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'IT WILL EXPLODE!' The Brutal Truth of Starmer's UK EXPOSED | Daily Expresso
'IT WILL EXPLODE!' The Brutal Truth of Starmer's UK EXPOSED | Daily Expresso YouTube video by Daily Express

'IT WILL EXPLODE!' The Brutal Truth of Starmer's UK EXPOSED

Is the UK heading to civil unrest?
#massmigration #migrants #muslims #islamism #Britain

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Creating conditions for regime change through a military campaign was always a tall order, said Assaf Orion, the former head of strategic planning for the Israeli military.
"There is no recipe for this. It's not mechanical engineering," he said. "The war is planned to last weeks, and these processes can take years."
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar acknowledged as much in an interview Wednesday with the Times of Israel. He said military action alone can't topple Iran's regime, which is something that needs to be done by Iranians themselves and isn't likely to happen until after the war. "Usually such things happen after the military campaign, less so when there's a war," Sa'ar told the Times.
Judging the resilience of Iran's rulers is tricky given the opaque nature of the regime's inner circles and the lack of a sustained foreign military presence on the ground. They could come under heavier pressure as the U.S. and Israel continue their attacks.
Despite Netanyahu's public statements, Israel's security services have said it would take time to grind down the Iranian regime and that they were facing a ticking clock once the war began.

Creating conditions for regime change through a military campaign was always a tall order, said Assaf Orion, the former head of strategic planning for the Israeli military. "There is no recipe for this. It's not mechanical engineering," he said. "The war is planned to last weeks, and these processes can take years." Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar acknowledged as much in an interview Wednesday with the Times of Israel. He said military action alone can't topple Iran's regime, which is something that needs to be done by Iranians themselves and isn't likely to happen until after the war. "Usually such things happen after the military campaign, less so when there's a war," Sa'ar told the Times. Judging the resilience of Iran's rulers is tricky given the opaque nature of the regime's inner circles and the lack of a sustained foreign military presence on the ground. They could come under heavier pressure as the U.S. and Israel continue their attacks. Despite Netanyahu's public statements, Israel's security services have said it would take time to grind down the Iranian regime and that they were facing a ticking clock once the war began.

There is no clear mechanism for unseating the regime. Trump toyed last week with the idea of Kurdish involvement in the war. But Iranian-Kurdish armed groups-mostly based in neighboring Iraq and in border areas—say the conditions aren't there and that Iranian government forces are still too strong.
Domestic discontent with Iran's government is running high. But the government retains its monopoly over the use of force. Residents said members of the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of the Basij, their plainclothes enforcers, are visible on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities.
Security forces are threatening would-be protesters with a shoot-to-kill order, raising the possibility of a repeat of the January crackdown, when thousands of antigovernment protesters were killed.
They have also adapted to the punishment. Despite intense Israeli strikes in the city of Isfahan, security forces still appear to control the city. Members of the Basij have been roaming the streets on motorcycles brandishing guns and flags of the Islamic Republic, one resident said.
Many opponents of the Iranian state believe that rising up against their leaders under the current conditions and with no guarantee of continued foreign military support would be suicidal.

There is no clear mechanism for unseating the regime. Trump toyed last week with the idea of Kurdish involvement in the war. But Iranian-Kurdish armed groups-mostly based in neighboring Iraq and in border areas—say the conditions aren't there and that Iranian government forces are still too strong. Domestic discontent with Iran's government is running high. But the government retains its monopoly over the use of force. Residents said members of the paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of the Basij, their plainclothes enforcers, are visible on the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities. Security forces are threatening would-be protesters with a shoot-to-kill order, raising the possibility of a repeat of the January crackdown, when thousands of antigovernment protesters were killed. They have also adapted to the punishment. Despite intense Israeli strikes in the city of Isfahan, security forces still appear to control the city. Members of the Basij have been roaming the streets on motorcycles brandishing guns and flags of the Islamic Republic, one resident said. Many opponents of the Iranian state believe that rising up against their leaders under the current conditions and with no guarantee of continued foreign military support would be suicidal.

Israeli officials now assess that Iran’s ruling regime is unlikely to fall in the immediate future, as Tehran’s battered rulers remain in control and conditions on the ground aren’t yet ripe for a popular uprising… archive.ph/7AVI5 #Islamism #IranWar

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What's the latest on #Islamism ? Is it fine to use the term and openly oppose it as a movement or is it considered Islamophobic?

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What's the latest on #Islamism? Is it fine to use the term and openly oppose it as a movement or is it considered Islamophobic?

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Only cowards object to Iran war on 'international law' grounds: The Islamic regime is explicitly criminal, slaughtering its own people and sponsoring terrorists around the world nationalpost.com/opinion/terr... By @terryglavin.bsky.social #Islamism #IranWar #InternationalLaw

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RFE/RL: Can the regime survive?
Zimmt: Any kind of regime change in Iran -- and we certainly hope for regime change in Iran -- depends in my view on three main conditions. One is to see millions of Iranians in the streets. because otherwise it's going to be almost impossible, in my view, to topple the Iranian regime only through aerial strikes from above.
The second condition would be to see some kind of coalition between different sections and parts of the Iranian society --students, women, bus drivers, workers, ethnic minorities --working together.
Last but not least, I would say one condition for a regime change in Iran is to see some cracks and divisions and perhaps defections from within the security apparatus inside Iran. And that's something which is going to be very difficult to achieve because, as we know, the Revolutionary Guards [and] the Basij are very much dependent on the Islamic republic. They know that if the regime collapsed, they might pay the consequences for that. And so they will fight until the end, in my view.
RFE/RL: So no cracks so far?
Zimmt: We might see some weakening of the command and control networks inside Iran. We might see some divisions between different sections of the military and political establishment inside Iran.
But certainly we have not seen any kind of losing control.
Just yesterday I looked at information about checkpoints established by the Basij, by the law enforcement forces in Iran. We still have reports about the intelligence agencies in Iran arresting people for treason or for cooperating with Israel.

RFE/RL: Can the regime survive? Zimmt: Any kind of regime change in Iran -- and we certainly hope for regime change in Iran -- depends in my view on three main conditions. One is to see millions of Iranians in the streets. because otherwise it's going to be almost impossible, in my view, to topple the Iranian regime only through aerial strikes from above. The second condition would be to see some kind of coalition between different sections and parts of the Iranian society --students, women, bus drivers, workers, ethnic minorities --working together. Last but not least, I would say one condition for a regime change in Iran is to see some cracks and divisions and perhaps defections from within the security apparatus inside Iran. And that's something which is going to be very difficult to achieve because, as we know, the Revolutionary Guards [and] the Basij are very much dependent on the Islamic republic. They know that if the regime collapsed, they might pay the consequences for that. And so they will fight until the end, in my view. RFE/RL: So no cracks so far? Zimmt: We might see some weakening of the command and control networks inside Iran. We might see some divisions between different sections of the military and political establishment inside Iran. But certainly we have not seen any kind of losing control. Just yesterday I looked at information about checkpoints established by the Basij, by the law enforcement forces in Iran. We still have reports about the intelligence agencies in Iran arresting people for treason or for cooperating with Israel.

RFE/RL: If the regime does survive, what's it going to be like?
Zimmt: I'm afraid that if their regime survives, especially if it's under Mojtaba Khamenei, we might see an even more hard-line state, more committed to not just continuing the core strategic goals of Iran -- meaning its missiles, nuclear, regional ambitions -- but we might also see a regime which might take more risks in comparison to [that under] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
For example, we know that throughout the years under Khamenei, Iran was certainly moving forward toward reaching a nuclear threshold state, but Khamenei didn't make a decision to break out.
My concern is that someone like Mojtaba might take the risk of breaking out, especially after realizing that this might be the ultimate deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.
RFE/RL: If the clerical establishment does remain in control, what will this mean for relations with the Gulf states?
Zimmt: They will realize that if this regime is still intact, they will have to live with that. And President Trump is not going to be here forever. I'm not sure if they can trust the Israelis, because some of them at least consider Israel to be a destabilizing force.
Their conclusion might be: We might have to work with Israel, with the United States. To strengthen our defense systems vis-a-vis the Iranians, we should try to find a way to accommodate with Iran because Iran is here to stay, because the Islamic republic might be here to stay.

