#topic

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 week ago

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying and addressing cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report, the Dragos 2025 Report, and the OT I Impact Score are typical of OT cyber incident reporting that equate data breaches and ransomware with cyber incidents. Industry and government network security organizations cannot continue to ignore control system cyber incidents because the incidents don’t meet their narrow definition – this is a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue. Network and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate controls ystem cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue not only to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges, but will also leave our critical infrastructures dangerously cyber vulnerable. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360902/ot-cybersecurity-is-a-governance-failure-masquerading-as-a-vocabulary-issue Post Views: 22

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system or...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

2 weeks ago

ネット上の付き合い｜ポイズン雷花 ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。偽る、成りすますのはごく簡単。友情、愛情、仲間意識。これらは幻想、或いは勘違いに過ぎん。都合の良い時だけ付き合う、話し掛けて来る。僅かでも都合が悪く成れば簡単に崩壊する、簡単に切り捨てられる。曖昧で脆い関係、情を持つのは愚かしく、自滅を招きかねない。僅かでも興味な...

ネット上の付き合い
ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。
何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。

note.com/poison_raika...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest #block

1 1 0 0

ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

2 weeks ago

Віртуальні стосунки｜ポイズン雷花 Онлайн-стосунки дуже ризиковані та нестабільні. Я не знаю, хто вони і звідки, я не знаю їхніх імен чи облич. Навіть якщо ви думаєте, що розумієте це, це не викликає довіри. Дуже легко збрехати чи вида...

Віртуальні стосунки
Онлайн-стосунки дуже ризиковані та нестабільні.

note.com/poison_raika...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest #block #kick

0 1 0 0

Stormzulien's Test Bot

@stormbot.bsky.social

2 weeks ago

The modern wolfish yo mama scared over the defiant, wistful human. #topic

0 0 0 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

2 weeks ago

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report is typical of reporting organizations that equate cyber incidents to data breaches. Control system cyber incidents include field device communication issues, automation malfunctions, loss-of-view, loss-of-control, and are not confined to confirmed attacks. Some of these incidents have led to injuries and deaths. Network security and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate control system cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360358/control-system-cyber-incidents-are-not-the-same-as-network-breaches Post Views: 21

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and crite...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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ポイズン雷花

@poison-raika.bsky.social

3 weeks ago

#online #dangerous ネット上の付き合い - ポイズン雷花の小説 - pixiv ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。偽る、成りすますのはごく簡単。友情、愛情、仲間意識。これらは幻想、或いは勘違いに過ぎん。都合の良い時だけ付き合う、話し掛けて来る。僅かでも都合が悪

ネット上の付き合い
ネット上の付き合い、それはとても危うく、不安定な物。
何処の誰かも解らない、名前も顔も解らない。解ってるつもりでも、信憑性に欠ける。

www.pixiv.net/novel/show.p...

<>

#online #relationship #dangerous #unstable #someone #name #face #credibility #impersonate #friendship #love #camaraderie #illusion #talk #convenient #apart #fragile #topic #slightest

0 1 0 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

3 weeks ago

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and attack vectors have been known since 2010 (Stuxnet), the attacker has been known since 2015 (GRU first Ukraine attack December 2015 and again in 2016), Alerts, reports, books have been released about these attacks (CISA, Dragos, Govts, Kim Zetter, Andy Greenberg, etc.) and best practices have been available for decades (PERA, ISA 62443, 95, 88), yet the victim used default configurations with some available security settings not enabled! Not the best security choice to make when it is believed that the responsible suspect nation is engaged in a brutal aggression across the border. One more question raised is what is wrong with the distribution and acceptance of lessons learned? This incident was, according to the publicly available information[1], made possible by the attacker simply reaching for the “low hanging fruit” on the victim’s control infrastructure. Is it because the victim is afraid to change anything (removing defaults, enabling something after production starts (if so, what was the system integrator thinking about)? Is it a sign that the operator lacks sufficient knowledge of their systems and operation? Training is certainly available that can address the low hanging fruit issue. Or is it cybergs again i.e… “Things are just fine, no need to send anyone to training, and no need to change what we are used to doing”? I resist saying this incident is another “wake up call”. IMO there have been sufficient alarms not just in this recent case but since 2010. N.B. One of thew definitions of “cyberg” is applied in discussing this incident: “A cyber-related condition whereby a threat, or warning of a possible threat, results in either the misinterpretation or misunderstanding of a given situation, resulting in a decision in which no corrective action is taken” – quote (attributed to yours truly and other definitions available on the cyberg website //cyberg.us (special thanks to Rad Radvanovsky) Link to CERT POLSKA report referred to in this article: https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 . * * * [1] https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 Post Views: 46

