducted coordinated airstrikes against multiple Iranian facilities, has further compounded the escalation of cyber threats.  Security analysts have identified a pattern where cyber activity closely follows developments on the ground following the strikes and retaliatory actions which have reverberated across several Middle Eastern nations following the strikes.  According to researchers, digital operations played a supporting role long before the first missiles were deployed. Iran's command-and-control infrastructure was disrupted by coordinated electronic warfare tactics and large-scale distributed denial-of-service campaigns. This temporarily impeded national internet access and could potentially complicate real-time military coordination by reducing national internet connectivity to a fraction of its usual capacity.  It is clear from such incidents that cyber capabilities are becoming increasingly integrated into broader strategic operations, influencing the circumstances under which conventional military engagements occur. However, analysts note that the cyber dimension of the conflict cannot be limited to state-directed operations alone.  As a result, it is widely expected that Iranian digital response will follow an asymmetric model, with loosely aligned or ideologically sympathetic groups operating outside its borders typically executing these actions. They vary considerably in capability, but their activities often involve defacing websites, leaking data, and launching disruptive attacks intended to generate publicity in addition to operational damage.  A team tracking online channels associated with hacktivist communities has observed hundreds of claims of cyberattack within days of the escalation, many of which were shared via propaganda platforms and messaging platforms aligned with geopolitical agendas.  In spite of the fact that not all claims reflect a verified breach, the rapid dissemination of such announcements can create confusion, inflate perceived impact, and press targeted organizations into responding before technical verification is possible. It is becoming increasingly clear that the target list is expanding beyond political disruption.  Monitoring of cybersecurity indicates that activities related to the conflict extend beyond Israel to Gulf States, Jordan, Cyprus, and American organizations based abroad. As a result of financial motivation, ransomware operators and threat groups have attempted to frame attacks against Israeli and Western-related entities as political alignments rather than criminal attacks. A gradual blurring of the distinction between state-aligned disruption and extortion involving financial gain is being caused by the blending of ideological messaging and traditional cybercrime tactics. Moreover, security teams have warned that opportunistic actors are leveraging geopolitical tensions as a narrative hook for phishing and fraud operations.  It has been observed increasingly that travel-related scams are targeting individuals stranded or traveling within the region, and credential harvesting campaigns are targeting diplomats, journalists, humanitarian organizations and defense contractors. There has been an increase in interest in industrial and operational technology environments in recent years, which has created an alarm.  It is important to note that early cyber activity linked to the conflict was primarily defacements and distributed denial-of-service attacks against public websites. In recent reports, threat intelligence reports have indicated an attempt to probe systems linked to industrial control components such as programmable logic controllers and other industrial control components.  Consequently, if substantiated, this shift would represent a substantial escalation of both technical ambition and potential impact for energy facilities, utilities, and other critical infrastructure operators throughout the Middle East and Gulf region, should reevaluate their operational network resilience, particularly those that connect information technology with industrial control systems.  Together, these developments suggest a broad range of potential cyber activity, including high-volume DDoS campaigns that target government portals as well as targeted spear-phishing activities that seek credentials from diplomats, media organizations, and defense contractors.  A number of analysts have warned that ransomware incidents can be politicized, hack-and-leak operations will target military-linked entities, and destructive malware may be used to disable government systems.  The influence campaigns and fabricated breach claims being circulated through social media platforms are expected to play a parallel role in shaping public perception as well as these technical threats. As a result of the possibility of both verified attacks and exaggerated narratives producing real-world consequences, enhancing situational awareness and improving defensive monitoring is becoming an integral aspect of risk management in organizations.  