RFE/RL: If the regime does survive, what's it going to be like? Zimmt: I'm afraid that if their regime survives, especially if it's under Mojtaba Khamenei, we might see an even more hard-line state, more committed to not just continuing the core strategic goals of Iran -- meaning its missiles, nuclear, regional ambitions -- but we might also see a regime which might take more risks in comparison to [that under] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. For example, we know that throughout the years under Khamenei, Iran was certainly moving forward toward reaching a nuclear threshold state, but Khamenei didn't make a decision to break out. My concern is that someone like Mojtaba might take the risk of breaking out, especially after realizing that this might be the ultimate deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and the United States. RFE/RL: If the clerical establishment does remain in control, what will this mean for relations with the Gulf states? Zimmt: They will realize that if this regime is still intact, they will have to live with that. And President Trump is not going to be here forever. I'm not sure if they can trust the Israelis, because some of them at least consider Israel to be a destabilizing force. Their conclusion might be: We might have to work with Israel, with the United States. To strengthen our defense systems vis-a-vis the Iranians, we should try to find a way to accommodate with Iran because Iran is here to stay, because the Islamic republic might be here to stay.

Amid ongoing public absence, is Iran's new leader in control?
Iran's new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is probably in charge despite making no public appearance since being appointed on March 8 & amid reports that he was injured in an air strike… www.rferl.org/a/iran-mojta... #Islamism #IranWar

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Why Holocaust education has failed It needs to teach the link between Nazism and genocidal Islamism

Why #Holocaust #education has failed.

It needs to teach the link between #Nazism and #genocidal #Islamism.

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While the country is in crisis mode, Mojtaba will need to rely on Ali Larijani for domestic and foreign-policy expertise. Larjani is one of the few remaining regime loyalists with senior experience in both the domestic and the international realms.
In a recent state-television interview, filmed in what appears to be a bunker, a relaxed Larijani said that Iran had been "raped" by outside powers, and he tried to rally not just the regime's base but the broader public behind the imperative to fend off foreign designs. Trump's words-the U.S. president had said that he would choose Iran's next leader, and that he didn't know whether Iran's map would look the same at the end of the war-have proved invaluable propaganda tools for the Islamic Republic.
For the foreseeable future, Mojtaba will attempt to rule from hiding as he tries to elude Israeli assassination. His focus will be not governing the country but staying alive. Whether Mojtaba has the endurance for this life is an open question. His father was forged by years of revolutionary hardship—prison, persecution, life underground-before coming to power and reportedly amassing a war chest exceeding $100 billion, built in part from properties confiscated from religious minorities who fled persecution.

While the country is in crisis mode, Mojtaba will need to rely on Ali Larijani for domestic and foreign-policy expertise. Larjani is one of the few remaining regime loyalists with senior experience in both the domestic and the international realms. In a recent state-television interview, filmed in what appears to be a bunker, a relaxed Larijani said that Iran had been "raped" by outside powers, and he tried to rally not just the regime's base but the broader public behind the imperative to fend off foreign designs. Trump's words-the U.S. president had said that he would choose Iran's next leader, and that he didn't know whether Iran's map would look the same at the end of the war-have proved invaluable propaganda tools for the Islamic Republic. For the foreseeable future, Mojtaba will attempt to rule from hiding as he tries to elude Israeli assassination. His focus will be not governing the country but staying alive. Whether Mojtaba has the endurance for this life is an open question. His father was forged by years of revolutionary hardship—prison, persecution, life underground-before coming to power and reportedly amassing a war chest exceeding $100 billion, built in part from properties confiscated from religious minorities who fled persecution.

The Iranian regime doubles down:
Trump was hoping for an Iranian Delcy Rodríguez. Instead, he may have produced an Iranian Kim Jong Un. www.theatlantic.com/internationa... #Islamism #IranWar By @ksadjadpour.bsky.social

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On Monday, the UK government announced the creation of a new "anti-Muslim hostility tsar," a special representative tasked with tackling hostility and hatred directed at Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim. #Islamism #LatestNews
expose-news.com/2026/03/11/u...

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No Consolation Prizes for Iran President Trump’s press conference this afternoon on the conflict with Iran was a reminder that when assessing the Islamic Republic’s threats, you have to include the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah

Iran must lose its imperial holdings. There ought to be no consolation prizes for an evil regime that loses a war it has been waging for four decades. And the rest of the Mideast deserves to sleep well at night. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #Islamism #IranWar #IranProxies

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Aoun accuses Hezbollah of working toward ‘collapse’ of Lebanese state for Iran’s sake Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on Monday accused Hezbollah of working toward the “collapse” of the state for the sake of Iran’s interests, a week after the

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on Monday accused #Hezbollah of working toward the “collapse” of the state for the sake of Iran’s interests, a week after the Tehran-backed militia launched an attack on Israel english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-... #Lebanon #Islamism

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Why Are Liberals Against Liberation? – with Elica Le Bon Podcast Episode · Call Me Back - with Dan Senor · March 9 · 37m

Why Are Liberals Against Liberation?

Iranian-American lawyer & activist Elica Le Bon explains the ideological narratives that form & distort the West’s reaction to the Iran war.

#Iran #Imperialism #Islamism #EpicFury #IranWar #FreeIran #WomanLifeFreedom

podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/c...

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The hunt for Iran’s ballistic missile crews: Tehran’s missiles are key to its retaliation against Israel and the US. But launching them brings an immediate risk of death archive.ph/nb0hi #Islamism #IranWar

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Opposition users see him as a symbol of the crisis.
Former Sharif University professor Ali Sharifi Zarchi wrote: "The survivors of the regime like Larijani, Pezeshkian, Qalibaf, and Ejei are even more criminal [than Khamenei]... by not surrendering power to the people, they have made Iran a target for attacks." Some believe that "unlike Khamenei, he is not ideological; his priority is the survival of the government and himself."
While many dissidents wish for his death, often using the term "cutlet-ed" (a reference to being blown up, originally used for Qasem Soleimani), pro-regime supporters describe him as "the powerful voice of the system in these difficult days."
"Cutlet" has become a dark meme in Iranian protest culture, referring to someone being shredded in an explosion. It is a direct jab at the IRC's cult of martyrdom.
Regardless of these differing views, Larijani has positioned himself as a key figure in shaping the country's broader strategic direction. His most immediate objective has been to influence the selection of the new Leader. Although reports suggest he initially opposed Mojtaba Khamenei's ascent, he was the first senior official to address the news network after the appointment was finalized. In that interview, he voiced hope that the decision would resolve internal rifts and open the path toward victory, "economic improvement," and "tranquility and welfare for the people."

Opposition users see him as a symbol of the crisis. Former Sharif University professor Ali Sharifi Zarchi wrote: "The survivors of the regime like Larijani, Pezeshkian, Qalibaf, and Ejei are even more criminal [than Khamenei]... by not surrendering power to the people, they have made Iran a target for attacks." Some believe that "unlike Khamenei, he is not ideological; his priority is the survival of the government and himself." While many dissidents wish for his death, often using the term "cutlet-ed" (a reference to being blown up, originally used for Qasem Soleimani), pro-regime supporters describe him as "the powerful voice of the system in these difficult days." "Cutlet" has become a dark meme in Iranian protest culture, referring to someone being shredded in an explosion. It is a direct jab at the IRC's cult of martyrdom. Regardless of these differing views, Larijani has positioned himself as a key figure in shaping the country's broader strategic direction. His most immediate objective has been to influence the selection of the new Leader. Although reports suggest he initially opposed Mojtaba Khamenei's ascent, he was the first senior official to address the news network after the appointment was finalized. In that interview, he voiced hope that the decision would resolve internal rifts and open the path toward victory, "economic improvement," and "tranquility and welfare for the people."

#Larijani: The Kingmaker who now holds Iran’s real power.
Larijani has positioned himself as a key figure in shaping the country’s broader strategic direction. His most immediate objective has been to influence the selection of the new Leader. iranwire.com/en/features/... #Iran #Islamism

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Like their foot soldiers, most militia leaders are not ideologically motivated, either, according to several of my interviewees who know these men personally.
When these groups were formed, some leaders were driven by desire to gain power or influence, or to kill with impunity. One Iraqi politician recounted that Khazali said he had taken up weapons because he did not want Shites to be upstaged by Sunnis in the fight against occupation. Another former high-ranking Iraqi politician said that another militia commander had first sought U.S. backing to lead a faction against Iranian-aligned groups but, when that effort failed, moved on to lead an Iranian-backed militia.
Having access to vast riches has changed the commanders' motivations. Nearly all of them had come from poverty. Tamimi explained that although
"at first, making money wasn't the goal," the commanders "got used to the money" over time.
Abdul Razzaq al-Hayyali, who joined the Badr Corps in 1982 after being captured during the Iran-Iraq War as a young officer, told me that after the group returned to Iraq in 2003 and proceeded to take over several state institutions-which meant access to the oil revenues-its leaders "started competing with each other over who gets more billions, they all have palaces, they have banks filled up with money in Iraq, Iran, the Gulf, abroad. They're stealing as if possessed."