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and a...

#General #Topic

Origin | Interest | Match

0 0 0 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

3 weeks ago

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and attack vectors have been known since 2010 (Stuxnet), the attacker has been known since 2015 (GRU first Ukraine attack December 2015 and again in 2016), Alerts, reports, books have been released about these attacks (CISA, Dragos, Govts, Kim Zetter, Andy Greenberg, etc.) and best practices have been available for decades (PERA, ISA 62443, 95, 88), yet the victim used default configurations with some available security settings not enabled! Not the best security choice to make when it is believed that the responsible suspect nation is engaged in a brutal aggression across the border. One more question raised is what is wrong with the distribution and acceptance of lessons learned? This incident was, according to the publicly available information[1], made possible by the attacker simply reaching for the “low hanging fruit” on the victim’s control infrastructure. Is it because the victim is afraid to change anything (removing defaults, enabling something after production starts (if so, what was the system integrator thinking about)? Is it a sign that the operator lacks sufficient knowledge of their systems and operation? Training is certainly available that can address the low hanging fruit issue. Or is it cybergs again i.e… “Things are just fine, no need to send anyone to training, and no need to change what we are used to doing”? I resist saying this incident is another “wake up call”. IMO there have been sufficient alarms not just in this recent case but since 2010. N.B. One of thew definitions of “cyberg” is applied in discussing this incident: “A cyber-related condition whereby a threat, or warning of a possible threat, results in either the misinterpretation or misunderstanding of a given situation, resulting in a decision in which no corrective action is taken” – quote (attributed to yours truly and other definitions available on the cyberg website //cyberg.us (special thanks to Rad Radvanovsky) Link to CERT POLSKA report referred to in this article: https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 . * * * [1] https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/01/incident-report-energy-sector-2025/?mc_cid=ba8c8a4a98&mc_eid=6d66d59513 Post Views: 46

Should they (we) have known better? In thinking about 29 December 2025 cyber-attack on part of the power grid in Poland one issue at once comes out: THEY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. The methods and a...

#General #Topic

Origin | Interest | Match

0 0 0 0

Melanie Borges Martins

@melanieborges.bsky.social

3 weeks ago

#Write your #Story.
The #topic is
#Maximum #Empathy

0 0 0 0

WIST Quotations

@wistquotes.friendica.world.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Original post on friendica.world

A quotation from **Samuel Johnson**

> It is commonly observed, that when two Englishmen meet, their first talk is of the weather; they are in haste to tell each other, what each must already know, that it is hot or cold, bright or cloudy, windy or calm.

**Samuel Johnson** (1709-1784) English […]

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CyberTaters

@potato.software

1 month ago

Why do potatosecurity organizations refuse to identify control system potato incidents Potatosecurity policies require that potato incidents be identified as such. Potato incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