It is also evident from the broader regional context why geopolitical escalation often results in heightened cyber security risks in the Middle East. Over the past decade, countries across the region have taken steps to transform public services, financial systems, telecommunications infrastructure, and energy operations through large-scale digital transformation initiatives.  Particularly, Gulf Cooperation Council members have led these efforts. In addition to strengthening economic diversification and technological capacity, these efforts have increased the digital attack surface available to threat actors at the same time. Monitoring of cybercrime activities in the Gulf has indicated an increasing number of traditional cybercrime activities targeting both private and state institutions. In recent years, financial fraud campaigns, ransomware attacks, and political-motivated web defacements have disrupted a wide range of industries, including banking, telecommunications, and more.  There have been several high-profile incidents in recent years that involved financial institution and mobile banking platform breaches, while ransomware groups have increasingly targeted large regional service providers as targets. These campaigns have grown in frequency as well as sophistication, reflecting the region's interconnected digital infrastructure’s increasing strategic value.  In addition, the threat environment is not limited to conventional cybercrime. Researchers continue to report advanced persistent threat groups conducting cyberespionage operations against governmental agencies, defense organizations, and energy infrastructure throughout the region, in addition to conventional cybercrime.  There is a widespread belief that many of these campaigns are associated with states and geopolitical rivalries, with a particular focus being placed on individuals associated with Iran following earlier cyber incidents against its nuclear facilities.  Several activities attributed to this group have included deployment of destructive malware, covert surveillance campaigns, and data destruction attacks, all aimed at disrupting critical infrastructure without providing any indication as to whether the underlying motive is political disruption or financial gain.  Consequently, attribution efforts have been complicated by the convergence of these motives, resulting in the increasing overlap between cyber espionage, sabotage, and criminal activity. Cybersecurity dynamics are also influenced by the political and social significance of the digital space within the region. Digital platforms, data flows, and communication infrastructure are frequently regulated by Middle Eastern governments as a matter of national stability and regime security. Consequently, social media platforms and messaging platforms have evolved into contested environments where state institutions, activists, extremist organizations, and influence networks compete to shape narratives in contested environments.  In times of conflict or political instability, this competition can take the form of distributed denial-of-service attacks, coordinated disinformation campaigns, doxxing operations, and claims of data breaches aimed at putting pressure on political opponents or influencing public opinion.  With the increasing use of artificial intelligence tools for creating synthetic media, automating propaganda, or manipulating information flow, it has become increasingly difficult for organizations to maintain reliable situational awareness during emergencies. In addition to the integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous technologies into military and security operations across the region, there is an emerging dimension.  New cybersecurity vulnerabilities are inevitable as governments and non-state actors experiment with artificial intelligence-enabled surveillance, targeting, and operational coordination systems. It is important to be aware that when systems depend on complex supply chains of software or foreign technological expertise, cyber intrusions, manipulation, and espionage can be a potential entry point.  According to security specialists, interference with these technologies could have consequences beyond the theft of data, impacting battlefield decision-making, operational reliability, or strategic control over sensitive defense capabilities, among other things.  Institutions are not the only ones to face such risks. Technology-facilitated abuse has become increasingly problematic for vulnerable communities as it intersects with personal safety concerns and digital rights.  A number of places in the region have experienced an increase in the spread of manipulated images and deepfake content as a result of technology-facilitated abuse, including impersonation schemes and sextortion. Many victims experience significant social stigma or legal barriers when seeking assistance, which can discourage them from reporting and allow perpetrators to operate with relative impunity.  In combination, these trends illustrate that cybersecurity is not limited to protecting networks or infrastructure in the Middle East. A complex intersection of national security, information control, technological competition, and social vulnerability has resulted in a situation where the region is particularly vulnerable to cyber activity arising from geopolitical tensions.