Like their foot soldiers, most militia leaders are not ideologically motivated, either, according to several of my interviewees who know these men personally. When these groups were formed, some leaders were driven by desire to gain power or influence, or to kill with impunity. One Iraqi politician recounted that Khazali said he had taken up weapons because he did not want Shites to be upstaged by Sunnis in the fight against occupation. Another former high-ranking Iraqi politician said that another militia commander had first sought U.S. backing to lead a faction against Iranian-aligned groups but, when that effort failed, moved on to lead an Iranian-backed militia. Having access to vast riches has changed the commanders' motivations. Nearly all of them had come from poverty. Tamimi explained that although "at first, making money wasn't the goal," the commanders "got used to the money" over time. Abdul Razzaq al-Hayyali, who joined the Badr Corps in 1982 after being captured during the Iran-Iraq War as a young officer, told me that after the group returned to Iraq in 2003 and proceeded to take over several state institutions-which meant access to the oil revenues-its leaders "started competing with each other over who gets more billions, they all have palaces, they have banks filled up with money in Iraq, Iran, the Gulf, abroad. They're stealing as if possessed."

In addition to enriching the Iranian regime, the Iraqi militias advance both parties' interests by securing their own political dominance, which in turn provides Tehran authority over Baghdad. The militias have maintained their position through repression, such as when they violently crushed anti-regime protests in Iraq in 2019. They have carried out acts of political violence, too: in 2021, when a Shiite-Kurdish-Sunni coalition sought to form a government excluding some of the militias' parties, the militias targeted its Kurdish and Sunni members with drones until they gave up on the plan. The militias have also taken steps to capture the state by appointing loyalists or pliable figures to key judicial and executive positions and through mass vote buying in the November 2025 parliamentary elections, as documented in videos and testimonies of people who were hired by political parties as election observers in exchange for their votes and the votes of their relatives.

In addition to enriching the Iranian regime, the Iraqi militias advance both parties' interests by securing their own political dominance, which in turn provides Tehran authority over Baghdad. The militias have maintained their position through repression, such as when they violently crushed anti-regime protests in Iraq in 2019. They have carried out acts of political violence, too: in 2021, when a Shiite-Kurdish-Sunni coalition sought to form a government excluding some of the militias' parties, the militias targeted its Kurdish and Sunni members with drones until they gave up on the plan. The militias have also taken steps to capture the state by appointing loyalists or pliable figures to key judicial and executive positions and through mass vote buying in the November 2025 parliamentary elections, as documented in videos and testimonies of people who were hired by political parties as election observers in exchange for their votes and the votes of their relatives.

Iran recognizes that if the Iraqi militias were to take significant military action against the United States and Israel, the devastating response that action would trigger would undermine the militias' grip on power and their ability to siphon off Iraq's resources. According to the commander of Israel's Northern Command, General Ori Gordin, Tehran pressured Lebanon's Hezbollah to intervene when Israel and the United States attacked Iran in the 12-day war; in contrast, according to Iraqi sources speaking to the pan-Arab newspaper Asharg Al-Awsat and the British think tank RUSI, Tehran discouraged the Iraqi militias from entering the fray. The purposes of the two proxies are different. Hezbollah receives massive financial assistance from Iran and from the Iraqi militias, and its function is to fight on Iran's orders. The Iraqi militias' job in recent years has been to preserve Iran's influence over Iraqi politics and to continue the plunder of Iraq's resources.
STAYING OUT OF TROUBLE
Today, with a war underway between Iran, Israel, and the United States, the interests of the Iraqi militias and Iranian regime may be diverging for the first time. U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated that he hopes the war will bring down the regime itself, but most militia leaders and rank and file do not want to go down in flames alongside it.
Wealthy militia commanders are wary about fighting Iran's wars.
According to an attendee at a tribal iftar gathering on February 24, Khazali, whose militia is nominally loyal to Iran, cursed fellow commanders who are eager to fight the Americans, saying at the dinner,
"We don't want to enter a war with the U.S., we want a stable Iraq. A war is not in the interest of Iraq." According to acquaintances who knew Khazali in the 1990s, he used to suffer from hunger and wear cheap nylon pants and plastic shoes. Now, according to an Iraqi politician, Khazali "is the strongest economic actor in Iraq." The militia commander is "afraid of being killed …

Iran recognizes that if the Iraqi militias were to take significant military action against the United States and Israel, the devastating response that action would trigger would undermine the militias' grip on power and their ability to siphon off Iraq's resources. According to the commander of Israel's Northern Command, General Ori Gordin, Tehran pressured Lebanon's Hezbollah to intervene when Israel and the United States attacked Iran in the 12-day war; in contrast, according to Iraqi sources speaking to the pan-Arab newspaper Asharg Al-Awsat and the British think tank RUSI, Tehran discouraged the Iraqi militias from entering the fray. The purposes of the two proxies are different. Hezbollah receives massive financial assistance from Iran and from the Iraqi militias, and its function is to fight on Iran's orders. The Iraqi militias' job in recent years has been to preserve Iran's influence over Iraqi politics and to continue the plunder of Iraq's resources. STAYING OUT OF TROUBLE Today, with a war underway between Iran, Israel, and the United States, the interests of the Iraqi militias and Iranian regime may be diverging for the first time. U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated that he hopes the war will bring down the regime itself, but most militia leaders and rank and file do not want to go down in flames alongside it. Wealthy militia commanders are wary about fighting Iran's wars. According to an attendee at a tribal iftar gathering on February 24, Khazali, whose militia is nominally loyal to Iran, cursed fellow commanders who are eager to fight the Americans, saying at the dinner, "We don't want to enter a war with the U.S., we want a stable Iraq. A war is not in the interest of Iraq." According to acquaintances who knew Khazali in the 1990s, he used to suffer from hunger and wear cheap nylon pants and plastic shoes. Now, according to an Iraqi politician, Khazali "is the strongest economic actor in Iraq." The militia commander is "afraid of being killed …

The Iraqi militias are not likely to make a difference militarily as the fight continues. If the war ends with some version of the current Iranian regime still in charge, however, the militias will continue to serve as Tehran's economic life support. Whatever comes next, the militias' focus on self-enrichment would be a vulnerability their adversaries can exploit. Unlike the suicidal jihadists they claim to be, militia members do not want to die and will comply when credibly threatened. This is why I was released after 903 days in Kataib Hezbollah captivity. Mark Savaya, Trump's Iraqi-American campaign backer and friend, met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in early September and, as he recounted to me later, told Sudani to convey a message to the militia's leadership: "Trump is pissed, and if Elizabeth is not released within a week, the U.S. will kill you." I was free a week later.
Although the use of force and credible threats have proved effective at compelling the militias to change their conduct, there are plenty of other ways to reduce their power. The large numbers of personnel who are interested in their salaries alone can be easily bought off by foreign intelligence services. Sanctions on the militias' leaders, their businesses and financial networks, and the Iraqi officials who funnel funds to the militias can restrict the groups' profits if sanctions are applied consistently and updated to include new shell companies. The militias' dependence on state resources also makes them vulnerable to sanctions on Iraqi oil, for example, which provides 92 percent of the government's revenues. The government's own vulnerability means, too, that pressure from high-level
U.S. officials can force Iraq's political leadership to shut down the countless schemes the militias use to siphon off state resources.
This armed network has largely captured the Iraqi state, but dismantling it would not be as difficult a task as it seems. That task will become an urg…

