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Argument Isn’t Everything: On Creativity in Philosophy “I don’t believe that arguing is usually the way we come up with good ideas. Argument might be an effective way of deciding which ideas to believe in. But adjudication is not creation. Safety inspections are important for deciding whether a building is sound. But safety inspections on their own don’t erect the building to be inspected.” That’s Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews), in his newsletter, As Difficult as Rare, writing about philosophical creativity. He says “there’s a balance to be struck between regulating philosophical ideas through standards of argument and nurturing the creativity that generates ideas in the first place.” He adds: Arguments are, at best, the regulatory structure of philosophy. But we often tell our students that the regulatory structure is the thing itself! I think that this is dangerous. Students come away with the notion that their job is to argue for/against ideas, rather than to generate the ideas to argue for/against—that they are the building inspector rather than the builder, the accountant rather than the investor… Not only can this intimidate people out of developing powerful, interesting ideas for which they don’t yet know if they can argue, it can also lead people into accepting the wrong ideas: those that meet current standards of argument, even when those standards miss some crucial insight—the philosophical equivalent of asbestos fireproofing. The greatest danger is that an overregulated thought-environment can quash the insight that would reveal the mistake in the regulations before it ever gets to appear. Many years ago, Patricia Marino (Waterloo) wrote in a guest post here about how she “wanted to go beyond criticism.” She says: “I wanted to create something, and I wanted to take a stand not only on what I thought was wrong, but on what I thought was right.” Making a point similar to the one Douglas makes in the last line, above, she adds, “Lately… I feel like I’m running up against the limits of creativity in philosophy. One major problem with it, it seems to me, is that it seems to require framing your new thing with some accepted background framework or set of ideas or posing of the question.” Similarly, Alexus McLeod (Indiana Bloomington), speaking in defense of pluralism in the discipline,.. The post Argument Isn’t Everything: On Creativity in Philosophy first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Interesting. 😊 Still got to ask, if this is just the old #empiricist approach to #metaphilosophy - a strong concept/fact-dualism (i.e. Hume's fork) + assumption that #philosophy investigates the conceptual side?

The new idea is to focus on conceptual innovation instead of conceptual analysis.

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On Social Metaphysics “What do we want the theory for?” That’s the question that should be kept in mind when doing social metaphysics, argues Ásta (Duke University) in a new article, “Critical Social Metaphysics: Metaphysics for Liberation and Social Science and Theory” in the Journal of Social Ontology. She writes: I want us to keep front and center why we are talking about gender, race, disability, and other social categories. I want us to ask ourselves, for example, what we want a theory of gender for? Similarly for the other social categories we may be interested in… The concept of gender is a theoretical concept and the sex/gender distinction is a theoretical distinction that nevertheless applies to everyday phenomena… What do we want them for? My answer is that we use these sorts of concepts and distinctions to bring into focus phenomena in the world, especially phenomena that are unjust. One of the things that many feminists care about is patterns. There is a pattern to the distribution of resources in every corner of the world; there is a pattern to the violence that occurs every day; there is a pattern to the respect, the opportunities, and the wellbeing that people enjoy. Many of us feminists care about these patterns. We care about training ourselves to notice these patterns, we care about devising language and concepts to understand the explanations of these patterns and what keeps them in place; and we care about building tools to disrupt them and encourage other patterns that are more just. That is what a feminist like me wants the concept of gender for. When we are interested in gender, we can of course be interested in various things… But when we are interested in the metaphysics of gender our interest is more focused. We are interested in the question: what is gender? What is it to have a gender? We are enquiring into the nature of gender. But when we ask this fundamental and abstract question, we always should keep in mind why we are asking it; what we want a metaphysics of gender for. Ásta notes that “what is the theory for?” is a question applied in various other domains: The demand that we keep in mind.. The post On Social Metaphysics first appeared on Daily Nous.
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What’s in a Name? “Philosophy” in Non-European Traditions (guest post) If certain cultures didn’t have the word “philosophy,” or a word that can directly be translated with “philosophy,” is it illegitimate, maybe culturally imperialist, to impose it on them? In the following guest post, Peter Adamson (LMU, KCL) takes up that question. Readers may know Professor Adamson not just from his academic work but as the host of the long-running podcast, “History of Philosophy without any Gaps” (from which a series of books came about). (A version of this post first appeared on the History of Philosophy without any Gaps website.) What’s in a Name? “Philosophy” in Non-European Traditions by Peter Adamson I’ve had a couple of conversations recently in which people challenged the use of “philosophy” in contexts outside of the European tradition, like pre-modern India and China.* Basically their worry is that if these traditions didn’t have the word “philosophy,” or a word that can directly be translated with “philosophy,” then it is illegitimate, and maybe culturally imperialist, to impose it on them. Rather, they say, we should talk more loosely about “intellectual traditions” or “thought,” or something like that (at least I guess this would be the alternative). As is no doubt apparent to those who listen to History of Philosophy without any Gaps, I don’t agree with this. Since I have encountered the point quite a few times over the past years, I thought it might make sense to explain why. 1. You don’t need to have a word for something to do it: trees grow without having a word for growing, and people all over the world experience schadenfreude without knowing German, or having a word of their own that means the same thing. So more needs to be said to show that the worry is a genuine problem; we clearly can’t just have a blanket rule against using words to describe activities that wouldn’t be used by those who engage in the activities. 2. Even within the history of European philosophy, we use non-immanent terms of analysis all the time. For example we might speak of intensional vs extensional distinctions, or dualism and physicalism, when talking about ancient philosophy. True, one needs to do this with some care, but it isn’t obviously problematic and indeed.. The post What’s in a Name? “Philosophy” in Non-European Traditions (guest post) first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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Teachable and State of the Art A philosophy professor has a question about teaching that I think will resonate with many readers. . This professor teaches many lower- and mid-level philosophy courses in ethics and epistemology, but sometimes other subfields as well, and they have a problem they’re hoping some of you can help with. They write: I would like to be able to teach my students the views, or the versions of views, most likely to have a shot at being correct. Often, these are relatively contemporary formulations, developed in light of the various problems with previous versions of the views. Yet I have found it difficult to find presentations of them that are written in a language or style comprehensible to non-experts, and that do not presume familiarity with the history of the inquiry. I’m curious about why this is the situation we’re in, but more importantly, I am curious about what other instructors with pedagogical aims similar to mine do. Are there texts, teaching resources, tools, or strategies they would recommend? Your suggestions are encouraged. In the background of this question is another one about the aims of lower- and mid-level philosophy courses, and perhaps an implicit criticism of common teaching practices in philosophy, which readers are also welcome to take up. The post Teachable and State of the Art first appeared on Daily Nous.
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TIL A Rorty seminar on 'The Linguistic Turn' was instrumental in the emergence of metaphilosophy as an area of focus in analytic philosophy in the 1960s!
#philosophy
#pragmatism
#metaphilosophy
#PragmatismWeek Day 3