Rising Cyber Threats Linked to Ongoing Middle East Conflict #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #cyberespionage #CyberWarfare

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Industrial Control System Security Market Size, Share | Report [2035] www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/indu...
#ICSSecurity #IndustrialPotatoSecurity #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity

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Industrial Control System Security Market Size, Share | Report [2035] Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Market is predicted to grow at a 7.25% CAGR, reaching USD 40755.94 Billion by 2035. Top company industry analysis highlights key drivers, emerging trends, regi...

Industrial Control System Security Market Size, Share | Report [2035] www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/indu...
#ICSSecurity #IndustrialCyberSecurity #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity

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Sandworm-Associated DynoWiper Malware Targets Polish Power Infrastructure   A cyber intrusion targeting the nation's energy infrastructure occurred in late 2025, which security experts have described as one of the largest cyberattacks the nation has faced in many years. It underscores the growing vulnerability of critical national systems in light of increasing geopolitical tensions, which are at odds with one another.  ESET, a cybersecurity company specializing in cyber security, has uncovered new data indicating that the operation was carried out by Sandworm, an advanced persistent threat group closely aligned with Russia that has been associated with disrupting energy and industrial networks for decades.  ESET researchers found that a deeper analysis of the malware used during the incident revealed operational patterns and code similarities that are consistent with Sandworm's past campaigns, indicating that the attack follows Sandworm's established playbook for damaging cyber activity.  According to the assailants, they were planning to use a malware strain named DynoWiper that was designed to permanently destroy files and cripple affected systems by irreversibly destroying them, a strategy which could have caused widespread disruptions across the Poland electricity industry if it had been successful.  At the time of publication, the Russian Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment. According to cyber experts, Sandworm, which is also known as UAC-0113, APT44, or Seashell Blizzard in the cybersecurity community, has been active for more than a decade and is widely regarded as an act of state-sponsored hacking, most likely aimed at Russian military intelligence agencies.  The group's ties to Unit 74455 of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) have been established by security researchers after repeated accusations that the organization has committed high-impact cyber-operations intended to disrupt and degrade critical infrastructure systems.  Throughout its history, Sandworm has been credited with some of the most significant cyber incidents against energy networks, most notably a devastating attack on the Ukraine's power grid nearly a decade ago, which used data-wiping malware and left around 230,000 people without power for a period of nearly 10 days. It is important to note that this episode still remains a prototypical example of the group's capabilities and intentions, and it continues to shape the assessment of the group's role in more recent attempts to undermine energy systems beyond Ukraine's borders.  As detailed in a recent report issued by ESET, they believed that the operation bore the hallmarks of Sandworm, a threat actor widely linked to Russia's military and intelligence apparatus, evidenced by its involvement in the operation.  A data wiping malware, DynoWiper, dubbed DynoWiper, was identified by investigators and tracked as Win32/KillFiles.NMO, which had previously been undocumented, pointing the finger at the group. The wiper campaign was similar in both technical and operational aspects to earlier Sandworm wiper campaigns, especially those that were observed following Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of that year.  In a statement published by ESET on December 29, 2025, the company stated that the malware had been detected during an attempt to disrupt Poland's energy sector, but that there are no indications that the attackers succeeded in causing outages or permanently damage the energy sector.  In an email sent on December 29, the Polish authorities confirmed that there was activity observed in the area of two combined heat and power plants and a system used to manage the generation of electricity from renewable sources, such as the power of wind and sun.  In a public statement, the Prime Minister said that the attacks were directed by groups “directly linked to Russian services,” citing the government's plans to strengthen national defenses through additional safeguards and cybersecurity legislation that will require more stringent requirements on risk management, information technology and operational technology security, and preparedness for incidents. Tusk said this legislation is expected to be implemented very soon.  Moreover, the timing of the incident attracted the attention of analysts as it coincided with the tenth anniversary of Sandworm's historic attack on Ukraine's power grid in 2015. BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware were deployed during the attack, and the attack caused hours-long blackouts for thousands of people, something that was cited as a continuation of a pattern of disruption campaigns against critical infrastructure that has been occurring for years.  A company named ESET stated that the attempted intrusion coincided with Sandworm's tenth anniversary of the devastating attack on Ukraine's power grid in the year 2000, though it only provided limited technical information beyond the identification of the malware involved.  Researchers are pointing out that the use of a custom-built wiper, as well as the pattern of Russian cyber operations in which data-destroying malware has been a strategic tool, aligns with a broader pattern observed in cyber operations. The use of wipers in attacks linked to Moscow has increased significantly since 2022.  The use of AcidRain to disable roughly 270,000 satellite modems in Ukraine has been an effort to disrupt the communication of the country. A number of campaigns targeting universities, critical infrastructure, and the like have been attributed to Sandworm. This is also true in the case of the NotPetya outbreak in 2017, a destructive worm that in its early stage was targeted at Ukrainian targets, but quickly spread worldwide, causing an estimated $10 billion in damage and securing its place as one of the highest-profile case studies in the history of cybercrime.  There are no indications yet as to why DynoWiper had failed to trigger power outages in Poland; the investigation has left open the possibility that the operation may have been strategically calibrated to avoid escalation or that strong defenses within the country’s energy grid prevented it.  In the aftermath of the incident, governments and operators of critical infrastructure across Europe have been reminded once again that energy systems continue to be an attractive target among state-sanctioned cyber operations even when those attacks do not result in immediate disruptions.  It is noted that security analysts have noted the attempt to deploy DynoWiper in a strategic capacity reflects a continued reliance on destructive malware as a strategy tool, and emphasize the importance of investing in cyber resilience, real-time monitoring, and coordinated incident response across both the information technology as well as operational technologies.  Although it appears that Polish officials are using the episode as a springboard in order to strengthen their defenses, experts point out that similar threats may not be bound by borders in the near future since geopolitical tensions are unlikely to ease at all.  Despite the fact that the failure of the attack may offer some reassurance for the time being, it also emphasizes a more significant reality: adversaries continue to search energy networks for weaknesses, and it will be crucial to be prepared and cooperative if we wish to avoid future disruptions, as well as to be able to detect and neutralize malware before it becomes a major problem.