The Iraqi militias are not likely to make a difference militarily as the fight continues. If the war ends with some version of the current Iranian regime still in charge, however, the militias will continue to serve as Tehran's economic life support. Whatever comes next, the militias' focus on self-enrichment would be a vulnerability their adversaries can exploit. Unlike the suicidal jihadists they claim to be, militia members do not want to die and will comply when credibly threatened. This is why I was released after 903 days in Kataib Hezbollah captivity. Mark Savaya, Trump's Iraqi-American campaign backer and friend, met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in early September and, as he recounted to me later, told Sudani to convey a message to the militia's leadership: "Trump is pissed, and if Elizabeth is not released within a week, the U.S. will kill you." I was free a week later. Although the use of force and credible threats have proved effective at compelling the militias to change their conduct, there are plenty of other ways to reduce their power. The large numbers of personnel who are interested in their salaries alone can be easily bought off by foreign intelligence services. Sanctions on the militias' leaders, their businesses and financial networks, and the Iraqi officials who funnel funds to the militias can restrict the groups' profits if sanctions are applied consistently and updated to include new shell companies. The militias' dependence on state resources also makes them vulnerable to sanctions on Iraqi oil, for example, which provides 92 percent of the government's revenues. The government's own vulnerability means, too, that pressure from high-level U.S. officials can force Iraq's political leadership to shut down the countless schemes the militias use to siphon off state resources. This armed network has largely captured the Iraqi state, but dismantling it would not be as difficult a task as it seems. That task will become an urg…

Iran’s fair-weather friends:
Why Shiite militias in Iraq are mostly staying on the sidelines. The focus in amassing wealth has diluted their ideological commitment therefore made them lesss willing to fight Iran’s wars with US & Israel, argues Elizabeth Tsurkov archive.ph/saFBc #Islamism #IranWar

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First, the EU & the UK… Now, the USA… 💣

#Islamism #Extremism #Radicalization #Terrorism #RedGreenAlliance

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'Islamism vs Muslims'
Refusing to call out Islamist extremism allows the conversation to be monopolised by others, he warns. "If Labour don't call this issue out, challenge it, mark out Islamism vs Muslims - which are distinctly different - then it creates a cementing factor for the far-Right, because the far-Right strategy is to label all Muslims as the problem."
Meanwhile, he fears spaces for moderates like himself are being closed down. "Twenty years of work with Muslim communities," he says, "and I'm on my own today."
It feels like a sad coda to his years of work to try and bring people together. But Mughal isn't done with his mission yet.
In the past few years, he has devoted time to "personal healing". He's become a trained therapist and still lives in north London. His ex-partner, Iman Atta, is now the director of Tell Mama, which no longer receives government funding.
A Government spokesman says: "We do not engage with extremists and will never be afraid to oppose Islamist actors.
"Muslim communities have always had our full support and we're investing record levels of security funding for faith communities, including £40m this year to protect mosques and Muslim community centres."
As the conflict in the Middle East escalates, Mughal has also watched the emergence of pro-Iran rallies and vigils for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Britain with concern.
He says: "For 40 years, the murder, the brutality, the vindictiveness and the terrorism and the intelligence gathering that Iran has undertaken in our country is extensive. How can people eulogise him? They may think, OK, he's a spiritual leader, we need to pray for him.
But there is a context which is glaringly obvious over 40 years... [he] was contemptible."
But his struggle against extremism goes on. In fact, his energy to fight it has been renewed.
After the Hamas terror attack on Oct 7 2023, Mughal travelled to Israel and spoke to Israelis about the trauma they had suffered, urging British Muslims to stand with …

'Islamism vs Muslims' Refusing to call out Islamist extremism allows the conversation to be monopolised by others, he warns. "If Labour don't call this issue out, challenge it, mark out Islamism vs Muslims - which are distinctly different - then it creates a cementing factor for the far-Right, because the far-Right strategy is to label all Muslims as the problem." Meanwhile, he fears spaces for moderates like himself are being closed down. "Twenty years of work with Muslim communities," he says, "and I'm on my own today." It feels like a sad coda to his years of work to try and bring people together. But Mughal isn't done with his mission yet. In the past few years, he has devoted time to "personal healing". He's become a trained therapist and still lives in north London. His ex-partner, Iman Atta, is now the director of Tell Mama, which no longer receives government funding. A Government spokesman says: "We do not engage with extremists and will never be afraid to oppose Islamist actors. "Muslim communities have always had our full support and we're investing record levels of security funding for faith communities, including £40m this year to protect mosques and Muslim community centres." As the conflict in the Middle East escalates, Mughal has also watched the emergence of pro-Iran rallies and vigils for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Britain with concern. He says: "For 40 years, the murder, the brutality, the vindictiveness and the terrorism and the intelligence gathering that Iran has undertaken in our country is extensive. How can people eulogise him? They may think, OK, he's a spiritual leader, we need to pray for him. But there is a context which is glaringly obvious over 40 years... [he] was contemptible." But his struggle against extremism goes on. In fact, his energy to fight it has been renewed. After the Hamas terror attack on Oct 7 2023, Mughal travelled to Israel and spoke to Israelis about the trauma they had suffered, urging British Muslims to stand with …

‘Moderate Muslims like me have been cut off by Labour in favour of extremists’.
The Tell Mama founder on confronting extremism, receiving threats from all sides and the isolation of not being the ‘right type of Muslim’ archive.ph/ZwSPq #Islamism #nationalism

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On Saturday, the US president said that the current attacks on the Iranian regime would need to go on for much longer before even considering sending in special forces because "if we ever did that, they would be so decimated that they wouldn't be able to fight at the ground level."
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official, was asked earlier this week how much government analysts were focused on the highly enriched uranium. He told a Council on Foreign Relations audience that, "without getting into any specifics, obviously we're always highly focused on that," the NYT reported.
The Institute for Science and International Security has published reports of Iranians adding dirt and rubble to the area or removing it, presumably related either to accessing the uranium or protecting the facility from anticipated new strikes from the US and Israel, after the new campaign began on February 28.
At present, Iran appears more focused on firing ballistic missiles than on nuclear activities, and Israel and the US are focused on the aerial campaign against the regime.
Nevertheless, all sides are likely to have contingency plans for the 60% enriched uranium, still assumed to be held underground.

On Saturday, the US president said that the current attacks on the Iranian regime would need to go on for much longer before even considering sending in special forces because "if we ever did that, they would be so decimated that they wouldn't be able to fight at the ground level." Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official, was asked earlier this week how much government analysts were focused on the highly enriched uranium. He told a Council on Foreign Relations audience that, "without getting into any specifics, obviously we're always highly focused on that," the NYT reported. The Institute for Science and International Security has published reports of Iranians adding dirt and rubble to the area or removing it, presumably related either to accessing the uranium or protecting the facility from anticipated new strikes from the US and Israel, after the new campaign began on February 28. At present, Iran appears more focused on firing ballistic missiles than on nuclear activities, and Israel and the US are focused on the aerial campaign against the regime. Nevertheless, all sides are likely to have contingency plans for the 60% enriched uranium, still assumed to be held underground.

The regime's fingerprints are on the missile arsenals targeting Israeli cities, on proxy terror militias embedded across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and on terror plots stretching from Buenos Aires to Burgas. When an adversary arms, funds, and directs forces committed to the destruction of a neighbouring state - and increasingly to the intimidation of the West - this is not peace. It is war by other means.
The moral and legal question is therefore not whether force is undesirable. It is whether, in the real world, states have the right - indeed the obligation - to defend their citizens against a fanatical regime built on hate that clearly proclaims its intentions to wipe out its opponents and builds rockets and centrifuges for making nuclear weapons for doing this.
Start with the missiles. Iran's own forces and proxies have launched or facilitated hundreds of lethal strikes against Israeli civilians in recent years. These are not battlefield exchanges along a contested frontier; they are deliberate efforts to terrorise a distant civilian population.
No international law or principle of justice requires a nation to absorb such heinous attacks while waiting for some pseudo-court or UN body to authorise defensive action. Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms the inherent right of self-defence. That right is not erased because the aggressor pretends to aim its attacks at military targets or operates through intermediaries.
Then there is the nuclear question. Iran's nuclear weapons programme has long violated both the spirit and letter of its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The combination of advanced enrichment capacity, ballistic missile development, and explicit threats against Israel creates a uniquely destabilising mix. A regime that calls for the elimination of another UN member state cannot reasonably expect that state (i.e. Israel) to treat its march toward nuclear capability as a routine matter of sovereign discretion, regardless of actual in…