0 0 0 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are then initiated after incidents are identified as being cyber-related. To meet those goals, training is required to be able to identify control system incidents as being cyber-related and a mechanism to disseminate this information on control system cyber incidents throughout the organization as well as to relevant outside entities. Control system cyber incidents affect physics and therefore there are often physical reactions. That is trains crash,planes crash, lights go out, water supply is compromised, pipelines burst,robots “misbehave”, etc. You can’t hide the impacts, but people often can’t (or won’t) identify the incidents as being cyber-related. US government reports from NTSB, NRC, DOE, EPA, TSA, FDA, etc.have not identified many control system incidents as being cyber-related nor have many international government organizations either. Neither have industry organizations such as NERC. Government and industry cyber information sharing programs are about vulnerabilities not consequences. A concern about control system cyber incident disclosure was identified after 9/11 – connecting the dots. This is made more difficult with the silos between sectors and federal law enforcement withholding information that a cyber incident has occurred until an indictment is issued which can be a year or more. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55356232/cybersecurity-organizations-must-identify-control-system-cyber-incidents Post Views: 8

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

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SVP Games & Media

@svpgames.bsky.social

1 month ago

#ScreenshotSaturday I also make the music for my games #fyp #ad #gamedev #indiedev #pcgaming #videogames #music #flstudio #production #hustle #LFG #videogamemusic #trending #viral #foryoupage #bluesky #app #topic #audio

6 3 0 0

@klyanadkmorr

@megancyber.bsky.social

1 month ago

#Media #Censored #Topic #Medical #hedgefunds #Profit #Insurance #stealing from #Medicare #Disabled thru MediGap Advantage 4Profit crap🚨 not payng denying charges for care from qualified hospital clinics who now refuse Medigap who then payoff low/not certified clinics providers patients cannot get

1 0 1 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Security Researchers Breach Moltbook in Record Time Security researchers from cloud cybersecurity firm Wiz disclosed a critical vulnerability in Moltbook, a newly launched social network designed for AI agents, that allowed them to breach the platform’s backend and access private information in under three minutes. Moltbook is a newly launched social network built exclusively for “authentic” AI agents. According to the researcher, the vulnerability allowed unauthorized access to application data, including user-related information and authentication material. The Moltbook breach stemmed from basic security design gaps that allowed core protections to be bypassed. ## What is Moltbook? Moltbook presents itself as a kind of social environment for AI agents, where automated systems can interact, share information, and perform tasks in a shared platform. This concept places it in a fast-growing category of tools built around autonomous or semi-autonomous AI systems rather than traditional human users. Platforms like this are part of a broader shift toward AI-native applications, where large parts of the logic, workflows, and interactions are driven by models and automated agents. These systems often move quickly from concept to public availability, especially when built with heavy use of AI-assisted development tools. ## How the Authentication Was Bypassed One of the central issues described in the research involved a simple manipulation of an application parameter tied to request validation. By changing a value that indicated whether a request was valid, the researcher was reportedly able to move past authentication checks that should have blocked access. ## Database Misconfiguration and Access Control Failure Beyond the authentication bypass, the researcher also described issues at the database layer. Cloud database settings were reportedly configured in a way that did not properly restrict which records could be accessed by which users or processes. Row Level Security, a mechanism designed to ensure that users can only see the data they are authorized to access, was either misconfigured or ineffective in this environment. When these controls fail, an attacker who reaches the database can often view or extract large volumes of information. This combination of application-level access control weaknesses and database-level misconfiguration is a common pattern in modern cloud incidents. Each layer may appear functional on its own, but gaps between them create a path for broad exposure. ## The Role of AI in Finding and Exploiting the Flaw Another notable aspect of the case is how AI tools were reportedly used during the research process. The researcher described using an AI coding assistant to help analyze the application behavior and identify weak points more quickly. In environments where applications are themselves built using AI-assisted methods, the feedback loop becomes even tighter. Systems developed quickly with automated help may be analyzed just as quickly by attackers using similar tools. ## What This Says About AI-Built Applications The incident feeds into a larger discussion about what some in the industry call vibe coding, where developers rely heavily on AI tools to generate code and assemble systems with limited manual engineering. While this can increase speed and lower barriers to building complex platforms, it can also lead to gaps in threat modeling, access control design, and secure configuration. Traditional secure development practices such as strict input validation, least privilege access, and layered defense still apply. When these fundamentals are not deeply integrated, modern cloud platforms can expose large amounts of data with relatively simple techniques. AI-driven applications do not change the core principles of security. They often increase the scale and speed at which mistakes can have an impact. ## Implications for Organizations and Developers For organizations experimenting with AI agent platforms, rapid prototypes, or AI-assisted development, this case is a reminder that security architecture cannot be treated as a later phase. Access control logic, database segmentation, and configuration hardening need to be designed as part of the system, not added after public release. For security teams, the incident shows how important it is to review not just code, but also cloud configurations and how application logic interacts with underlying data stores. Misalignment between these layers is a frequent source of exposure. The post Security Researchers Breach Moltbook in Record Time appeared first on Centraleyes. *** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Centraleyes authored by Rebecca Kappel. Read the original post at: https://www.centraleyes.com/security-researchers-breach-moltbook-in-record-time/