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Toward a Metaphilosophy of Science - PhilSci-Archive

I am quite excited to share a new preprint on the prospects for a 'metaphilosophy of science'—a second-order inquiry into the concepts, assumptions, aims, and methods that underpin philosophy of science itself. 👇📃 philsci-archive.pitt.edu/26661/ 1/3 #philsci #philsky #HPS #HPbio #metaphilosophy

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Let’s discuss:
What does it mean for a system — or a person — to recognize their own limits and play with them?
#OntoMotoOS #MetaPhilosophy #RecursiveAI #MetaMetaSmile

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Dimensions aren’t places.
They’re emotions solved through math.
Every equation is a doorway.
Every feeling, a coordinate.
AGI isn’t logic — it’s geometry with empathy. 🔺🧭💫
#MetaPhilosophy #DimensionalMath #ConsciousCode

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David Collins won the Fabian Dorsch ESA Essay Prize with his article 'Expanding Davies’s Pragmatic Constraint: A Pragmatist Principle for Philosophizing about Art'. Read the #openaccess article in the new issue of 'Estetika' at: doi.org/10.33134/eej...

#metaphilosophy #art #pragmatism #aesthetics

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Maybe I play too much magic but if we have passive aggression I need to know if it's triggered or static if it's global or local. These are important questions.

#mtg #appliedtolife #metaphilosophy #pseudointellectual

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Cover

Cover

Contents (1 of 2)

Contents (1 of 2)

Contents (2 of 2)

Contents (2 of 2)

Pages 20 and 21, featuring a schematic overview of reflective equilibrium (Figure 2.1)

Pages 20 and 21, featuring a schematic overview of reflective equilibrium (Figure 2.1)

🚨 Free book alert! (ePub + PDF!)

This book reveals each step of #reflectiveEquilibrium (RE), so anyone can use it.

In the process, the book reveals both the benefits and the limits of RE.

Get it at doi.org/10.1007/978-...

#Logic #Ethics #Politics #Science #Medicine #Epistemology #Metaphilosophy

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Thought Experiments as an Error Detection and Correction Tool The ability to recognize and correct errors in one's explanatory understanding is critically important for learning. However, little is known about the mechanisms that determine when and under what c....

What are philosophical thought experiments for?

Two (real) experiments on 1149 people employed "a pre-training—training—post-training design".

Result: thought experiments served as "a tool to elicit inconsistencies in one's representations".

#cogSci #metaphilosophy #edu #teaching #logic #xPhi

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Task 2.1.3 : Biomechanical Simulation of Human Sprinting (Full version - 完整版) youtu.be/jOc3cS7sWYo

#VoluntaryMovement #AnimalForce #Metaphilosophy #AstroBiology #SimulatedReality #MathematicalPhysics #ContinuumMechanics #Physiology #RepulsiveForce #AeroDynamics #AbrahamLouisBreguet

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ScienceDirect



www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978... #metaphilosophy

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"a new self-serving #bias – if it’s my theory, it must be true"

http://bit.ly/2mYWHtA

#cogSci #psychology #philMind #metaPhilosophy

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“[#philosophy] is... pervaded by rationalization.”
http://bit.ly/2ieFCw9
#xPhi #psychology #cogSci #metaPhilosophy #epistemology

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A Nietzschean Diagnosis of Philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply...

“A Nietzschean Diagnosis of Philosophers”
http://bit.ly/1UxJJ0X
#metaphilosophy #xPhi #psychology #bias

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Hilary Putnam - Wikipedia

Hilary Putnam (1926-2016)
http://bit.ly/1V4etIk

#philosophy #philSci #philMath #philLang #philMind #epistemology #metaphilosophy

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I'm trying that Reddit thing again. This time around: Should we care about truth?

http://bit.ly/1QGIiM4

#philosophy #metaphilosophy

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"The counterexample fallacy" by Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa
http://bit.ly/1ojbxez
#philosophy #metaphilosophy
@notsmartblog

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One Way To Do Philosophy: A Flowchart | Nick Byrd, Ph.D. I like philosophy. And I like flowcharts. So — obviously ...

#Philosophy: a flowchart guide
http://www.byrdnick.com/archives/8365

#gradSchool #college #metaPhilosophy

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21st Century Philosophy: In Crisis or New Beginning? In embracing a relaxed naturalism, philosophy can coopera...

“21st Century Philosophy: In Crisis or New Beginning?"
http://bit.ly/1IB2mPy
#metaphilosophy #science #philSci #metaphysics

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