The regime's fingerprints are on the missile arsenals targeting Israeli cities, on proxy terror militias embedded across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and on terror plots stretching from Buenos Aires to Burgas. When an adversary arms, funds, and directs forces committed to the destruction of a neighbouring state - and increasingly to the intimidation of the West - this is not peace. It is war by other means. The moral and legal question is therefore not whether force is undesirable. It is whether, in the real world, states have the right - indeed the obligation - to defend their citizens against a fanatical regime built on hate that clearly proclaims its intentions to wipe out its opponents and builds rockets and centrifuges for making nuclear weapons for doing this. Start with the missiles. Iran's own forces and proxies have launched or facilitated hundreds of lethal strikes against Israeli civilians in recent years. These are not battlefield exchanges along a contested frontier; they are deliberate efforts to terrorise a distant civilian population. No international law or principle of justice requires a nation to absorb such heinous attacks while waiting for some pseudo-court or UN body to authorise defensive action. Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms the inherent right of self-defence. That right is not erased because the aggressor pretends to aim its attacks at military targets or operates through intermediaries. Then there is the nuclear question. Iran's nuclear weapons programme has long violated both the spirit and letter of its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The combination of advanced enrichment capacity, ballistic missile development, and explicit threats against Israel creates a uniquely destabilising mix. A regime that calls for the elimination of another UN member state cannot reasonably expect that state (i.e. Israel) to treat its march toward nuclear capability as a routine matter of sovereign discretion, regardless of actual in…

International law is becoming a suicide pact for Western democracies: Critics of the US-Israeli attack on Iran are erasing the history of the regime’s terror – the antithesis of justice and morality archive.ph/u3uw4
By Gerald M. Steinberg #IranWar #Islamism #terrorism #InternationalLaw

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Officials familiar with the intelligence noted that the Islamic Republic can now reach the uranium through a very narrow access point. It is unclear how quickly Iran could move the uranium, which is in gas form and stored in canisters.
US officials have said that American spy agencies have constant surveillance on the Isfahan site and a
high degree of confidence that they would be able to detect and react to any attempt by the Iranian government or other groups to move it.
On Saturday, US President Donald Trump was asked on Air Force One if he would consider sending in ground forces to seize the uranium.
He responded, "Right now we're just decimating them, but we haven't gone after it. But [it is] something we could do later on. We wouldn't do it now."
The report said that Washington had decided not to try to retrieve the uranium last year because doing so would have been too dangerous.
US officials said in the report that the air campaign against Iran would need to continue for days to further weaken Iranian defenses before making any final decision on the viability of that type of raid.
The option to conduct a raid on nuclear sites was reported earlier by Semafor. The NYT reported in January that Trump was considering sending special forces teams into Iran.

Officials familiar with the intelligence noted that the Islamic Republic can now reach the uranium through a very narrow access point. It is unclear how quickly Iran could move the uranium, which is in gas form and stored in canisters. US officials have said that American spy agencies have constant surveillance on the Isfahan site and a high degree of confidence that they would be able to detect and react to any attempt by the Iranian government or other groups to move it. On Saturday, US President Donald Trump was asked on Air Force One if he would consider sending in ground forces to seize the uranium. He responded, "Right now we're just decimating them, but we haven't gone after it. But [it is] something we could do later on. We wouldn't do it now." The report said that Washington had decided not to try to retrieve the uranium last year because doing so would have been too dangerous. US officials said in the report that the air campaign against Iran would need to continue for days to further weaken Iranian defenses before making any final decision on the viability of that type of raid. The option to conduct a raid on nuclear sites was reported earlier by Semafor. The NYT reported in January that Trump was considering sending special forces teams into Iran.

On Saturday, the US president said that the current attacks on the Iranian regime would need to go on for much longer before even considering sending in special forces because "if we ever did that, they would be so decimated that they wouldn't be able to fight at the ground level."
Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official, was asked earlier this week how much government analysts were focused on the highly enriched uranium. He told a Council on Foreign Relations audience that, "without getting into any specifics, obviously we're always highly focused on that," the NYT reported.
The Institute for Science and International Security has published reports of Iranians adding dirt and rubble to the area or removing it, presumably related either to accessing the uranium or protecting the facility from anticipated new strikes from the US and Israel, after the new campaign began on February 28.
At present, Iran appears more focused on firing ballistic missiles than on nuclear activities, and Israel and the US are focused on the aerial campaign against the regime.
Nevertheless, all sides are likely to have contingency plans for the 60% enriched uranium, still assumed to be held underground.

On Saturday, the US president said that the current attacks on the Iranian regime would need to go on for much longer before even considering sending in special forces because "if we ever did that, they would be so decimated that they wouldn't be able to fight at the ground level." Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's top policy official, was asked earlier this week how much government analysts were focused on the highly enriched uranium. He told a Council on Foreign Relations audience that, "without getting into any specifics, obviously we're always highly focused on that," the NYT reported. The Institute for Science and International Security has published reports of Iranians adding dirt and rubble to the area or removing it, presumably related either to accessing the uranium or protecting the facility from anticipated new strikes from the US and Israel, after the new campaign began on February 28. At present, Iran appears more focused on firing ballistic missiles than on nuclear activities, and Israel and the US are focused on the aerial campaign against the regime. Nevertheless, all sides are likely to have contingency plans for the 60% enriched uranium, still assumed to be held underground.

Mossad can detect, catch if Iranian nuclear officials move enriched uranium, US intel suggests.
US President Donald Trump might consider a covert mission to seize it once the Islamic regime is more decimated. www.jpost.com/israel-news/... #nuclearweapons #IranWar #Islamism

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The country has dramatically changed its legislation in recent years to attract new residents and business.
It passed labor laws that aim to eradicate abuses, and liberalized the visa rules that shackled most foreign residents to their employers. It also allowed professionals-or anyone buying an apartment-to obtain so-called golden visas, the renewable 10-year residence permits that are not linked to a particular job. The country has no personal income tax—a reason why people moving here are often resented in their home nations. But the U.A.E. also has no social safety net for foreigners. If you don't work, you're on your own-and, unless on a golden visa, can't stay.
Foreigners can also set up companies with 100% ownership in an increasing number of industries and areas, creating a new class of entrepreneurs in anything from artificial intelligence to financial consulting to interior design.
"The U.A.E. was very smart in making sure that these people establish roots and have a stake in the success of the country. Had this been in 2010, or 2015, there would have been a very different reaction, by some people, who don't own their businesses, who don't own their houses, don't own their apartments," said Emirati writer and intellectual Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi. "Now, almost nobody that I know is planning on leaving. They feel that this is their home for the long term. And for us, the best expression of love is—if possible-for these people to remain here."

The country has dramatically changed its legislation in recent years to attract new residents and business. It passed labor laws that aim to eradicate abuses, and liberalized the visa rules that shackled most foreign residents to their employers. It also allowed professionals-or anyone buying an apartment-to obtain so-called golden visas, the renewable 10-year residence permits that are not linked to a particular job. The country has no personal income tax—a reason why people moving here are often resented in their home nations. But the U.A.E. also has no social safety net for foreigners. If you don't work, you're on your own-and, unless on a golden visa, can't stay. Foreigners can also set up companies with 100% ownership in an increasing number of industries and areas, creating a new class of entrepreneurs in anything from artificial intelligence to financial consulting to interior design. "The U.A.E. was very smart in making sure that these people establish roots and have a stake in the success of the country. Had this been in 2010, or 2015, there would have been a very different reaction, by some people, who don't own their businesses, who don't own their houses, don't own their apartments," said Emirati writer and intellectual Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi. "Now, almost nobody that I know is planning on leaving. They feel that this is their home for the long term. And for us, the best expression of love is—if possible-for these people to remain here."

The U.A.E., of course, is not a liberal democracy:
It is a federation of seven emirates, with the hereditary ruler of the most powerful of them, oil-rich Abu Dhabi, serving as president, while the ruler of Dubai, the most populous, serves as a prime minister.
Citizenship is only rarely granted to newcomers, and there are no elections. Some of the country's foreign entanglements, particularly in the Sudan civil war, have earned widespread condemnation abroad.
But it's also a place where things work: quickly, efficiently, and, unusually for many parts of the Middle East, without the need to pay bribes. Dubai, in particular, has already shown its resilience during the Covid pandemic, ensuring that it never had shortages of food and essentials, that the lockdown was brief, and that its inhabitants were among the first in the world to access vaccines. Its economy-and property prices-quickly bounced back afterward. If the threat of attacks from Iran doesn't become permanent, many expect it to recover this time, too.
"It's normal and quite understandable to feel nervous and anxious anytime the umbrella of safety feels compromised. But just as during Covid, people in the U.A.E. know very well the government will do everything it can to ensure their safety and security," said Yousef Al Otaiba, the country's minister of state and ambassador to Washington who returned to the U.A.E. shortly after the war began. "And, just like Covid, we will come out of this stronger."