Sandworm-Associated DynoWiper Malware Targets Polish Power Infrastructure #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #DynoWiper #ESETResearch

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Hypervisor Ransomware Attacks Surge as Threat Actors Shift Focus to Virtual Infrastructure  Hypervisors have emerged as a highly important, yet insecure, component in modern infrastructural networks, and attackers have understood this to expand the reach of their ransomware attacks. It has been observed by the security community that the modes of attack have changed, where attackers have abandoned heavily fortified devices in favor of the hypervisor, the platform through which they have the capability to regulate hundreds of devices at one time. In other words, a compromised hypervisor forms a force multiplier in a ransomware attack.  Data from Huntress on threat hunting indicates the speed at which this trend is gathering pace. Initially in the early part of 2025, hypervisors were involved in just a few percent of ransomware attacks. However, towards the latter part of the year, this number had risen substantially, with hypervisor-level encryption now contributing towards a quarter of these attacks. This is largely because the Akira ransomware group is specifically leveraging vulnerabilities within virtualized infrastructure.   Hypervisors provide attackers the opportunity by typically residing outside the sight of traditional security software. For this reason, bare-metal hypervisors are of particular interest to attackers since traditional security software cannot be set up on these environments. Attacks begin after gaining root access, and the attackers will be able to encrypt the disks on the virtual machines. Furthermore, attackers will be able to use the built-in functions to execute the encryption process without necessarily setting up the ransomware.  In this case, security software would be rendered unable to detect the attacks. These attacks often begin with loopholes in credentials and network segmentation. With the availability of Hypervisor Management Interfaces on the larger internets inside organizations, attackers can launch lateral attacks when they gain entry and gain control of the virtualization layer. Misuse of native management tools has also been discovered by Huntress for adjusting Machine Settings, degrading defenses, and preparing the environment for massive Ransomware attacks.  Additionally, the increased interest in hypervisors has emphasized that this layer must be afforded the equivalent security emphasis on it as for servers and end-points. Refined access controls and proper segmentation of management networks are required to remediate this. So too is having current and properly maintained patches on this infrastructure, as it has been shown to have regularly exploited vulnerabilities for full administrative control and rapid encryption of virtualized environments. While having comprehensive methods in place for prevention, recovery planning is essential in this scenario as well.  A hypervisor-based ransomware is meant for environments, which could very well go down, hence the need for reliable backups, ideally immutables. This is especially true for organizations that do not have a recovery plan in place. As ransomware threats continue to evolve and become more sophisticated, the role of hypervisors has stepped up to become a focal point on the battlefield of business security.  This is because by not securing and protecting the hypervisor level against cyber threats, what a business will essentially present to the cyber attackers is what they have always wanted: control of their whole operation with a mere click of their fingers.

Hypervisor Ransomware Attacks Surge as Threat Actors Shift Focus to Virtual Infrastructure #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #CyberAttacks

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Suomesta voi matkustaa junalla muualle Eurooppaan ehkä jo keväällä – valtiolta 1,9 miljoonan lisärahoitus Suomen ja Ruotsin välisen rataliikenteen käynnistymiseen tulee 1,9 miljoonan vuosittainen rahoitus valtiolta. Alueen kuntien aktiivisuudella oli ministerin mukaan merkitystä.