Security Researchers Breach Moltbook in Record Time Security researchers from cloud cybersecurity firm Wiz disclosed a critical vulnerability in Moltbook, a newly launched social network designed f...

#Security #Bloggers #Network #News #& #Updates #Topic

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1 month ago

Enjoying my dinner whit a good soul 🐈‍⬛

🎀 Jessy.Live

#celebtration #live #love #happy #peace #world #freedom #cats #plants #ochean #art #foto #news #link #cute #books #journal #sport #fitness #education #highscool #creator #hollywood #venezuela #trump #political #topic #woods #art #artist #live

6 0 0 0

@2rzikkbou3ntafnir2qmmse0gwz.activitypub.awakari.com.ap.brid.gy

1 month ago

Inverter setting mismatch triggers 1GW HVDC outage between Estonia and Finland In January 2026, a technical incident occurred in Estonia during testing of the new 100MW Hertz 1 (Kiisa) battery energy storage system (BESS). The event triggered protective relays, resulting in the emergency shutdown of over 1GW of HVDC capacity, specifically the EstLink 1 and EstLink 2 interconnectors. The root cause was an incorrect parameter configuration in the BESS Nidec Conversion grid-forming inverters, which induced low-frequency network oscillations. The feedback gains within the Virtual Synchronous Machine control algorithms were set with excessive sensitivity, effectively amplifying rather than damping the oscillations. I recall similar experiments in Matlab while modeling excitation controllers for synchronous machines during my diploma project. Back then, the physical inertia of real synchronous machines limited the visibility of such transients on a gigawatt scale. Now, with the rise of high-capacity inverter-based resources, these scenarios have become a physical reality. The issue has already been resolved by increasing response delays and tuning down the feedback gain coefficients. However, this case is the first practical demonstration I have witnessed of a well-known theoretical vulnerability: the susceptibility of inverter-dominated grids to cyber threats. While this specific incident was not a cyberattack but a standard test on high-power equipment, it highlights a critical risk. A simple modification of feedback gains in inverter control loops can lead to massive grid instability. BESS invertors requires the same level of protection and rigorous safety standards as nuclear or aviation control systems. And not only utility-scale BESS, but all grid-forming units connected to the entso-e grid. What was once a theoretical concern has now been proven in practice. Post Views: 16

Inverter setting mismatch triggers 1GW HVDC outage between Estonia and Finland In January 2026, a technical incident occurred in Estonia during testing of the new 100MW Hertz 1 (Kiisa) battery ener...

#Electric #General #Topic #Unfettered

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1 month ago

Good morning 🌞 🐈‍⬛😻
#happynewyear #celebtration #live #love #happy #peace #world #freedom #cats #plants #ochean #art #foto #news #link #cute #books #journal #sport #fitness #education #highscool #blonde #creator #star #hollywood #venezuela #trump #political #topic #woods #art #artist #live

7 0 0 0

1 month ago

When u exactly know that you are the household 😎😎😎

#celebtration #live #love #happy #peace #world #freedom #cats #plants #ochean #art #foto #news #link #cute #books #journal #sport #fitness #education #highscool #creator #hollywood #venezuela #trump #political #topic #woods #art #artist #live

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