The U.A.E., of course, is not a liberal democracy: It is a federation of seven emirates, with the hereditary ruler of the most powerful of them, oil-rich Abu Dhabi, serving as president, while the ruler of Dubai, the most populous, serves as a prime minister. Citizenship is only rarely granted to newcomers, and there are no elections. Some of the country's foreign entanglements, particularly in the Sudan civil war, have earned widespread condemnation abroad. But it's also a place where things work: quickly, efficiently, and, unusually for many parts of the Middle East, without the need to pay bribes. Dubai, in particular, has already shown its resilience during the Covid pandemic, ensuring that it never had shortages of food and essentials, that the lockdown was brief, and that its inhabitants were among the first in the world to access vaccines. Its economy-and property prices-quickly bounced back afterward. If the threat of attacks from Iran doesn't become permanent, many expect it to recover this time, too. "It's normal and quite understandable to feel nervous and anxious anytime the umbrella of safety feels compromised. But just as during Covid, people in the U.A.E. know very well the government will do everything it can to ensure their safety and security," said Yousef Al Otaiba, the country's minister of state and ambassador to Washington who returned to the U.A.E. shortly after the war began. "And, just like Covid, we will come out of this stronger."

Everybody loves to hate Dubai. Here’s why they’re wrong.
The city, under fire from Iran and assailed by critics, is a beacon of opportunity for people around the world. archive.ph/jY2f6 By
@yarotrof.bsky.social #Dubai #IranWar #Islamism

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Today's war is another
example. "We are here in many ways because the Iranians have been chanting 'Death to America' for 47 years. I used to say, 'I don't think this is
helpful.' " Western interlocutors and intermediaries would respond that the regime didn't really mean it. "Well, if they don't mean it, then don't say it.
Stop. But they never would," he says. "To be honest, I think they got away with things for so long that they got used to it."

Today's war is another example. "We are here in many ways because the Iranians have been chanting 'Death to America' for 47 years. I used to say, 'I don't think this is helpful.' " Western interlocutors and intermediaries would respond that the regime didn't really mean it. "Well, if they don't mean it, then don't say it. Stop. But they never would," he says. "To be honest, I think they got away with things for so long that they got used to it."

They didn't count on a president who would break from standard operating procedure, whom they couldn't stall until the next U.S. election.
Mr. Ansari says Iran had every chance to avert war. But it lost Europe by siding with Russia in Ukraine, and it refused to make a plausible offer when Mr. Trump returned to office. "The longer they waited, the worse it got. They could've gotten a deal six months ago. But when ships are waiting outside, the asking price goes up."
The regime insisted throughout on a "right to enrich uranium"-which "would have more credibility if they respected any other rights as well," Mr. Ansari cracks. "We often think of the Iranians as very strategic thinkers, playing the long game. No, no. It's different. They're ditherers," he says. "We ascribe to them too much competence. I do not consider what's happening now to be the result of great strategic thinking." He points to a "dogmatic ideology and a grievance culture, whereby they've taken a hit for their nuclear program and can't back down." In his assessment, by sheer stubbornness, the regime "basically decided to declare war on the U.S." l
The failure to see that, and so much else, can be attributed to the prevailing "Washington-centered analysis," Mr. Ansari says. "We always see Iran as almost marginal to the problem, which is Washington." If only Mr. Trump hadn't done this or that, the commentators rage. But if there is now an opening for regime change, it is because U.S. policymakers for once were able to turn from the mirror and see what the Iranian
people know well: The problem is in Iran.

They didn't count on a president who would break from standard operating procedure, whom they couldn't stall until the next U.S. election. Mr. Ansari says Iran had every chance to avert war. But it lost Europe by siding with Russia in Ukraine, and it refused to make a plausible offer when Mr. Trump returned to office. "The longer they waited, the worse it got. They could've gotten a deal six months ago. But when ships are waiting outside, the asking price goes up." The regime insisted throughout on a "right to enrich uranium"-which "would have more credibility if they respected any other rights as well," Mr. Ansari cracks. "We often think of the Iranians as very strategic thinkers, playing the long game. No, no. It's different. They're ditherers," he says. "We ascribe to them too much competence. I do not consider what's happening now to be the result of great strategic thinking." He points to a "dogmatic ideology and a grievance culture, whereby they've taken a hit for their nuclear program and can't back down." In his assessment, by sheer stubbornness, the regime "basically decided to declare war on the U.S." l The failure to see that, and so much else, can be attributed to the prevailing "Washington-centered analysis," Mr. Ansari says. "We always see Iran as almost marginal to the problem, which is Washington." If only Mr. Trump hadn't done this or that, the commentators rage. But if there is now an opening for regime change, it is because U.S. policymakers for once were able to turn from the mirror and see what the Iranian people know well: The problem is in Iran.

Is Iran on the brink of another revolution?
The regime faces a crisis like never before, historian Ali M. Ansari explains, and the nation has an 120-year tradition of fighting to establish the rule of law. archive.ph/pDQfL By Elliot Kaufman #HistoricalPoliticalMemory #Islamism #IranWar

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No one immediately claimed responsibility for Friday's attack. Nigeria is battling a complex security crisis from different armed groups. The United States has sent troops to the West African nation to help advise its military on the fight against insecurity.
Separate attacks this week also took place in the communities of Konduga, Marte, Jakana, and Mainok between Wednesday and early Friday, according to a military spokesperson.
The spokesperson, Uba Sani, said the troops were able to repel the attacks on the communities of Konduga, Marte, Jakana and Mainok, but "a number of brave soldiers paid the supreme price in the line of duty," along with a senior officer. He did not elaborate on military casualties.
Sani described the assaults as "failed attacks" and said they showed "increasing desperation of terrorist elements under sustained operational pressure" from the military.
Ulf Laessing, with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, said Friday's attack on Ngoshe took advantage of the Nigerian army's difficulties in controlling large swaths of the country where jihadi groups operate.
Militants are also benefiting from increased cross-border cooperation between their groups and the use of drones to scout out their targets before attacking.

No one immediately claimed responsibility for Friday's attack. Nigeria is battling a complex security crisis from different armed groups. The United States has sent troops to the West African nation to help advise its military on the fight against insecurity. Separate attacks this week also took place in the communities of Konduga, Marte, Jakana, and Mainok between Wednesday and early Friday, according to a military spokesperson. The spokesperson, Uba Sani, said the troops were able to repel the attacks on the communities of Konduga, Marte, Jakana and Mainok, but "a number of brave soldiers paid the supreme price in the line of duty," along with a senior officer. He did not elaborate on military casualties. Sani described the assaults as "failed attacks" and said they showed "increasing desperation of terrorist elements under sustained operational pressure" from the military. Ulf Laessing, with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, said Friday's attack on Ngoshe took advantage of the Nigerian army's difficulties in controlling large swaths of the country where jihadi groups operate. Militants are also benefiting from increased cross-border cooperation between their groups and the use of drones to scout out their targets before attacking.

"The army is fighting a ghost - fighters descending with motorbikes on villages and disappearing into the bush before the army can respond in time," said Laessing.
Among the most prominent Islamic militant groups are Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, which is affiliated with the Islamic State group and known as Islamic State West Africa Province. There is also the IS-linked Lakurawa, as well as other "bandit" groups that specialize in kidnapping for ransom and illegal mining.
Recently, the crisis has worsened to include other militants from the neighboring Sahel region, including the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which claimed its first attack on Nigerian soil last year.
Several thousand people in Nigeria have been killed, according to data from the United Nations. Analysts say not enough is being done by the government to protect its citizens.

"The army is fighting a ghost - fighters descending with motorbikes on villages and disappearing into the bush before the army can respond in time," said Laessing. Among the most prominent Islamic militant groups are Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, which is affiliated with the Islamic State group and known as Islamic State West Africa Province. There is also the IS-linked Lakurawa, as well as other "bandit" groups that specialize in kidnapping for ransom and illegal mining. Recently, the crisis has worsened to include other militants from the neighboring Sahel region, including the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which claimed its first attack on Nigerian soil last year. Several thousand people in Nigeria have been killed, according to data from the United Nations. Analysts say not enough is being done by the government to protect its citizens.