Finland-Sweden: "This project will promote the security & security of supply of the whole of Finland..." Funding to finally open the Tornio-Haparanda connection, enabling cross-border rail movement across the #BothnianArc... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity #societalresilience yle.fi/a/74-20195051

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Germany: #criticalinfrastructuresecurity & #civilprotection...

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UK: Subsea resilience & crisis preparedness... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity #societalresilience

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Battle for the seabed: defence groups take aim at underwater security Disruption to gas pipelines and telecoms cables have focused policymakers’ minds on protecting submarine assets

This leads on the #criticalinfrastructuresecurity context, but it does mention #ProjectCabot & ASW capabilities. It doesn't set these within the broader strategic context of #AtlanticBastion & the #GIUKGap. No klaxon on this occasion... www.ft.com/content/ec7d...

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Cyber turbulence ahead as airlines strap in for a security crisis - Help Net Security Explore key cybersecurity challenges facing the aviation industry, from threats to regulations and protection strategies.

The aviation industry faces a growing cyber crisis—aging systems, rising threats, and high stakes demand urgent action. ✈️🛡️
#AviationCyberRisk #CriticalInfrastructureSecurity

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More Than a Breaching- A Rock Song On "What To Look For" Possible Iran Cyber Retaliation

#CyberSecurity
#CyberThreats
#NationStateAttacks
#CyberWarfare
#ThreatIntelligence
#CyberDefense
#InfoSec
#CriticalInfrastructureSecurity
#APTThreats
#CyberRisk

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More Than a Breaching- A Rock Song On "What To Look For" Possible Iran Cyber Retaliation

#CyberSecurity
#CyberThreats
#NationStateAttacks
#CyberWarfare
#ThreatIntelligence
#CyberDefense
#InfoSec
#CriticalInfrastructureSecurity
#APTThreats
#CyberRisk

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More Than a Breaching- A Rock Song On "What To Look For" Possible Iran Cyber Retaliation

#CyberSecurity
#CyberThreats
#NationStateAttacks
#CyberWarfare
#ThreatIntelligence
#CyberDefense
#InfoSec
#CriticalInfrastructureSecurity
#APTThreats
#CyberRisk

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CUI: Waterworth, scale & three oceanic corridors. Great analysis from @ravirockks.bsky.social... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity

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Screenshot of the Baltic Synchro countdown clock showing the time left until the Baltic states disconnect from the Russian and Belarus Brell network.

Screenshot of the Baltic Synchro countdown clock showing the time left until the Baltic states disconnect from the Russian and Belarus Brell network.

Frequency realignment: final hours of preparations for tomorrows disconnection by Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania from the Russian power grid & Sunday's full synchronization with mainland Europe... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity

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Screenshot of an extract from the announcement (24th January 2025) by the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) for a new enquiry to examine threats to undersea cables.

Screenshot of an extract from the announcement (24th January 2025) by the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) for a new enquiry to examine threats to undersea cables.

UK: Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) opens new enquiry to examine threats to undersea cables... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity #nationalresilience committees.parliament.uk/committee/11...

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Could Ireland’s longheld neutrality make it vulnerable to infrastructure attacks? Transatlantic subsea cables serving Europe and the UK go to or near its shores – but some say recent suspected sabotage means Ireland must be able to defend itself

Prospectif: towards a longer-term future maritime '2I-Bastion'? #criticalinfrastructuresecurity www.theguardian.com/world/2025/j...

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Critical infrastructure needs robust cybersecurity. Learn how SimSpace strengthens OT security in our case study: https://buff.ly/3WlRCOg

#CriticalInfrastructureSecurity #CyberDefense #OperationalResilience

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Interesting language being used here: 'retaliation doctrine'. This is the original question exchange from 3rd December 2024... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=20...

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This is excellent from @erikbrown.bsky.social ‬& @sophiabesch.bsky.social... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity

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A primary focus on 4 components of UK CNI (Communications, Energy, Government & Finance) is interesting: firmly positioning this within the criticalities framing & recognising the substantive upstream dependencies these components embody for the other 9 CNI sectors... #criticalinfrastructuresecurity

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For those of you attending & interested in #criticalinfrastructuresecurity, you can hear Ravi's presentation "The tangled web: Critical software and critical infrastructure law" on Wednesday 18th in Think Tank 3
Melbourne Room 1 at 10.50...

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