Islamic militants attacked a town in northeastern #Nigeria on Friday, abducting more than 300 people, including women and children…The attack happened in the town of Ngoshe in Borno state, according to Bulama Sawa, an official from the Gwoza area. www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/0... #Islamism

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Qatar remains home to key Hamas political figures, including senior officials who have operated from luxury Doha compounds for over a decade. Despite an Israeli strike in September 2025 that targeted Hamas negotiators in Doha
- killing at least six people (including aides and a Qatari officer) but sparing top leaders like Khalil al-Hayya - the group's core political bureau has not fully relocated.
Hamas leadership survived that attempt and continues to use Qatar as a base for diplomacy, fundraising, and coordination. Qatar's hosting arrangement, backed by billions in aid funneled to Gaza (often criticized as indirect support for Hamas military wings), has drawn repeated Israeli condemnation.

Qatar remains home to key Hamas political figures, including senior officials who have operated from luxury Doha compounds for over a decade. Despite an Israeli strike in September 2025 that targeted Hamas negotiators in Doha - killing at least six people (including aides and a Qatari officer) but sparing top leaders like Khalil al-Hayya - the group's core political bureau has not fully relocated. Hamas leadership survived that attempt and continues to use Qatar as a base for diplomacy, fundraising, and coordination. Qatar's hosting arrangement, backed by billions in aid funneled to Gaza (often criticized as indirect support for Hamas military wings), has drawn repeated Israeli condemnation.

An Iranian missile strike on the US radar at Al Udeid base highlights #Qatar ’s strategic contradiction; a Gulf ally hosting American forces while protecting #Hamas leadership and financing networks tied to the war against Israel. www.ynetnews.com/opinions-ana... #Iran #Islamism #terrorism

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This hands-off approach to Iran has been a long time coming. Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel, Beijing has grown increasingly disillusioned with Tehran's capability and credibility as a regional power. Chinese strategists have also lost confidence because of what they see as Iran's tendency to capitulate to Western demands, rather than fight back, as manifested in its persistent desire to negotiate with Washington. Ultimately, Beijing doesn't see regime change in Iran as a worst-case scenario. China is willing to work with whatever leadership emerges after the strikes as long as it protects oil flows and prioritizes shared economic interests. Only if these interests are threatened, or if a protracted war of attrition disrupts oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, will Beijing have to reconsider its place on the sidelines and respond more forcefully.
FALLING OUT OF FAVOR
China's Iran strategy has long been predicated on the assumption that the country could be a foothold for Beijing's interests in the Middle East. In 2021, to underscore their growing cooperation, the two countries signed a
25-year, $400 billion strategic cooperation pact that aimed to bolster their economic and security ties. But few of the projects envisioned in the pact have materialized because of Tehran's concern that China's influence would compromise Iranian sovereignty and independence, and Beijing has become frustrated by Tehran's inconsistency and unreliability. Most important, China has determined that Iran's power and revolutionary credentials are both overstated. Iran has a population ten times that of Israel and three times that of Saudi Arabia, but its GDP is less than 90 percent of Israel's and only 25 percent that of Saudi Arabia. In Beijing's estimation, Iran has used proxy wars and asymmetric warfare to deter its adversaries, which has inflated its capacity and disguised its internal weaknesses.
China also sees a mismatch between Iran's strategic goal of leadi…

This hands-off approach to Iran has been a long time coming. Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel, Beijing has grown increasingly disillusioned with Tehran's capability and credibility as a regional power. Chinese strategists have also lost confidence because of what they see as Iran's tendency to capitulate to Western demands, rather than fight back, as manifested in its persistent desire to negotiate with Washington. Ultimately, Beijing doesn't see regime change in Iran as a worst-case scenario. China is willing to work with whatever leadership emerges after the strikes as long as it protects oil flows and prioritizes shared economic interests. Only if these interests are threatened, or if a protracted war of attrition disrupts oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, will Beijing have to reconsider its place on the sidelines and respond more forcefully. FALLING OUT OF FAVOR China's Iran strategy has long been predicated on the assumption that the country could be a foothold for Beijing's interests in the Middle East. In 2021, to underscore their growing cooperation, the two countries signed a 25-year, $400 billion strategic cooperation pact that aimed to bolster their economic and security ties. But few of the projects envisioned in the pact have materialized because of Tehran's concern that China's influence would compromise Iranian sovereignty and independence, and Beijing has become frustrated by Tehran's inconsistency and unreliability. Most important, China has determined that Iran's power and revolutionary credentials are both overstated. Iran has a population ten times that of Israel and three times that of Saudi Arabia, but its GDP is less than 90 percent of Israel's and only 25 percent that of Saudi Arabia. In Beijing's estimation, Iran has used proxy wars and asymmetric warfare to deter its adversaries, which has inflated its capacity and disguised its internal weaknesses. China also sees a mismatch between Iran's strategic goal of leadi…

Moreover, in the view of many Chinese analysts, Iran has failed to demonstrate enough resolve to directly confront its adversaries. When the United States assassinated Qasem Soleimani, Iran's top military general, in 2020, for instance, and when Israel struck the Iranian embassy in Syria in
2024, Tehran's retaliation against U.S. bases in Iraq and Israel was seen as underwhelming. Many Chinese observers also found the Iranian response to the 12-day war, which included offering advanced warning to Qatar and the United States before launching missiles, disproportionately weak and ineffective. Chinese netizens derided Iran's responses as "performative retaliation." Pessimism about Iran's fate is now baked into Chinese assessments of the Middle East: in the current crisis, Chinese opinion leaders such as the prominent pundit Hu Xijin lament the quagmire Iran and its people now face and blame Tehran for leading the country into it.
Iran's treatment of its proxies has further weakened Chinese confidence.
Since 2023, these groups have been targeted and wiped out one after another. Israeli forces have decimated Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, yet Iran has failed to lend meaningful support or retaliate effectively.
Beijing watched, dumbfounded, in December 2024, when Iranian Vice President Mohammad Zarif denied the country's relationships with proxy groups in the region-the so-called axis of resistance-and declared that Iran had no control over their actions. Then, in April 2025, Iran evacuated its military personnel from Yemen in the midst of a U.S. bombing campaign, which meant abandoning its Houthi allies to avoid increasing tension with Washington and keep alive the hope of resuming negotiations with the United States.
Beijing is also disappointed in the Iranian regime's domestic failures.
Although Chinese state media have refrained from openly criticizing the regime, the Chinese policy community focused on the Middle East is clear-eyed about the bad decision-making, …

Moreover, in the view of many Chinese analysts, Iran has failed to demonstrate enough resolve to directly confront its adversaries. When the United States assassinated Qasem Soleimani, Iran's top military general, in 2020, for instance, and when Israel struck the Iranian embassy in Syria in 2024, Tehran's retaliation against U.S. bases in Iraq and Israel was seen as underwhelming. Many Chinese observers also found the Iranian response to the 12-day war, which included offering advanced warning to Qatar and the United States before launching missiles, disproportionately weak and ineffective. Chinese netizens derided Iran's responses as "performative retaliation." Pessimism about Iran's fate is now baked into Chinese assessments of the Middle East: in the current crisis, Chinese opinion leaders such as the prominent pundit Hu Xijin lament the quagmire Iran and its people now face and blame Tehran for leading the country into it. Iran's treatment of its proxies has further weakened Chinese confidence. Since 2023, these groups have been targeted and wiped out one after another. Israeli forces have decimated Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, yet Iran has failed to lend meaningful support or retaliate effectively. Beijing watched, dumbfounded, in December 2024, when Iranian Vice President Mohammad Zarif denied the country's relationships with proxy groups in the region-the so-called axis of resistance-and declared that Iran had no control over their actions. Then, in April 2025, Iran evacuated its military personnel from Yemen in the midst of a U.S. bombing campaign, which meant abandoning its Houthi allies to avoid increasing tension with Washington and keep alive the hope of resuming negotiations with the United States. Beijing is also disappointed in the Iranian regime's domestic failures. Although Chinese state media have refrained from openly criticizing the regime, the Chinese policy community focused on the Middle East is clear-eyed about the bad decision-making, …

China's interest in Iran is first and foremost about energy security.
Although China has diversified its energy supply and invested heavily in coal, solar, wind, and nuclear—renewables surpassed oil to become China's second-largest source of energy consumption, after coal, in 2025—oil plays an irreplaceable role in its economy. China still relies on imported oil for fueling its jets, powering its ships, and producing petrochemicals.
China's is estimated to have between 1.3 and 1.4 billion barrels of oil in reserve, or around 30 percent of its imports in 2025, which is enough to withstand a short-term disruption of shipments from the Middle East but not a long one.
One thing China worries about-and what could sway Beijing's calculus and force it off the sidelines—is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which would cut off more than half of China's oil imports. Chinese oil executives and Middle East experts have long dismissed the possibility of regional conflict leading to a long-term shutdown of shipping lanes. If war in the Middle East disrupted oil shipments through the strait, they argue, it would trigger a global energy crisis and a collective solution would quickly emerge. During the 12-day war, for instance, Chinese experts dismissed Iran's willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz because they believed it would antagonize the whole Gulf and undercut Iran's own revenue. Beijing has used this argument to refute domestic calls for-and Western speculation about—potentially building a Chinese military presence in the region.
The assumption that global energy producers and consumers will not allow the region to fall apart is now being put to the test. Beijing is pressuring Tehran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and avoid taking any measures that could disrupt energy shipments. If China's oil supplies from the region are threatened, it could turn to alternate suppliers, especially Russia, which is currently the source of more than 17 percent of China's oil imports…

China's interest in Iran is first and foremost about energy security. Although China has diversified its energy supply and invested heavily in coal, solar, wind, and nuclear—renewables surpassed oil to become China's second-largest source of energy consumption, after coal, in 2025—oil plays an irreplaceable role in its economy. China still relies on imported oil for fueling its jets, powering its ships, and producing petrochemicals. China's is estimated to have between 1.3 and 1.4 billion barrels of oil in reserve, or around 30 percent of its imports in 2025, which is enough to withstand a short-term disruption of shipments from the Middle East but not a long one. One thing China worries about-and what could sway Beijing's calculus and force it off the sidelines—is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which would cut off more than half of China's oil imports. Chinese oil executives and Middle East experts have long dismissed the possibility of regional conflict leading to a long-term shutdown of shipping lanes. If war in the Middle East disrupted oil shipments through the strait, they argue, it would trigger a global energy crisis and a collective solution would quickly emerge. During the 12-day war, for instance, Chinese experts dismissed Iran's willingness to close the Strait of Hormuz because they believed it would antagonize the whole Gulf and undercut Iran's own revenue. Beijing has used this argument to refute domestic calls for-and Western speculation about—potentially building a Chinese military presence in the region. The assumption that global energy producers and consumers will not allow the region to fall apart is now being put to the test. Beijing is pressuring Tehran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and avoid taking any measures that could disrupt energy shipments. If China's oil supplies from the region are threatened, it could turn to alternate suppliers, especially Russia, which is currently the source of more than 17 percent of China's oil imports…

Why China won’t help Iran: China’s hands-off approach to Iran has been a long time coming. Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel, Beijing has grown increasingly disillusioned with Tehran’s capability and credibility as a regional power… archive.ph/2wUIE #communism #Islamism

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Zohran Mamdani’s wife liked social media posts celebrating Oct. 7 attacks NYC First Lady Rama Duwaji showed support for far-left orgs applauding Hamas rampage

"Zohran Mamdani's wife celebrated the Hamas mass murder and rape spectacle in Israel on October 7, 2023 (via social media likes).
#Islamism #Antisemitism #Hamas #Mamdani #Terrorism
jewishinsider.com/2026/03/zohr...

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After the Second World War turned against the Axis, Germany put its resources into frantically trying to race to the Final Solution and annihilating the Jews of Hungary, who had yet to be deported to the camps. As losses mounted, people wondered how the Nazi regime could continue to commit to the mass incarceration and murder of Jews at the expense of the Wehrmacht.
The answer, as Iran shows us in our own day, is that a regime animated and motivated by eliminationist anti-Semitism is not a rational actor, and must be treated accordingly.

After the Second World War turned against the Axis, Germany put its resources into frantically trying to race to the Final Solution and annihilating the Jews of Hungary, who had yet to be deported to the camps. As losses mounted, people wondered how the Nazi regime could continue to commit to the mass incarceration and murder of Jews at the expense of the Wehrmacht. The answer, as Iran shows us in our own day, is that a regime animated and motivated by eliminationist anti-Semitism is not a rational actor, and must be treated accordingly.

Iran’s irrational self-destruction:
I know that people are tired of Nazi analogies, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that the ayatollahs in Iran were similarly beset with, and blinded by, a self-defeating obsession with the Jews. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #antisemitism #Islamism

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Allah’s Dress Code and Other Subtle Clues When the investigation is ongoing, but the suspect already brought the branding.

#Austin #Texas #Islam #Islamism
atheistnn.substack.com/p/allahs-dre...

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According to the report, the Israeli intelligence discovered a "life pattern" for Khamenei and his security personnel, including travel routes, hours of activity, and the identities of the senior figures who were usually with the late Iranian leader.
The report also mentions that Israel used Artificial Intelligence tools, alongside algorithms, to sort through vast amounts of information that was gathered about the Iranian leadership and its movements.
Additionally, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided an additional human source to certify the exact location where Khamenei was set to be on the day of his assassination.

According to the report, the Israeli intelligence discovered a "life pattern" for Khamenei and his security personnel, including travel routes, hours of activity, and the identities of the senior figures who were usually with the late Iranian leader. The report also mentions that Israel used Artificial Intelligence tools, alongside algorithms, to sort through vast amounts of information that was gathered about the Iranian leadership and its movements. Additionally, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided an additional human source to certify the exact location where Khamenei was set to be on the day of his assassination.

How was Khamenei's assassination achieved?
The FT report details that Israel attacked the compound where Khamenei was being guarded using Sparrow missiles, while the planes were deployed during the day in order to achieve tactical surprise, even with the high level of alert in Iran.
In total, 30 missiles were fired against the compound, while cellular towers in the area had been disrupted, so that the security personnel's phones could not receive warning calls.
The operation included signals intelligence, cellular network penetration, and the American source confirming that the meeting was taking place.
FT also mentioned that the planning for the operation started in 2001, when the former prime minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Mossad to make Iran its main target.

How was Khamenei's assassination achieved? The FT report details that Israel attacked the compound where Khamenei was being guarded using Sparrow missiles, while the planes were deployed during the day in order to achieve tactical surprise, even with the high level of alert in Iran. In total, 30 missiles were fired against the compound, while cellular towers in the area had been disrupted, so that the security personnel's phones could not receive warning calls. The operation included signals intelligence, cellular network penetration, and the American source confirming that the meeting was taking place. FT also mentioned that the planning for the operation started in 2001, when the former prime minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Mossad to make Iran its main target.

Inside the plan to kill the Ayatollah: Israel hacked into Tehran's traffic cameras in order to surveil the daily life of senior Iranian figures in preparation for Operation Roaring Lion, during which the regime's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed www.jpost.com/middle-east/... #Iran #Islamism

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The Islamist threat to the Golan
Israel has traditionally viewed the fragmentation of southern Syria as a chaotic threat to be contained.
But the alternative - a unified south under the thumb of Sharaa's rebranded Islamists - is far worse.
Damascus's stated goal of deploying state security to the Jordanian border is a Trojan horse. While the international community (including US envoy Tom Barrack) views this as a necessary step to stop the rampant Captagon smuggling left over from the previous regime, the reality is darker. Deploying Sharaa's forces to Sweida is a territorial conquest designed to subjugate a fierce minority population and box in the IDF.
If Sharaa establishes full sovereignty over Sweida, the Golan Heights will face a unified, hostile, and deeply entrenched Islamist front. A government born from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) cannot be trusted to police the border with Israel; it will inevitably provide sanctuary and state-sanctioned cover to radical Sunni actors and ISIS remnants operating in the Badia desert.

The Islamist threat to the Golan Israel has traditionally viewed the fragmentation of southern Syria as a chaotic threat to be contained. But the alternative - a unified south under the thumb of Sharaa's rebranded Islamists - is far worse. Damascus's stated goal of deploying state security to the Jordanian border is a Trojan horse. While the international community (including US envoy Tom Barrack) views this as a necessary step to stop the rampant Captagon smuggling left over from the previous regime, the reality is darker. Deploying Sharaa's forces to Sweida is a territorial conquest designed to subjugate a fierce minority population and box in the IDF. If Sharaa establishes full sovereignty over Sweida, the Golan Heights will face a unified, hostile, and deeply entrenched Islamist front. A government born from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) cannot be trusted to police the border with Israel; it will inevitably provide sanctuary and state-sanctioned cover to radical Sunni actors and ISIS remnants operating in the Badia desert.

Israel must stop Damascus from absorbing #Sweida: Damascus under interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa is quietly trying to absorb southern Syria. Israel’s best defense against this creeping Islamist state is to ensure it fails. www.jpost.com/opinion/arti... #Islamism #Syria #Lebanon

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